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Somatechnics suggests the possibility of radically different ways of relating 
embodied subjectivity to the environment, […] somatechnics demands, too, a re-
evaluation and reframing of ethics of the proper regard for the interrelationship 
between other, self, and world. It raises anew the hoary questions of agency and 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The	daimon	connects	also	to	the – in Wynter’s term – demonic grounds outside 
of the polis (Wynter 1990). These grounds are not only the place for silencing 
and erasure, but also recuperate the possibility for proliferation of logos, 





















































































































































dominated”	(Lugones	2005,	87). While citizens make sense of themselves 
through subjecting to the functioning of the monological order, dominated 
‘others’ find themselves socially positioned: put in place – so to speak. The 
fields of force of the monological order sustain one-dimensional spaces to 
deflect multilogical engagement. A binary ordering retains the dysselection of 
outsiders by ascribing citizens a monological frame of reference that orders 
their understandings as loyal to the state. The demonic grounds outside of the 
polis offer the space for the emergence and proliferation of logos and mythos, 
through multilogical engagement, making new forms of life.  
	Juxtaposing	a	universal	‘silenced	ground’	of	‘	white	western	womanhood’	as	the	
silence	in	the	centre	of	the	polis	with	the	silencing	of	black	women,	Wynter	
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claims	the	perspective	out	of	view	as	‘demonic	grounds’	(Wynter	1990,	355).	
This	double	erasure	runs	not	only	along	gendered	lines,	but	is	also	racialised,	and	
pushes	the	black	woman	out	of	a	legible	frame	of	reference	as	a	function	of	the	
system.	This	specific	mode	of	social	causality,	which	the	topos	of	race	prescribes	
as	teleology	in	the	dominant	system	of	meaning	(Wynter	1990,	357).	“The	
variable	of	race/racial	difference	is	[…]	destiny”	(ibid.).	This	coding	of	difference	
is	claimed	as	mapping	onto	physiognomy	and	anatomy	leading	to	the	
naturalisation	of	hierarchy	(Wynter	1990,	358ff).	Racialised	codings	lead	to	the	
extraction	of	cultural	production,	labour,	and	territory.	This	‘stablised	form	of	
life’	(Wynter	1990,	362)	signals	attribution	of	behaviour,	motivations,	and	
possible	dynamic	change.	For	instance,	as	Parisi	and	Terranova	suggest,	the	shift	
from	disciplinary	logic	to	turbulent	logic	is	merely	a	shift	in	form,	if	dominant	
codifications	do	not	get	altered.	Increased	complexity	means	that	further	
expansion	and	extraction	can	take	place	(Parisi	and	Terranova	2000,	9,	10).	The	
underlying	logic	remains	intact	but	new	forms	open	up	new	places	for	extraction	
in	line	with	established	hierarchies.	Wynter	unearths	in	a	reading	of	the	Tempest	
how	black	women	are	conceptualised	as	having	no	will	or	desire	(Wynter	1990,	
363)	because	these	attributes	are	irrelevant	in	the	imposed	system	of	
exploitation.	Wynter	explains:	
	
[g]iven	that	the	idealization/negation	of	both	groups	is	effected	precisely	by	the	
dominant	group’s	imposition	of	its	own	mode	of	volition	and	desire	(one	
necessarily	generated	from	the	raison	d’etre	of	its	group	–	existential	interests)	
upon	the	dominated;	as	well	as	by	stable	enculturating	of	the	latter	by	means	of	
its	theoretical	models	(epistemes)	and	aesthetic	fields,	generated	from	its	
increasingly	hegemonic	and	secularizing	system	of	meanings	(Wynter	1990,	
363).	
	
The	monological	ordering	of	the	world	creates	a	space	outside	of	its	system	of	
thought	that	is	outside	of	its	space	of	perception.	The	monological	order	literally	
cannot	see	the	space	it	shaped,	as	it	exists	entirely	outside	of	the	projection	and	
inscription,	and	the	monological	order	has	no	techne	or	coding	for	interaction	
available,	because	the	raison	d’etre	for	the	projected	wall	is	to	enable	primary	
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and	purely	extraction	and	exploitation.	This	‘demonic	ground’	–	as	imposition	of	
silence,	is	removed	from	the	‘universal’	silence	of	the	centre	exactly	by	the	
barrier	of	racialization	–	(white/normative)	women	are	silent	at	the	heart	of	the	
polis,	where	Black	(nonnormative)	women	are	coded	as	absent	or	unnoticed	
(Lugones	2003,	71;	McKittrick	2006,	121).		
	
I	will	return	here	shortly	to	trans,	not	only	as	coding	for	the	possibility	of	
disruption	of	categorical	enclosure	(Stryker	2008b,	1;	Bey	2017,	276),	but	also	as	
that	other	meaning	‘transgender’.	To	read	trans	as	part	of	the	demonic	is	not	
accidental.	Since	trans	has	in	the	normative	imagery	no	capacity	for	
reproduction,	and	therefore	the	category	flags	dysselection	as	well	as	
disposability	(Stryker	1994).	The	plea	for	life	in	the	polis	might	run	through	the	
promise	of	perpetuation	of	the	dominating	logos,	for	instance	by	making	the	plea	
of	productivity	in	the	workplace	(Irving	2008,	159).	It	could	be	argued	that	the	
trans	liberal	practice	aims	at	access	to	the	force	fields	of	the	dominant	
monological	order.	Unironically,	this	trans	liberal	project	goes	by	the	name	of	
‘inclusion’	(Raha	2015;	van	der	Drift	2016).	However,	both	the	trans	liberal	
project,	as	well	as	a	project	of	nonnormative	ethics	are	contrasted	by	the	
normative	practice	of	forced	sterilisation,	for	instance	of	trans	people,	but	also	of	
people	with	disabilities.	Gender	clinics	still	work	with	a	pathology	that	projects	
the	desire	for	dysselection	into	the	trans	agent	(Benjamin	1954;	EU-FRA	2014).	
This	projection	is	claimed	as	trans’	own	will,	and	it	is	this	pathology	that	assigns	
the	trans	agent	a	degraded	social	position	(Stryker	1994).	This	somatechnical	
dysselection	lays	claim	to	the	soul,	the	body,	and	the	social	marker	of	the	trans	
agent,	expelling	them	onto	the	demonic	grounds	of	silenced	projection,	
naturalised	dysselection,	as	pathologising	impetus.	However,	if	racialization	is	
tied	into	this	analysis	the	codings	flag	an	increased	jeopardy	of	aggressive	action	
upon	the	trans	body	(Raha	2017;	Bey	2017;	Krell	2017;	Stanley	2011).	
Nonnormative	ethics	as	trans	project	departs	from	trans	liberalism	and	makes	
the	case	for	a	negation	of	the	dominant	order,	and	claims	its	place	on	the	
demonic	grounds	outside	of	the	polis,	not	only	as	constitutional,	but	also	as	
starting	point	for	a	vector	of	re-coding	meaning	and	logos.	This	argument	for	the	
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demonic	grounds	as	starting	point	is	expanded	upon	by	Alexander	Weheliye	
(2014),	which	I	will	turn	to	in	chapter	four.			
	
While	the	coding	of	the	monological	order	is	done	both	through	epistemic	
models,	aesthetical	fields,	as	well	as	somatechnical	applications	(Glissant	1989;	
Feinberg	1992b;	Stryker	1994;	Wadiwel	2009),	ensuring	replication	and	
consolidation	of	the	hermeneutic	field	of	meaning	(Wynter	1990,	364),	the	space	
outside	of	the	polis	is	open	to	de-coding	and	re-coding.	The	‘demonic	models’	
have	already	conceived	of	“a	vantage	point	outside	of	the	space-time	orientation	
of	the	[…]	observer”	(ibid.).	The	breaking	of	the	code	cannot	happen	from	inside	
of	the	monological	order,	and	thus	the	demonic	ground	becomes	the	space	par	
excellence	for	the	disruption	of	the	systemic	definitional	behavioural	patternings	
(ibid.).	As	McKittrick	argues,	the	workings	of	demonic	systems	have	
indeterminate	outcomes,	“because	the	organising	schema	cannot	predict	the	
future”	(McKittrick	2006,	xxiv).	I	return	here	shortly	to	flag	up	the	interstitial	
bridge	away	from	dominating	norms	that	Anzaldúa	proposed.	The	formation	of	a	
new	mythos	as	code	of	behavioural	sensibilities	necessarily	came	with	the	
constitution	of	a	new	practical	truth.	Truth	is	tied	into	predication:	the	
affirmation	or	denial	of	parts	of	an	argument.	While	discussed	in	chapter	two,	as	
the	shifting	practical	truth	of	ensouled	formation,	truth	can	be	seen	to	stabilise	a	
changing	world,	and	thus	claim	these	are	clear.	In	contrast,	openness	to	second	
order	emergence	needs	indeterminacy	in	order	for	the	possibility	of	new	
evaluations	to	arise.	The	problem	with	the	monological	order	is	not	that	it	is	
organisationally	static	–	as	factory	discipline	would	presuppose	–	the	problem	is	
that	it	is	dynamic	with	a	stable	logical	core,	unable	to	halt	its	entitlement	to	
extraction,	yet	able	to	adapt	to	new	forms.	This	means	that	the	monological	
order	can	change	code	but	not	form,	as	the	core	value	of	entitlement	to	
extraction	needs	to	remain	stable.	Nonnormative	ethics	is	structured	by	loss,	
which	translates	in	to	the	willingness	to	suspend	practical	truth,	in	order	to	
allow	new	mutual	forms	to	emerge.	I	will	discuss	this	further	in	chapter	four,	and	
argue	that	willingness	to	change	practices,	signals	a	willingness	to	emerge	with	
new	truths,	which	creates	the	space	for	indeterminacy.		
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The	emergence	of	new	forms	of	meaning	needs	multilogical	truths,	both	to	break	
out	of	domination/subjection	model,	but	also	to	allow	for	the	proliferation	of	
practical	exploration.	Experimentation	of	new	forms	of	life	and	patterns	of	
meaning	needs	to	be	practical	due	to	the	previous	finding	that	connection	
between	agents	cannot	be	presupposed	through	an	overarching	principle.	
Subsequently,	a	space	to	connect,	to	play,	to	move	that	has	not	yet	been	overtly	
structured	is	necessary	in	order	to	have	connective	codes	emerging.	This	space	is	
demonic	allowing	for	the	possibility	of	emergence	of	new	technes	or	codes,	and	
thus	unpredictable	futures.	In	response	to	Wynter,	da	Silva	urges	to	question	
how	we	come	up	with	answers	to	the	questions	of	who	we	are	(da	Silva	2015,	
104).	This	development	of	new	models	of	questioning	aligns	with	the	creation	of	
new	technes	of	self	understanding	and	relationality	(van	der	Drift	forthcoming).	
Furthermore	these	technes	and	codings	should	emerge	outside	of	the	realm	of	
established	use	(Da	Silva	2014,	82),	in	order	to	keep	making	space.	As	argued	in	
chapter	two,	this	needs	a	model	that	emphasises	first	order	emergence,	before	
second	order	emergence,	as	it	places	both	the	disruption	of	the	dispositional	
order	contained	in	the	agent	at	the	front,	as	well	as	emphasises	practical	
engagement	before	theoretical	procedure,	in	order	to	avoid	centralising	pre-
existing	answers.	This	does	not	mean	a	tabula	rasa	of	practices,	it	means,	as	I’ve	
argued	in	chapter	two,	a	recoding	in	praxis,	but	negation	of	orders.	This	changes	
the	time	assessment	within	the	operation	from	the	future	–	when	the	theory	can	
be	implemented,	to	the	present:	the	possibility	of	generating	new	forms	in	space.		
	
Lugones	operational	model	of	tactical-strategies	explicitly	folds	first	and	second	
order	emergence	into	the	practical	present	(Lugones	2003,	208).	The	dual	
perspectives	of	tactical	resistance	and	strategic	alliances,	envisions	in	close	
conjunction	with	epistemic	ordering	of	knowledge	and	codes	of	situated	
meaning.	The	double	negation	of	the	practical	present	allows	for	the	“end	of	the	
world	as	we	know	it”	(Da	Silva	2016,	59,	cf.	2014),	while	simultaneously	nudging	
re-coding	as	agential	activity	by	its	indeterminate	affirmation	in	action.	As	the	
discussion	in	chapter	two	has	shown,	there	is	no	de-coding	without	re-coding,	
and	dispositions	need	to	be	undone	by	being	redone	(Lugones	2003,	55;	
Williams	1985).		
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Returning	to	some	elements	of	the	above	discussion,	especially	loss	and	
playfulness,	Lugones’	hang	out	space	(Lugones	2003,	220)	is	important	as	it	tries	
to	undo	the	pressure	of	fields	of	force	of	the	dominant	order.	The	above	
conclusion	that	this	dominant	order	necessarily	creates	spaces	that	it	cannot	
perceive,	returns	here	in	new	form.	As	discussed	in	chapter	two,	agents	are	in	
processes	forming	logos	coming	with	a	practical	truth,	which	entails	that	in	a	
non-dominated	multilogical	space	there	is	no	access	to	intentionality.	Intentions	
are	emerging	from	different	logics,	and	not	through	assigned	social	positions	as	
the	monological	order	claims:	in	order	to	order.	Intentionality	needs	therefore	to	
be	elusive	and	be	able	to	flow	into	shared	space	as	Lugones	suggests.	Within	this	
emergence,	loss	and	playfulness	are	tools	for	navigating	the	negated	
containment,	letting	go,	and	rescripting	of	the	complex	collective	of	agents.				
	
The	space	for	hanging	out	of	“the	streetwalker”,	who	is	part	of	a	variety	of	
collectives,	is	thus	suggestive	of	localised	meanings,	situated	evaluations	as	
multilogical	emergence.	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	experienced	and	projected	
ascriptions	of	the	monological	order.	While	navigating	that	order	might	be	
situational,	as	its	fields	of	force	are	adaptive	around	a	static	core,	the	aim	of	the	
order	is	to	allow	the	emergence	of	a	set	of	agents	mirrored	through	their	
wielding	of	power	as	belonging	and	functional	within	the	polis.	It	is	the	wielding	
of	power,	more	than	an	internal	identity	that	forges	the	dominant,	monological	
agent	(Da	Silva	2009,	219).	Domination	enables	extraction	and	ease	of	passage	
through	space	(cf.	Enke	2012,	243).	The	friction	of	heated	bodies	in	the	polis	are	
subsequently	navigations	of	modulations	steering	the	polis	towards	singular	
ends.	Nonnormative	navigation	is	partly	functioning	through	camouflaging	of	its	
logic	and	emergent	collective	potentialities.	As	discussed	above,	da	Silva	
questions	the	grounding	of	the	question	of	who	we	are;	in	the	space	of	
multilogics	these	questions	are	sought	in	emergent	collective	practice	in	which	
indications	of	answers	find	various	vectors	of	expression.	Furthermore,	what	the	
coding	of	‘heated	bodies’	and	Wynter’s	term	‘master	code’	shows,	is	that	codes	do	
not	need	to	be	true	in	order	to	function.	The	intermittent	answers	to	relationality	
in	nonnormative	space	could	be	envisioned	as	pragmatic	techne	over	staking	
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truth	claims,	because	the	questioning	goes	on.	It	is	in	this	space	for	ongoing	
mutual	exploration	of	forms	that	underlines	it	is	ethics	above	epistemology	that	
shapes	the	entry	to	the	question.	In	chapter	four	I	will	go	deeper	in	this	material.	
In	sum,	nonnormative	ethics	is	not	about	the	epistemic	excavation	of	the	world	
through	practice,	but	about	emergent	relations	that	steer	forms	of	life	away	from	
exploitation	and	extraction,	which	only	seems	possible	away	from	the	
monological	functioning	of	the	polis.		
	
The	question	that	presents	itself	consequently,	is	to	the	structure	of	
nonnormative	worlds.	The	question	is	less	one	of	essentialism	–	a	question	to	the	
pure	core	of	a	group,	which	I	have	previously	discussed	this	in	this	chapter	–	but	
more	one	of	possibility	of	deviation	and	different	approaches	to	connection,	
interrelation	and	evaluations	(DiPietro	2016).	As	DiPietro	argues	language	use	is	
often	discussed	in	gender	and	sexuality	studies	as	“social	positioning	across	
power	differentials.	Seldom	do	they	encounter	languages	as	the	realities	that	
they	are	(Arteaga	1994)	and	what	they	contribute	to	the	study	of	social	
ontologies	or	the	understandings-meanings	of	the	basic	entities	of	our	realities”	
(DiPietro	2016,	68).	DiPietro	discusses	codes	in	language	as	connective	tissue	
and	linguistic	variation	as	inscribing	difference	based	on	class,	race,	and	locality.	
Mindful	of	the	globalising	normativities	encapsulated	in	nonnormative	terms	in	
other	localities,	DiPietro	draws	attention	to	the	operation	of	different	codings	in	
different	contexts,	even	when	deployed	by	agents	mixing	in	the	same	space.		
For	a	nonnormative	ethics,	DiPietro’s	insights	underline	not	to	conflate	code	and	
logic,	and	open	terms	for	a	myriad	of	uses.	This	ties	in	with	the	earlier	
observation	that	it	is	not	truth,	but	relationality	that	is	at	stake	in	nonnormative	
ethics,	and	further	that	codings	have	different	functions	within	the	same	space.	
To	specify;	logos	comes	with	practical	truth	structuring	perception	and	action,	
technes	are	the	modes	of	relation	between	agents,	and	codes	cue	in	positionality	
and	potentiality,	and	logic	is	the	internal	structure	of	forms	of	life.	While	a	logical	
kernel	is	not	necessary	to	connect	across	differences,	patterns	of	domination	
need	to	be	avoided;	otherwise	imposition	and	connection	are	conflated.	The	
absence	of	a	need	for	a	logical	kernel	in	emergent	forms	of	life,	subsequently	puts	
	 183	
multilogical	formation	forward	as	alternative	model	to	conceptions	based	on	
prefigured	commonality,	whether	that	is	identity,	or	shared	conceptions	on	how	
such	a	form	of	life	should	be	shaped,	which	includes	‘proper’	use	of	codes,	
masking	as	truth	–	in	epistemological	approaches	to	relational	coding,	as	is	for	
instance	discussed	by	Wynter.			
	
Wynter’s	task	of	breaking	the	code	returns	hereby	to	a	radical	root	of	not	
claiming	self-knowledge,	but	collective	generation	in	space	(Wynter	2003,	331).	
This	collectivity	can	only	be	emergent	if	it	“does	not	mythify	territorial	
enclosures	and	purities	of	peoples,	languages,	traditions”	(Lugones	2003,	220).	
Lugones’	proposes	that	change,	including	self-change	and	self-knowledge	is	
interactive	(Lugones	2003,	74).	This	interactivity	functions	within	a	plurality	
that	contains	multiple	logics	in	which	the	truth	that	one’s	being	animates	differs	
with	different	perceivers	(Lugones	2003,	73).	As	opposed	to	reading	differences	
as	constitutive	of	the	norm	(Wynter	1984,	47),	coming	with	a	dismissal	through	
which	the	norm	becomes	singular.	As	argued,	forms	of	life	outside	of	the	norm	
are	not	necessarily	proscribed	in	their	form	by	the	norm,	but	the	agents	within	
such	forms	will	receive	various	forms	of	maltreating	projections,	for	instance	
racism,	sexism,	colonialism,	that	proscribe	possible	“meaning”	to	an	agents’	
actions	(Lugones	2005,	86).	Lugones	articulates	forms	of	life	as	a	series	of	
connecting	worlds	that	function	necessarily	in	resistance	to	an	overarching	
norm,	while	not	being	internally	constituted	by	it.		
	
Lugones	connects	the	solitary	norm-disrupting	and	border-crossing	agent	to	the	
collective,	not	as	already	part	of	a	homogenous	whole	of	like-minded	souls,	but	
as	agent	forming	meaning	in	order	to	illicit	a	response	as	part	of	a	collective	
process	of	formation:		
As	I	understand	the	liberatory	project,	the	inner	and	the	collective	struggles	are	
not	separable;	they	are	“moments”	or	“sides”	of	the	liberatory	process.	[…]	The	
collective	struggle	backs	up,	makes	resistant	meaning-making	possible	as	
meaning-making	is	interactive.	The	conceiving	as	well	as	the	taking	up	and	
carrying	of	meaning	requires	a	collectivity,	however	disorganised	or	open-ended	
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that	collectivity	may	be	(Lugones	2005,	97).		
The	connection	between	inner	and	outer	is	readily	conceived	as	bundled	
navigation,	negating	norms	in	negotiation	with	collectives	against	dominant	
impositions.	Lugones’	‘hanging	out’	is	a	gathering	without	an	already	set	and	
practical	plan	of	action,	in	order	to	open	the	agents’	senses	to	transmutations	of	
borders	of	meaning	(Lugones	2003,	220).	Hanging	out	is	conceived	as	a	“tactical	
strategic	activity	that	informs	space	against	the	construal	of	bounded	territories	
that	mythologise	sameness”	(Lugones	2003,	220).	Especially	as	these	
collectivities	are	not	organised	around	the	idea	of	a	necessarily	connecting	norm,	
the	disorganisation	requires	attention	to	generosity	and	loss	in	order	not	to	
disperse	before	any	meaning	can	arise.	The	connective	code	of	the	polis	bases	its	
bonds	on	pre-established	similarity,	not	on	connections	across	difference.	The	
openness	hanging	out	carefully	holds	allows	for	differing	logos	to	come	together	
and	avoid	impositions	of	dominating	logics	(Lugones	2003,	224).	It	is	a	concrete	
practice	of	creating	and	engaging	with	meaning-making,	without	a	sense	of	
wholeness,	which	is	perceived	as	dangerous	and	intruding	fiction	(Lugones	
2003,	225).	This	bodily	being	in	space	generates	the	possibility	of	meaning	to	
emerge	from	the	spaces	in	between,	not	as	the	immediate	and	directed	
generation	of	political	heat,	but	as	the	possibility	of	an	emerging	action	
orientation	and	a	tactical-strategical	production	of	meaning	and	collective	
mythos.	That	this	mythos	is	not	directly	connected	to	each	singular	logos	(Sennett	
1995,	81)	makes	it	possible	to	find	connection	without	simplifying	each	agent	to	
the	aspiration	of	matching	a	collectively	imposed	norm.	The	absence	of	a	
presupposed	sense,	and	the	creation	of	meaning	as	call-and-response,	needs	a	
double	vision	of	the	agent.	“I	move	between	the	solitary	and	the	collectively	
social,	two	sides	of	resistance”	(Lugones	2003,	227).		
This	further	explains	the	somatechnical	operation	of	the	agent	as	resistant	
collective	navigation.	Understanding	this	practice	comes	now	with	a	qualitative	
nuance:	while	moving	away	from	oppressive	norms	requires	a	closing	off	or	
blocking	out,	which	is	similar	to	the	operation	of	technes	reducing	agents	to	
roles,	as	discussed	through	Derrida,	an	emergent	collective	form	requires	an	
opening-up.	The	space	between	agential	logos	comes	with	a	side	reminiscent	of	
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the	bodies	in	the	polis	“[t]he	knowing	is	from	within	our	bodies,	its	senses	felt	
from	within	when	sensing	the	outside;	the	imagination	open	to	sexual/social	
callings”	(Lugones	2005,	98).	Here	heat	generation	and	friction	come	together	in	
a	multiplicitous	meeting.	In	addition	this	meeting	comes	with	a	side	that	is	social,	
but	hesitant	resistance	against	“common	sense	and	the	power	of	simplification”	
(Lugones	2003,	228)	needed	to	not	presuppose	a	unity	that	will	allow	
monological	domination.	This	dual	working	is	theorised	by	Audre	Lorde	as	
generative,	as	much	as	creating	separation:		
	
Certainly	there	are	very	real	differences	between	us	of	race,	age,	and	sex.	But	it	is	
not	those	differences	between	us	that	are	separating	us.	It	is	rather	our	refusal	to	
recognise	those	differences,	and	to	examine	the	distortions	which	result	from	
our	misnaming	them	and	their	effects	upon	human	behaviour	and	expectation”	
(Lorde	1996,	163).		
	
In	Lorde’s	words	the	problem	lies	indeed	not	in	the	difference	between	agents,	
but	in	the	malforming	codifications	that	create	worlds	of	dominant	sense,	and	
subordinate	potential.	In	the	inverse	of	the	categorisation	lies	the	openness	to	
difference	as	a	form	of	dialogical	knowing	as	an	“poli-vocal	complexity	that	has	
anti-utopian	direction	to	the	future”	(Lugones	2003,	224).	This	way	difference	
becomes	not	an	insurmountable	barrier	(Lorde	1996,	163)	that	runs	as	deviance	
from	the	norm,	splitting	agents	through	unmatched	purity	(Lugones	2003,	143),	
but	can	work	as	tool	for	change.		
	
A	non-dominating	interaction	allows	for	the	creative	function	of	difference	in	our	
lives	(Lorde	1996,	159).	It	is	urgent	not	to	reduce	this	difference	as	an	arrogant	
perception	that	is	used	to	“graft	the	substance	of	another”	onto	ourselves,	what	
Lugones	terms	“abuse	without	identification”	(Lugones	2003,	80).	Non-
dominating	mutlilogical	interactions	need	to	be	approached	with	a	sense	of	
disunity	of	other	agents.	“Community	must	not	mean	a	shedding	of	our	
differences,	nor	the	pathetic	pretence	that	these	differences	do	not	exist”	(Lorde	
1996,	159).	To	conceive	such	a	relationality	of	difference	as	generative	and	not	in	
need	of	a	logic	of	control,	requires	an	ethics	of	pragmatic	and	turbulent	relation	
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(Parisi	and	Terranova	2000,	20),	which	furthermore	requires	the	generosity	to	
deal	with	disorganisation.	The	heat	generated	in	nonnormative	interaction	does	
not	come	with	a	pressure	valve	–	such	as	ostracising	–	but	leans	on	generosity	
and	loss	to	make	space	for	differences.	Collectives	are	generative	because	they	
come	with	differing	operational	logics	creating	unknown,	and	anti-utopian,	
emerging	forms	of	life.	The	ensouled	body	changes	form	and	generates	thereby	
new	practical	truths.	These	truths	propel	insights	in	new	forms	of	relation,	and	
the	intertwined	renewing	interactions	between	agents	can	create	new	forms	of	
life.	An	ensouled	body	have	new	capabilities	when	not	caught	in	a	single	grid	of	
ordering	reason.		
	
The	formation	of	agential	logos	finds	effect	in	the	daimon	that	is	seen	by	the	
agent’s	surroundings,	but	not	by	the	agent	themselves.	Not	only	does	this	explain	
Lugones’	animation	of	codes	in	other	worlds,	but	it	also	gives	shape	to	the	
collective	processes	an	agent	is	engaged	in.	“If	rebellion	and	creation	are	
understood	as	processes,	rather	than	as	isolated	acts,	then	each	act	of	solitary	
rebellion	and	creation	is	anchored	in,	responsive	to,	and	looks	for	a	response	
from	a	collective,	even	if	disorganized,	process	of	resistance”	(Lugones	2005,	97).	
This	does	not	mean	that	the	formation	of	the	daimon	happens	in	collectives	that	
are	sympathetic	to	the	agent,	but	that	the	formation,	while	contextual,	does	not	
need	to	mimetically	follow	available	forms.	An	agent	does	not	need	to	copy,	while	
still	being	responsive	to,	or	with	its	surroundings.	Logos	informs	practical	truth,	
it	can	only	emerge	as	meaning	through	a	mutual	and	interdependent	process	of	
formation.		“Meaning	that	is	not	in	response	to	and	looking	for	response	fails	as	
meaning”	(Lugones	2005,	97).	These	collective	codings	can	suggest	techne	in	the	
further	formation	of	nonnormative	agents.	While	normative	eudaimonia	appears	
meaningful	in	dominant	codifications,	nonnormative	forms	of	life	are	resistant	to	
existing	categorisation,	but	also	nurture	new	codes.	The	interactivity	of	
somatechnical	change	and	the	formation	of	forms	of	life	suggests	that	changing	
one’s	body	changes	one’s	world	as	practical	truth	shifts.	This	shift	allows	for	a	
further	fluctuation	of	interdependent	and	interactive	emergent	logics,	that	as	
long	as	they	can	resist	unification	and	purification,	leave	agents	with	an	open-
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ended	formative	possibility.	The	body	remains	central	in	propelling	these	new	
formations.		
	 	
	
Ends,	Means,	and	the	Diamond	of	Form	
	
Up	until	here	I	have	laid	out	the	argument	that	bodily	change	is	underlying	
emergent	collectivities.	Nonnormative	formation	of	logos	allows	for	emergent	
relations	away	from	the	confined	positionality	of	the	polis.	Daimons	perceived	on	
demonic	grounds	lend	connection	beyond	projected	codifications.		
Nonnormative	formation	emerging	away	from	the	enclosure	of	the	polis	opens	
the	possibility	for	multilogical	connection	situating	loss	and	generosity	as	parts	
of	the	process	of	making	space.	The	projections	of	power	encapsulate	these	
grounds	in	static	imagery,	locating	the	agents	in	presupposed	positions.	The	
monological	order	of	the	polis	cannot	perceive	the	space	of	multilogics	except	as	
space	for	extraction	(Da	Silva	2014,	82)	and	enclosed	territory	(McKittrick	2006,	
135);	the	spaces	of	commodification	of	life	into	the	maximum	extraction	through	
slavery	and	lands	as	terra	nullius	ready	to	be	laid	waste.		
	
The	multilogical	nonnormative	complex	collectivities	emerge	from	a	modus	
operandi	that	can	situate	adaption	as	loss	that	is	generative.	To	lose	a	part	of	
one’s	logos	is	to	make	the	space	for	connection,	which	allows	for	new	mythos	of	
relation.	This	new	emerging	forms	are	not	a	negotiation	with	the	present	
monologic,	but	skirting	under	the	radar	of	projections	it	aims	at	connection	
divergent	from	powerful	ordering	of	the	dominant	singular	regime.	I	have	
proposed	change	is	not	a	spontaneous	combustion	of	new	possibilities,	but	
crafted	relationality	that	presupposes	mutual	difference	and	disordered	
connection.	Because	of	these	commitments	it	is	necessary	to	stay	out	of	a	theory	
that	calls	for	a	tabula	rasa	in	possible	nonnormative	interaction	and	emergent	
techne	(Lugones	2003,	217)	as	it	forecloses	formation	and	agential	history.	
Cherríe	Moraga	suggest	that	“[m]aybe	one	of	the	greatest	damages	white	
feminism	did	to	women	was	to	convince	us	of	our	own	victimization	without	at	
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the	same	time	requiring	us	to	acknowledge	our	complicity	in	oppression	and	the	
ways	in	which	we,	ourselves,	oppress”(Moraga	2011,	59).	Relapsing	in	the	
silence	at	the	centre	of	the	polis,	its	universal	womanhood	was	unwilling	to	
acknowledge	logics	outside	of	the	walls.	A	nonnormative	ethics	is	only	possible	
by	acknowledging	which	parts	of	oneself	one	has	to	lose,	as	the	walls	of	the	polis	
are	fractals	running	through	dunamis	ending	in	dispositions.	Beyond	the	singular	
order	“the	World	[can	be	seen]	as	Plenum	and	not	as	Universe”	(Da	Silva	2014,	
86).	This	instant	appearance	of	multiplicity	creates	room	for	seeing	different	
relations	and	thereby	different	interactions	of	power.	Moving	away	from	the	
universe	and	dissolving	its	orderings	requires	an	“unknowing	and	undoing	of	the	
World”	(Da	Silva	2014,	86).	Subsequently,	it	becomes	pressing	to	navigate	
meeting	between	agents,	which	can	grow	into	forms	of	life.	I	have	argued	
through	changing	logos	that	only	way	to	de-code	is	to	re-code,	which	has	to	be	
done	from	the	demonic	models	which	render	outcomes	uncertain	(Wynter	1990,	
365;	McKittrick	2006,	xxiv).	Careful	about	the	possibilities	for	doing	this,	it	is	
worth	emphasising	that	Wittgenstein	suggests	a	form	of	life	does	not	only	
presuppose	agreement	on	principles,	but	also	agreements	on	decisions	and	
judgements	(Wittgenstein	2010	241).	This	suggests	that	it	is	not	only	necessary	
to	heed	the	remnants	of	the	norm	present	in	emerging	forms	of	life,	but	also	that	
axioms	alone	will	not	be	sufficient	as	it	presses	the	point	that	principles	of	
interaction	are	post-hoc	fabrications	after	a	form	of	life	is	established.		
	
In	order	to	elaborate	on	the	working	of	monological	approaches,	I	will	now	look	
at	an	example	of	a	monological	theory	that	aims	at	keeping	space	for	difference.	
According	to	Rawls,	in	a	classical	formulation	of	liberal	ethical	theory,	the	
conception	of	the	good	life	lies	within	a	conception	of	the	right	life	(Rawls	2009,	
348).	Rawls	argues	that	the	constraints	of	justice	both	allow	for	a	protection	of	
difference,	and	a	proliferation	of	forms	of	life.	In	the	terms	of	the	current	
discussion,	Rawls	claims	the	polis	will	support	all	differences	that	are	ethically	
compatible	to	be	contained	in	a	monological	space.	The	Wittgensteinian	critique	
of	this	model	points	to	the	misconception	in	this	idea,	and	claims	that	it	is	the	
right	that	is	contained	by	notions	of	the	good.	The	agreement	on	what	counts	as	a	
good	form	of	life	is,	allows	for	reverse	engineering	the	principles	of	right,	and	
	 189	
thus	constrains	the	proliferation	of	forms	of	life,	as	these	fall	outside	of	existing	
agreements	of	possibility.	Nonnormative	trans	bodies	are	an	example	of	this	
problematic,	as	these	do	not	come	with	the	social	power	necessary	to	disrupt	
existing	orderings,	yet	receive	undue	social	pressure,	as	discussed	in	chapter	
one.	The	invasiveness	of	monological	orderings	stems	from	these	normative	
agreements	on	judgement	and	perception,	and	their	claim	to	a	“well-ordered	
society”(Rawls	2009,	4,	397).	Multilogical	connections	are	blocked	out,	precisely	
because	of	the	perception	of	regulation	through	principled	evaluation.	Rawls’	
conception	of	well-orderedness	is	not	a	content-neutral	evaluation.	The	
imposition	of	‘order	over	chaos’	(Wynter	2003)	leads	directly	to	an	
misidentification	of	nonnormative	agents	as	deviant	(Lorde	1996,	163)	instead	
of	as	inhabitants	of	worlds	of	being	with	mutual	difference	from	the	perceiver	
(Lugones	2003,	97).	Through	Wynter’s	reading	it	becomes	clear	why	multilogics	
will	be	perceived	as	‘chaos’	that	needs	to	be	controlled.	Singular	monological	
perception	cannot	perceive	practical	truths	that	do	not	match	its	own,	and	the	
notion	of	well-orderedness	lays	a	(false)	moral	claim	to	the	right	to	rule.	The	two	
notions	enforce	each	other,	as	not	allowing	one	to	face	loss	of	truth,	and	
extending	generosity	in	perception,	in	combination	with	an	alleged	right	to	
impose,	will	lead	to	the	immediate	impossibility	of	facing	lived	multilogical	
reality.	Liberal	reasoning	of	encapsulating	multiplicity	in	a	single	principle	
formed	the	theoretical	model	for	conceptions	of	‘multiculturalism’	(Bannerji	
2000,	1).	
	
However,	as	my	discussion	in	chapter	two	already	indicated	the	means	form	the	
ends	in	agential	formation.	The	navigation	of	agents	allows	for	both	the	first	
order	emergence	of	practical	ensouled	truth,	as	well	as	the	second	order	emerge	
between	agents	of	shared	forms	of	sense.	A	primary	single	principle	claims	the	
inverse:	first	we	know	what	ordering	to	prefer,	and	then	we	can	see	what	life	fits	
in	that	order.	This	is	the	dominant	claim	of	the	monological	order,	which	does	
not	need	discipline,	but	can	offer	adaptability	situated	around	a	stable	normative	
core.	In	contrast,	the	Wittgensteinian	perspective	on	forms	of	life	claims	that	the	
principles	are	reconstructions	after	the	agreement	on	ends.	For	emergent	forms	
of	life,	this	suggests	that	a	diamond	shape	of	ends,	meanings,	and	principles	is	
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emergent	and	in	flux.	The	ends	pull	change,	as	much	as	the	principles	push	
change,	and	both	are	changed	by	the	(collective)	navigation.	Both	principles	and	
ends	can	be	envisioned	as	codings	that	propel	and	allow	nonnormative	
emergence;	a	point	I	will	elaborate	in	chapter	four.	It	is	a	diamond	shape	as	
forms	of	life	come	with	shared	ends	(Ahmed	2010;	Berlant	2011)	that	then	
inform	principles,	with	modulations	in	the	form	in	between,	as	explicated	by	the	
polis.	It	suggests	thus	that	agents	navigating	environments	not	only	face	
emergent	ends	out	of	the	vector	of	their	actions	–	which	changes	over	time,	but	
also	that	principles	of	structuring	such	ends	are	emerging	out	of	shifting	worlds	
of	sense	and	visions	of	the	good	~	flux	happens	on	both	sides	of	an	(imagined)	
centre.	This	problematizes	a	‘reflective	equilibrium’	model,	where	theory	is	
tested	to	practice	and	practice	to	theory,	which	will	be	mutually	adapted	to	each	
other	(Rawls	2009,	18).	As	Wittgenstein	draws	attention	to,	the	description	of	
the	present	already	contains	the	basis	for	the	principles.	This	ties	in	with	the	
formulation	of	chapter	two,	where	I	argued	that	practical	truth	emerges	from	
agential	logos	which	influences	how	situations	are	perceived.	In	order	to	create	
the	space	for	multilogical	engagement,	changing	codes	need	to	be	drawn	up	and	
revised	in	conjunction	with	changes	in	logos	and	multilogical	entanglement.	
Emergent	practical	truth	and	second	order	worlds	of	sense,	are	both	in	flux	as	
the	navigation	of	agents,	single	and	plural,	are	forming	relations	based	on	loss	
and	generation,	which	changes	ends,	and	practical	truths.	For	existing	forms	of	
life,	this	means	that	the	diamond	shape	of	possible	evaluations	is	already	in	
place.	These	are	not	only	the	principles,	which	can	be	rediscovered	in	the	act,	as	
intentions,	both	single	and	plural,	but	moreover	the	decisions	on	the	outcomes	of	
such	principles,	which	are	stably	in	place.	These	decision-evaluations	are	the	
primary	markers	of	judging	action	with	and	testing	agents	as	adapting	to	the	
available	norm.	Principles	are	thus	post	hoc	evaluations.	In	sum,	the	possible	
movements	of	agents	are	regulated	both	on	a	principle	level,	as	well	as	on	an	
evaluative	level.	Normative	agents	are	caught	in	the	pressures	of	top-down	and	
bottom-up	appraisal	of	possibility	and	perception.	This	pressure	hardens	a	
monological	order	and	can	only	allow	agents	to	emerge	out	of	it	by	force	or	
friction.	Ahmed’s	theorisation	of	happiness	is	the	case	in	point:	it	is	not	about	the	
principles,	but	about	the	solid	objects	of	happiness.	Unhappy	agents	are	forced	
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out,	placed	out,	or	cause	sufficient	friction	to	get	out	(Ahmed	2010).	For	a	
nonnormative	form	of	life	to	emerge,	it	will	thus	emerge	in	a	parallel	formation	
of	emergent	principles	as	well	as	emergent	evaluations.	Daimons	live	not	yet	in	
diamonds,	but	are	forming	under	pressure,	by	friction,	and	will	be	out	of	place.		
	
	
Forming	Logics,	Codings,	Lives	
	
Summarising	the	argument,	I	have	made	space	for	the	understanding	that	a	form	
of	life	holds	the	space	for	existing	judgements	and	principles.	Judgements	can	
vary,	creating	room	for	modulation	and	differences	in	interactions.	Judgements,	
or	evaluations,	stem	from	shared	meaning,	based	on	dispositional	practical	truth.	
Nonnormative	practical	truth,	organised	as	logos,	emerges	from	indeterminate	
affirmation	in	action.	Through	Wynter	the	understanding	emerges	that	practice	
comes	before	praxis:	action	comes	before	shared	understanding	about	that	
action,	even	though	it	might	be	emerging	from	a	shared	conception	about	what	is	
negated.	Praxis	entails	shared	evaluations	and	modes	of	relation,	which	can	
culminate	in	codings	–	the	topic	of	the	next	chapter.	Furthermore,	accepting	that	
one	animates	different	logics	in	different	worlds,	and	that	these	animations	
might	be	out	of	one’s	control	is	one	of	the	operational	understandings	to	
constitute	nonnormative	forms	of	life	(Lugones	2003,	88).	This	underlines	that	
other	agents	will	evaluate	your	actions,	and	have	an	appraisal	of	one’s	daimon	
that	might	not	necessarily	concur	with	one’s	practical	truth.	These	shifts	in	
perception	and	a	coinciding	shift	in	actions	are	central	to	accepting	multilogics	as	
praxis,	the	shared	understandings	of	resistance	meaning	(Lugones	2005).	This	
affirms	the	conclusion	of	chapter	two	that	the	deed	precedes	the	word	and	that	
language	–	or	mythos	–	is	a	refinement	of	practice	(Wittgenstein	1984,	31).	
	
If	interaction	–	before	principles	and	judgements	–	is	the	plane	of	emergence	of	
agents	and	connections,	it	is	inevitable	to	emphasise	space	for	relationality	in	
lieu	of	prefabricated	connective	tissue:	existing	technes	or	mythos.	Emergence	of	
nonnormative	code	is	thus	after	practice.	Code	emerges	as	(temporal)	summary	
of	recurring	interactions.	Bodies	without	normative	ends	are	generating	new	
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codes,	which	does	not	mean	that	they	get	imbued	with	the	power	to	successfully	
contest	the	norm.	Nonnormative	agents	can	still	be	subjected	to	the	operations	of	
the	monological	order	and	its	logical	core	of	projection	and	extraction,	even	if	
they	are	also	living	nonnormative	forms	of	life.73		
	
With	material	being	generative	the	ordering	of	the	terms	ethics	and	
epistemology	is	in	that	order	–	from	the	ethical	to	the	epistemological:	relations	
before	knowledge,	verbs	before	nouns	(Hoagland	1988,	269).	The	monological	
ordering	of	the	polis	and	the	enclosure	of	the	demonic	grounds	is	partly	the	
attempt	at	epistemic	control	(who	owns	the	knowledge),	which	turned	into	
process	controlling,	as	Parisi	and	Terranova	have	successfully	emphasised.	
Fracturing	the	norm,	making	space	for	multiplicity	and	non-dominance	needs	
further	approaches	than	multilogics	alone	
	
As	I	have	argued	above,	the	dominant	order	does	not	have	the	possibility	to	see	
the	connections	and	multiple	logics	that	are	forming	on	the	demonic	grounds.	
The	monological	order	creates	its	own	space	of	impossibility	of	perception,	as	it	
can	only	understand	itself	through	the	projections	it	claims	upon	nonnormative	
bodies.	The	reflection	of	projection	constitutes	the	norm.	This	argument	is	in	
contrast	with	the	general	reading	that	the	norm	is	constituted	by	the	margins	
(Edwards	2015,	142).	I	am	arguing	for	the	inverse	of	this	reading	that	the	
deviant	is	not	constitutive	of	the	norm	–	this	would	suggest	it	happens	in	the	
same	space	of	reason,	but	the	norm	projects	on	the	deviant	and	sees	it	
constitutive	power	reflected	back	on	itself.	The	norm	and	the	nonnorm	have	
different	spaces	of	reason.		
	
The	norm	is	thus	the	place	that	projects	singular	difference	upon	the	space	of	
multilogics,	which	is	imaginatively	outside	of	the	polis	yet	practically	enclosed	by	
it.	As	argued	before,	the	walls	of	the	polis	are	fractals,	culminating	in	dispositions	
and	agential	logos.	In	its	impossibility	to	perceive	the	space	of	multilogics	as	an	
equal	set	of	truths,	it	preserves	an	aggressive	working	of	power	as	the	right	to	
																																																								
73	While	I	believe	that	ethical	decoding	is	necessary	for	radical	social	transformation,	I	am	very	
reluctant	to	posit	this	as	the	only	strategy	to	overturn	exploitative	orderings.	
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project.	Traversing	of	different	codings	within	the	walls	of	the	polis	are	thus	not	
properly	speaking	‘inclusion’	but	encapsulations,	the	renegotiations	of	codings	
for	the	purpose	of	adaptation	and	legitimization	of	the	norm.	This	leads	to	
situations	of	trans	and	queer	police	forces	described	by	Che	Gossett	as	
“[q]ueerness	and	transgender	bodies	are	no	longer	policed,	they	are	doing	the	
policing”	(C.	Gossett	2013,	586).	Fields	of	force	can	change,	while	the	logical	
operation	of	entitlement	to	extraction	and	projection	remains	uncontested	and	
embraced	by	‘included’	agents.		
	
The	space	of	nonnormative	multilogics	thus	operates	under	normative	
projections	which	can	function	as	camouflage.	Normative	operation	is	still	
constituted	from	within	the	single	space	of	chaos	and	order	(Wynter	1984,	
1990).	If	the	monological	order	acknowledges	these	constitutions	as	their	own,	
only	self-establishing	norm	would	evaporate	and	become	part	of	the	multilogic	
the	logical	operation	of	extraction	and	exploitation	would	then	need	to	disappear	
alongside,	while	codings	are	serving	this	project.	The	demons	outside	of	the	polis	
are	not	(necessarily)	subsumed	in	this	aspiration,	even	though	they	can	
obviously	be	affected	by	it	–	such	is	the	working	of	power.	This	affecting	can	be	
done	through	environmental	pressure,	the	material	conditions	of	life,	but	also	
through	the	power	of	projection	limiting	possibilities	of	understanding	and	
formation	by	being	drowned	out	in	the	singular	projections	of	the	norm.	Vikki	
Kirby	(2015)	makes	a	similar	claim	about	the	perpetuation	of	re-centring	the	
norm	and	returning	life	outside	the	polis	to	the	walls	of	projection	by	the	norm.	
In	contrast	I	aim	to	give	an	account	of	nonnormative	ethics	which	already	
decentres	the	normative	order,	while	this	alone	can	be	seen	not	the	be	the	
solution	–	as	this	space	has	always	existed.	That	the	space	outside	of	the	walls	of	
the	polis	is	shared	does	not	mean	it	is	the	same	(Kirby	2015,	99).	This	
emphasises	the	need	for	coalitional	and	hybrid	relationality	in	forms	of	life	
outside	of	the	monological	order	of	the	polis.			
	
This	hybridity	and	coalition	is	possible	because	the	individual	is	constituted	by	
its	body,	and	not	by	a	singular	form.	The	individual	is	not	divisible	(Kirby	2015,	
103)	,	but	that	is	only	such	as	body:	the	constitutive	substance	based	on	the	
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existence	of	soul	and	need	for	nutrition.	Individuality	in	a	nonnormative,	
multilogical	reading	lies	neither	in	the	logos	–	as	that	can	be	multiple	and	is	made	
of	a	manifold	of	dunamis,	nor	in	the	mythos	–	as	that	is	shared	and	need	not	be	
singular,	nor	in	the	projections	under	which	one	lives	–	the	daimons	are	read	
differently	and	the	encapsulations	are	cliché	by	necessity.	Individuation	lies	only	
in	the	indivisibility	of	the	ensouled	body.	The	agent,	as	agent,	can	only	be	one.	
Kirby	argues	that	the	human	as	individual	exists	with	spontaneous	self-
generation	(Kirby	2015,	105).	My	contestation	to	that	claim	is	that	while	the	
body	is	by	necessity	generative,	it	is	not	spontaneously,	but	through	navigation,	
generosity,	and	loss.	I	have	argued	in	chapter	two	that	formation	is	inevitable.	
Inside	the	polis	one	strives	to	adapt	to	the	idea	of	shared	eudaimonia,	and	the	
formation	of	form	is	adaptive	to	shared	evaluations.	Outside	of	the	norm,	on	the	
demonic	grounds	and	space	of	multilogics,	the	nonnormative	agent	has	no	ends	
to	aspire	towards,	thus	has	to	create	those	as	praxis,	following	the	generative	
possibility	of	means	as	was	shown	to	be	central	in	indeterminate	agential	action	
(Anzaldúa	1987).		
	
The	issue	currently	at	hand	is	how	to	envision	the	space	of	multilogical	
interaction	without	a	form	of	power	that	exists	as	fields	of	force	of	imposition	
through	projection.	Returning	to	chapter	one	the	trans	battle	cry	of	“do	not	
assume”	returns	here	in	a	new	light.	If	power	is	the	power	to	project	and	extract	
through	enclosure,	the	aim	for	a	nonnormative	ethics	is	to	find	a	form	of	
relational	force	that	can	embrace	generosity	and	loss,	instead	of	property	and	
accumulation,	and	still	have	codings	to	enable	relationality	beyond	the	direct	
connection.	Accumulation	and	enclosure	is	inevitable	in	the	monological	order	of	
the	polis.	Nonnormative	ethical	connection	understood	through	multilogical	
interaction,	structured	by	generosity	and	loss	needs	the	formation	of	
nonnormative	codings	of	relationality,	instead	of	the	dominating	encapsulation	
of	the	master	code	(Wynter	2003).	In	chapter	four	I	will	propose	an	emergence	
of	codings	and	discuss	their	place	in	nonnormative	ethics.		
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In	chapter	two,	the	transsomatechnical	formation	of	logos	got	conceptualised	as	
navigation	leading	to	practical	truth	and	ensouled	bodily	change.	The	structure	of	
navigation	consists	of	a	double	negation	and	indeterminate	affirmation.	In	
chapter	three	technes,	mythos,	and	codes	have	been	discussed	as	structuring	
relations	and	forms	of	life.	Technes	structure	relations	between	agents.	
Normative	technes	can	erase	agents	by	relegating	them	to	patterns	of	action	that	
masks	their	logos.	Nonnormative	techne	are	emergent	structures	of	relation	
allowing	mutuality	and	difference.	Mutuality	lies	partly	in	the	emergence	itself,	
because	agents	offer	their	loving	perception	to	make	the	interstice	by	which	a	
structure	can	emerge.	Daimons	bring	agents	together	in	mutuality,	but	also	
protect	differences,	as	they	do	not	need	to	fall	in	a	singular	order.	Logos	makes	
agents	particular,	while	techne	brings	them	together.	Daimons	bridge	the	gap	
between	as	interstice	and	protect	difference,	by	making	agents	multiple	in	
themselves.	World-travelling	between	forms	of	life	with	their	own	logic,	has	led	
to	the	understanding	that	agents	make	relations	by	allowing	loss	of	practical	
truth	in	logos.	This	leads	agents	to	give	up	(part	of)	the	orientation	in	an	
environment	and	perceive	differences	generously.	The	technes	that	emerge	in	
this	manner	further	embrace	differences,	by	not	demanding	impositions	of	truth,	
relations,	and	logics	of	forms	of	life.	Furthermore,	I	have	made	the	argument	that	
forms	of	life	can	be	bridged	by	mythos:	connective	codings	that	do	not	attach	to	
logos	or	logics.	Mythos	allows	agents	navigations	beyond	the	immediate	
environment,	whether	normative	or	nonnormative.	However,	mythos	are	not	the	
only	codes.		
	
In	this	chapter	I	will	concentrate	on	emergent	codes,	which	allow	nonnormative	
connections,	without	demanding	singular	logics	of	operation.	These	codes	can	
traverse	contexts	and	thereby	lift	a	theory	of	nonnormative	ethics	out	of	the	
realm	of	immediate	experience.	Normative	codings	function	as	impositions	of	a	
dominating	logic	and	structure	hierarchies	enabling	exploitation.	Nonnormative	
codings	allow	for	connections	between	agents	and	forms	of	life,	retain	
experiences	and	patterns	of	action,	and	can	thus	function	as	resistance,	but	also	
structuring	explorations	in	radical	transformation.	By	negating	the	polis	as	such,	
ethics,	that	is:	agential	relations	in	and	between	forms	of	life,	emerges	as	the	
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ground	for	connection	without	relating	structure	to	a	political	order.	Codes	are	
therefore	a	part	of	the	structure	of	ethics	that	organises	connection	without	
demanding	stasis	of	agents	or	forms	of	life.		
	
In	the	last	chapter	the	emergence	of	codes	was	discussed	as	contextual	
shorthand	structuring	relations	across	different	logics.	Sylvia	Wynter	uses	the	
term	‘master	code’	(Wynter	2003,	300)	to	describe	the	mapping	of	a	symbolic	
order	that	follows	the	colonial	expansion	of	European	powers.	The	symbolic	
order	claimed	by	the	master	code	subjugates	colonized	peoples	and	structures	
the	world	according	in	rational/irrational	and	human/animal	practical	and	
epistemological	hierarchies.	In	this	chapter	I	will	draw	on	anti-colonial	
approaches	to	problematize	the	operation	of	such	practical	codes	and	develop	a	
proposal	for	nonnormative	ethical	codings,	which	are	emerging	outside	of	the	
polis.	I	will	draw	on	insights	of	Sylvia	Wynter	who	has	argued	that	“one	cannot	
‘unsettle’	the	‘coloniality	of	power’	without	a	redescription	of	the	human	outside	
the	terms	of	our	present	descriptive	statement	of	the	human,	“Man”	(Wynter	
2003,	268),	which	is	structured	around	a	single	organising	principle	and	master	
code	(Wynter	2003,	300).	In	this	chapter,	I	will	therefore	look	at	emerging	codes	
that	structure	relations,	and	their	emergence	in	forms	that	do	not	tie	in	with	the	
current	forms	of	relationality.	In	a	criticism	of	structures	Starhawk	boldly	states:		
“nothing	is	easier	to	see	than	consciousness	once	we	recognize	that	it	is	
embodied	in	the	forms	and	structures	we	create”	(Starhawk	1982,	18).	I	will	lie	
out	this	argument	as	a	contrast	between	the	changing	codification	of	the	
monological	order	of	the	polis,	and	the	multilogical	connections	between	
nonnormative	agents.			
	
This	chapter	endeavours	to	connect	emergent	coding	with	the	ensouled	bodily	
logos	of	nonnormative	agents	and	enable	theorising	different	layers	of	
abstraction,	durations	of	code,	and	changing	of	codes	through	nonnormative	
vectors.	This	reconnects	the	discussion	with	chapter	two,	where	the	double	
negation	and	single	affirmation	underlying	agential	formation,	emerges	in	
indeterminate	vectors,	which	structures	the	means	of	formation	with	shifting	
ends.	In	this	chapter	I	will	propose	that	it	is	not	only	agential	ends	that	change	
	 198	
with	the	unfolding	of	different	means,	but	also	that	codes	undergo	similar	
processes	of	change,	and	can	be	short	in	duration	as	they	are	expressive	of	forms	
of	life.	This,	in	turn,	deepens	the	findings	of	chapter	three	on	shared	connection	
in	forms	of	life	with	a	discussion	on	the	workings	of	codes.	In	this	chapter	I	
propose	that	codes	need	to	change	in	order	to	keep	them	functioning	as	mutually	
inclusive	of	different	logics.	This	proposal	clarifies	frictions	and	tensions	as	
points	of	scrutiny	in	connection.	Acknowledging	that	different	logics	create	
friction	requires	giving	up	demands	for	clarity	of	intention.	Hereby,	Édouard	
Glissant’s	notion	of	opacity	becomes	a	key	in	the	understanding	of	nonnormative	
connections.	This	means	that	agents	are	willing	to	face	opacity	of	others,	and	
thus	allow	opacity	in	themselves.	In	conjunction	with	the	argumentation	in	
chapter	three	the	connection	between	loss	and	opacity	gets	deepened.	I	will	close	
this	chapter	by	theorising	this	willingness	to	face	loss	as	the	mutual	gift	that	
allows	for	bonds	to	emerge.	Mutual	loss	as	a	basis	of	emerging	connection	is	
contrasted	with	the	imposed	exploitation	of	the	polis.	However,	just	as	codings	
are	temporal,	so	can	nonnormative	bonds	be,	as	they	are	not	proposed	as	the	
walls	of	a	new	polis.	
	
In	the	first	two	chapters	I	have	offered	arguments	for	my	conception	that	bodies	
allow	and	are	constitutive	in	the	formation	of	new	logics,	new	affective	relations,	
and	new	ways	of	understanding	the	world.	This	chapter	offers	an	argument	
about	the	emergence	of	new	codes	outside	of	the	polis.	These	arguments	about	
emerging	relations	between	differing	logics	function	without	collapsing	into	
confined	groups	with	stable	epistemologies,	that	happen	to	share	a	predefined	
political	space,	but	indeed	press	an	argument	about	how	agents	and	collectivities	
can	become	unheard	of	(Abbas	2010;	Weheliye	2014,	126)	in	the	polis.	To	be	
unheard	is	to	find	articulation	outside	the	terms	of	the	polis,	without	aiming	at	
inclusion,	and	legitimation	offered	by	the	structures	that	are	the	prime	cause	of	
exclusion	(Abbas	2010).	Instead	of	erasure	this	suggests	escape,	as	well	as	
frames	the	violence	of	the	polis	to	be	structured	by	indifference,	as	Weheliye	
cogently	claims.	As	argued	in	chapter	three,	the	invisibility	of	the	demonic	
grounds	emerges	because	the	polis	can	only	see	the	reflection	of	its	own	
projections.	The	proposal	in	this	chapter	will	claim	space	for	emergence	of	codes	
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as	unheard	and	invisible	ethical	claims	suggesting	practical	footholds	and	
waypoints	to	navigate	one’s	environment,	but	also	stretching	beyond	that	as	
codes	aligning	vectors	in	interaction.		
	
Coding	practice	
	
In	the	conceptualisation	of	nonnormative	ethics	two	elements	have	been	central.	
The	first	is	logos	–	the	formation	of	an	agent.	Logos	combines	affective,	
perceptive	and	reflective	interactions	of	the	agent	in	an	environment,	suggesting	
practical	truth.	The	second	element	is	logic:	the	mode	of	functioning	of	
collectivities,	coming	with	technes	of	relation.	Logic	entails	the	appraisal	of	the	
daimon	behind	the	agents	through	shared	meaning	and	evaluations.	
Furthermore,	as	I	argued	through	Wittgenstein	(2010,	241)	in	chapter	three	this	
logic	combines	both	axioms	and	decisions,	leaving	space	for	modulation	of	
agents	between	these	two	points.	Modulations	are	not	deviations	of	a	central	
norm,	but	variations	informing	principles	and	judgments.	This	structure	needs	a	
third	element,	which	is	code.	Codings	function	as	guidance	for	relationality,	and	
organise	imagery	and	signs,	indicating	positionality	and	expectation	within	
dissimilar	relations.	This	dissimilarity	can	be	either	seen	as	a	hierarchical	and	
unequal	relation,	which	is	the	case	with	the	impositions	of	(variations	on)	the	
master	code,	or	alternatively	as	differences	in	logos,	indicating	different	logics,	
and	thus	in	need	of	codes	to	enable	temporal	or	durable	connections.				
	
Kwame	Anthony	Appiah	conceptualizes	‘code’	in	the	context	of	moral	change	as	
“a	set	of	shared	norms”	(Appiah	2010,	175),	which	extends	beyond	mere	rules.	A	
subset	of	this	system	of	codes	is	the	‘honor	code’	indicating	whether	someone	of	
a	“certain	identity	gains	the	right	to	respect,	how	they	should	lose	it,	and	how	
having	and	losing	honor	changes	the	way	they	should	be	treated”	(ibid.).	Such	a	
code	structures	relations	between	different	groups,	but	also	within	a	group:	“[i]f	
you	adhere	to	an	honor	code,	you’ll	not	only	respond	with	respect	to	those	who	
keep	it,	but	you’ll	respond	with	contempt	to	those	who	don’t”	(Appiah	2010,	
177).	Appiah	draws	upon	codes	as	operating	alongside	‘rights’	to	create	space	for	
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emotional	interactions	and	personal	development	in	a	wider	conception	of	
morality	than	one	based	on	legalistic	structures	alone	(Appiah	2010,	182).	
Alongside	perceived	moral	duties,	Appiah	conceptualises	the	space	of	respect.		
	
While	this	conception	makes	space	for	relation	beyond	the	discursive	alone,	the	
problem	it	runs	in	to	is	that	it	still	rolls	out	a	system	of	duties	and	rights,	with	
affective	zones	regulating	respect	and	dignity.	What	it	can	do	is	show	how	peer	
pressure	in	the	form	of	respect	can	change	the	way	duties	and	rights	are	
conceived,	but	what	it	can	not	do	is	show	how	agents	falling	out	of	the	zones	of	
respect,	can	make	claim	change	while	standing	outside	of	the	zones	of	universal	
mutuality:	it	keeps	agents	tied	into	a	single	space	of	pressure.	In	short	–	if	one	is	
trans	and	pathologised,	black	and	poor	and	deemed	irrational,	these	structures	
allow	little	possibility	in	a	singular	ordering	of	a	dominant	norm	to	claim	agency	
as	nonnormative	agent,	while	they	can	only	claim	benevolent	actions	within	
hierarchies.	This	returns	the	problems	of	in	and	exclusion	within	the	polis,	as	I	
have	been	arguing	against.	Appiah’s	system	functions	on	a	belief	that	everybody	
can	be	part	of	the	polis,	but	fails	to	account	for	the	structures	of	exclusion	that	
the	polis	–	as	I	have	argued	in	chapter	three	-	necessarily	generates.		
	
To	nuance	understanding	of	the	operation	of	codes,	I	propose	to	look	at	the	
conceptualization	of	Friedrich	Kittler.	Kittler	discusses	codes	both	in	a	legal	and	
technological	context.	The	function	of	these	codes	lies	quite	close	to	each	other,	
as	they	in	both	cases	work	to	organise	actions	in	a	concise	manner,	abstracted	
from	specific	contexts.	Kittler	articulates	codes	as	“what	determine	us	today,	and	
what	we	must	articulate	if	only	to	avoid	disappearing	under	them	completely”	
(Kittler	2008,	40).	This	indicates	vis-à-vis	Appiah	that	before	agents	enter	into	
the	space	of	possible	rights,	agents	can	disappear	under	the	codes	that	determine	
placement,	functioning,	and	audibility.	Nonnormative	‘respect’	can	only	begin	to	
function	beyond	a	system	of	imposed	codes;	codes	have	to	be	made	visible.			
	
Kittler	traces	code	along	two	different	lines.	The	first	is	as	secret	language,	which	
emerged	after	logograms	changed	to	alphabets,	in	combination	with	a	
communications	technology	(Kittler	2008,	40).	The	second	is	codicilla,	known	
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also	as	imperia,	the	orders	of	the	roman	Emperor,	extending	into	“code”	the	book	
of	law,	up	onto	Emperor	Napoleon	(Kittler	2008,	41).	Already	enclosed	in	the	
term	code	is	both	the	imperial	command,	and	emphasised	due	to	its	linkage	with	
secrecy,	the	one-sided	imposition.	Codes	are	thus	operational	summaries,	
functioning	within	(a	system	of)	relation.	Systematic	codes	relate	positions	to	
activities,	linking	signage	and	imagery	to	positionality	and	output.	Kittler	
explains	programming	code	as	‘elegant’	when	its	output	is	longer	than	itself	–	
thus	less	code	is	needed	than	the	message	that	comes	out.	Short	codes,	and	long	
outputs	are	the	desiderata	(Kittler	2008,	43).	Here,	we	can	tie	in	with	the	
operation	of	the	master	code,	as	historicised	and	theorized	by	Wynter	(Wynter	
2003,	287),	and	its	attachment	to	phenotypes	and	deviant	bodies	(Wynter	2003,	
296,	1990,	359).	This	master	code	of	racialization,	misogyny,	and	transphobia	is	
attached	to	bodies	and	functions	thus	‘elegantly’	and	comes	with	an	output	of	
denigration,	exploitation,	and	availability	for	destruction,	in	line	with	the	
explained	‘desiderata’	of	coding.74	The	simplicity	of	the	master	code	creating	an	
eugenical	and	dysgenical	ordering	that	maps	onto	different	contexts	enables	
understanding	of	what	Nandita	Sharma	has	termed	“a	single	field	of	power”	
(Sharma	2015,	164),	and	thus	the	master	code	functions	as	single	organising	
principle.			
	
Willard	Van	Orman	Quine	describes	the	‘word’	emerging	from	the	termination	of	
Aristotelian	essence	(Quine	1951,	4).	Word	is	what	is	left	after	essence	does	not	
describe	the	substance	inherently,	so	to	speak.	As	I	have	argued	in	chapter	two	
and	three,	agents	make	logos	without	ingrained	essence.	And	yet	–	there	is	word	
that	is	free	from	this	essence	–	code	that	is	not	already	attached	to	the	body,	but	
is	made	to	take	that	place.	Some	of	the	codes	are	close	to	present	logics	–	they	are	
supposed	to	feel	natural	(Wynter	2001,	35)	and	its	operation	is	matched	to	
phenotype,	such	as	the	codings	of	racism.	In	this	chapter	I	will	use	code	with	the	
suggestion	of	Kittler	of	‘displacement’,	the	transferal	of	one	element	onto	another	
element,	susceptible	to	faulty	communication	(Kittler	2008,	45).	Code	is	thus	
suggestive	to	function	as	translation	of	interaction,	but	will	not	mean	universally	
																																																								
74	The	terms	‘elegantly’	and	‘desiderata’	are	particularly	cynical	in	this	context.	Yet,	the	terms	do	
conceptually	explain	social	codings	in	a	relevant	manner.		
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the	same	thing,	as	I	will	discuss	below.	Code,	in	the	ethical	sense,	turns	out	to	be	
“the	practice	of	realities”	(Kittler	2008,	45).	It	is	code,	not	language,	I	focus	on,	
because	codes	are	operational	vignettes	structuring	relations	and	indicating	
actions,	which	ties	it	in	with	ethics.	Codes	in	the	way	I	will	discuss	them	are	thus	
abstractions	suggesting	technes,	and	claiming	structures	of	perception	in	
contexts.	These	structures	can	be	both	negative	and	positive,	but	I	will	make	the	
case,	they	do	not	need	to	encapsulate	the	situation	or	the	agents	in	full.		
	
	
Affect,	Discipline,	Change	
	
Theorisations	of	nonnormative	forms	of	life,	with	affect	as	the	main	point	of	
focus,	argue	that	affects	traversing	in	between	or	through	agents	encapsulate	
reactions	and	perceptions,	while	these	cannot	help	to	formulate	how	the	
uncategorised	can	be	faced	–	only	that	it	might	be	produced	(Ahmed	2004;	
Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987).	This	is	a	structural	phenomenon	as	affect	cannot	
face	the	unknown,	except	in	fear,	where	fear	is	ultimately	the	fear	of	death	
(Derrida	2008,	44).	Affect	operates	around	existing	forms	of	relation.	In	contrast,	
I	have	been	arguing	that	agential	becoming	emerges	through	a	nonnormative	
logic,	which	changes	the	form	of	the	world.	This	means	that	the	question	of	how	
to	relate	to	what	is	unknown	is	re-opened,	and	is	structured	by	re-figuring	one’s	
changed	relation	to	past	ways	of	encountering	the	world.	Loss	operates	as	
guidance	to	change,	and	in	the	falling	apart	of	logos	new	connections	can	be	
formed.	One	becomes	unknown	to	oneself,	and	that	may	open	relation	to	the	
unknown.		
	
My	suggestion	in	this	chapter	is	that	agential	action	based	on	affects	that	either	
direct	over	the	horizon	of	current	forms	(as	indeterminate	newness)	or	conserve	
these	forms	by	keeping	flows	in	demarcated	paths	(a	problem	affect	theory	
addresses)	do	not	provide	sufficient	materials	for	conceptualising	the	encounter	
with	a	changing	world.	For	instance,	friction	remains	an	indication	of	falling	out	
with	current	orderings	(Ahmed	2010)	–	but	cannot	be	understood	as	an	
indication	of	possibility:	to	start	a	fire.	Indeed	by	claiming	friction	as	indicative	of	
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one’s	own	position	only	as	already	outside	of	the	frame	of	possibility	will	limit	
the	understanding	of	one’s	actions,	and	what	Cherríe	Moraga	calls	the	failure	of	
white	feminism	to	advocate	its	own	complicity	(Moraga	2011,	59).	This	is	due	to	
the	focus	of	the	agent	in	friction	as	the	operator	breaking	the	smoothness	of	
normative	placement	and	its	subsequent	articulation	of	queer,	migratory,	and	
racialised	displacement.	However,	I	will	argue	below	that	from	within	this	
displacement	friction	can	be	indicative	of	transposed	normative	attachments,	but	
also	as	the	indication	of	points	in	the	interaction	where	loss	of	logic	and	
generosity	of	perception	could	occur	in	a	nonnormative	exchange	(Lugones	
2003).	From	this	insight	we	can	conclude	for	nonnormative	ethics	that	firstly,	
friction	is	many-sided	and	secondly,	that	friction	can	be	experienced	as	
indicative	of	the	surface	tension	in	the	encounter	of	differing	logics.	That	is	to	
say,	friction	can	be	the	space	for	healing	and	the	presence	of	creation,	and	not	
only	the	space	of	the	cut–	the	violent	discomfort	of	separation	and	othering	
(Pillai	2016;	van	der	Drift	2018).		
	
	
Intentions,	Actions,	Waypoints	
	
I	will	extend	the	discussion	of	the	last	chapter	on	bridging	differing	logics	and	the	
problematisation	of	conceptualizing	intentions.	Intentions	are	relevant	only	
within	a	singular	logical	conception,	after	a	form	of	life	has	been	established	with	
its	concurrent	agreement	on	principles	and	judgements.	To	contrast	
intentionality,	I	will	discuss	the	emergence	of	codes	that	can	function	as	markers	
and	waypoints	for	unfolding	new	forms	of	life	in	encounters	that	are	not	
envisioned	through	imposition,	extraction,	or	destruction.	These	latter	terms	are	
the	parameters	for	encounters	used	by	the	polis	to	subject	the	grounds	outside	
its	walls,	as	argued	by	Wynter	(2003,	2015)	and	da	Silva	(2013,	2015).	
Intentions	function	to	modulate	and	assess	codified	behaviours	within	the	
normative	single	field	of	power	(Sharma	2015,	164).	Disciplinary	approaches	
operate	through	a	claim	to	an	interiority,	as	Foucault	has	theorised	(Foucault	
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1977),	and	the	workings	of	shame	and	guilt	can	also	be	traced	along	these	lines.	
Shame	can	be	understood	as	being	seen	by	the	wrong	people	doing	the	wrong	
thing	and	guilt	can	be	seen	an	emotional	response	to	transgression	of	the	law	
(Williams	1993).	The	key	problem	is	that	intentions	cannot	traverse	logics	
relevantly,	since	differing	practical	truths	render	them	(partly)	incommunicable.	
Moreover,	because	intentions	come	with	different	logics	of	action	in	different	
forms	of	life,	intentions	as	such	are	not	the	relevant	facet	for	ethical	scrutiny,	
because	the	logical	framework	is	the	frame	from	which	confrontation	will	arise.	
Good	intentions	still	come	with	structural	imposition	in	the	polis.	Furthermore,	
as	the	discussions	of	Lugones	(2005)	and	Wynter	(2003)	have	indicated,	in	
processes	of	subjection	and	forced	codification	intentions	are	not	relevant	for	the	
recipient	of	imposed	codings,	and	neither	for	the	citizen	of	the	colonial	polis.	
Weheliye	and	Abbas	(Abbas	2010;	Weheliye	2014),	in	conjunction	with	Lugones	
and	Wynter	(Lugones	2003;	Wynter	2001),	defended	successfully	the	claim	that	
spoken	‘interiority’	cannot	be	heard,	unless	it	is	done	in	the	available	codes	of	the	
monological	order.	Subsequently,	it	becomes	questionable	to	claim	that	this	
normatively	coded	speech	backfires	onto	the	nonnormative	agent,	instilling	a	
new	‘interior’	that	aligns	to	be	demands	of	the	order	of	the	polis,	as	univocal	
occurrence.	This	would	subscribe	to	the	polis	a	total	victory	of	body	and	mind,	
something	that	would	make	resistance	impossible	because	the	agent	is	
enveloped	by	the	norm.	75	From	the	perspective	of	the	dominant	agent	the	
imposition	of	a	social	ordering	is	constituted	by	externalizing	the	actors	
placement	forcing	a	contraction	of	the	soul	(Wadiwel	2009,	52).	This	imposition	
in	its	most	extreme	form	is	the	creation	of	thingness	(Césaire	2000,	42)	in	the	
Césaire’s	discussion	of	the	subjugation	of	a	black	population.	This	carries	a	
resonance	with	the	previous	discussion	of	Wadiwel’s	techne	of	whipping	the	
Aboriginal	subject,	where	mastery	over	the	soul	was	intended	(Wadiwel	2009,	
54),	at	the	same	time	as	this	interiority	was	put	into	question:	
		
	[…]	being	‘‘black’’	means	to	have	the	existence	of	one’s	soul	put	in	question;	
epistemological,	because	the	flogging	aims	not	only	to	establish	the	existence	of	
																																																								
75	Matthew	Fuller	drew	attention	to	this	quote:	“Economics	are	the	method;	the	object	is	to	change	the	heart	and	soul.”	
(M.Thatcher,	Sunday	Times,	5/1/81)	
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a	soul,	but	to	discover	its	nature,	to	identify	its	truth	that	has	previously	been	
hidden	behind	a	dark,	thick	hide	(Wadiwel	2009,	55).		
Wadiwel’s	description	of	the	soul	being	disciplined	and	retracted,	finds	a	parallel	
in	the	description	of	the	Muselmann	in	the	camps	(Weheliye	2014,	126).	The	
Muselmann	was	starved	to	the	point	of	retraction	of	the	soul.	The	technique	of	
whipping	the	flesh	recalls	the	discussion	in	chapter	one,	where	the	cutting	of	
genitals	was	thought	to	affect	the	mind	(Barker-Benfield	1978,	123).	The	
transposition	of	forced	sterilization,	not	only	as	disciplinary	practice,	but	
moreover	as	eugenic	technique	(Threadcraft	2016,	4)	brings	trans	in	renewed	
focus.	The	surgical	and	molecular	technologies	(P.	B.	Preciado	2013)	claimed	to	
rule	the	interiority	of	deviating	bodies,	structured	through	pathologisation,	must	
spectacularly	fail	as	they	lay	claim	to	an	interiority	that	necessarily	removes	
itself	from	the	ordering	of	the	polis.	The	aggressive	means	that	are	claimed	to	
“normalize”	a	body	(Spade	2011),	force	a	logos	necessarily	to	speak	in	a	voice	
that	falls	out	of	the	normalized	domain,	and	hide	under	existing	pathologies.	This	
disappearance,	or	camouflage,	under	imposed	codings,	applied	with	technologies	
that	work	upon	the	body,	is	seen	from	the	dominant	norm	as	total.		
Christina	Sharpe	indeed	dismisses	the	claim	to	total	subjugation	in	the	extreme	
condition	of	enslavement	and	holds	the	space	open	for	alternative	agential	logos	
(Sharpe	2016).	Weheliye	indicates	a	similar	space	in	his	discussion	of	the	battle	
of	the	enslaved	Douglas	with	overseer	Covey,	where	Douglas	manages	to	“wrest	
dominance	from	his	overseer”	(Weheliye	2014,	95).	This	is	only	possible	if	
Douglas	has	no	complete	mimetic	overlap	with	the	ascribed	code.	Lugones	
critiques	the	image	of	oppression	as	total	by	ascribing	it	as	a	“desideratum	of	
oppression	theory”	(Lugones	2003,	55).	These	overlaps	contrast	with	the	curious	
demand	of	total	subjugation	when	articulated	from	within	the	norm.	Its	totality	
is	not	contested.	For	instance,	the	Muselmann,	Agamben’s	signifier	for	the	barest	
of	life	outside	of	the	polis	(Agamben	1998,	185)	is	narrated	as	life	nearest	to	
death	in	total	subjugation.	Howerver,	Weheliye	unearths	also	here	escape	at	its	
heart	in	the	dreams	of	beatitude	and	gastronomical	bliss	(Weheliye	2014,	128).	It	
could	thus	be	thought	that	aim	of	the	disciplinary	actions	are	not	to	lay	claim	to	
the	interiority	of	the	agent	under	strain,	but	to	create	silence	and	normative	
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placement	through	domination	allowing	material	exploitation	(Wynter	2003;	Da	
Silva	2015;	Sampaio	2015).	The	double	strain	put	onto	the	nonnormative	agent	
from	within	the	polis	is	then	to	translate	itself	through	this	silencing	in	
acceptable	terms	(Abbas	2010).	In	the	latter	case	interiority	is	irrelevant,	but	
serves	as	“pornotroping”	of	the	subjugated	body	(Weheliye	2014,	90;	Spillers	
1987;	P.	B.	Preciado	2013;	cf.	Kitzinger	1987).		
My	proposal	to	avoid	this	regression	of	demand	of	sameness	of	interiority,	
absence	of	interiority,	and	thingification,	is	to	conceptualise	codings	as	laying	a	
claim	to	a	pragmatics	of	interaction,	but	not	claim	these	as	expressive	of	an	
interior	space,	while	simply	accepting	that	there	is	a	logic	of	agential	action	
present	in	the	form	of	techne.	The	demos	in	the	polis	well	believe	their	
projections	of	interiority,	but	as	argued	in	chapter	three,	this	is	what	makes	
ethics	with	the	polis	impossible.	My	proposal	both	makes	space	for	an	ethics	that	
accepts	differing	logos	as	well	as	creates	space	for	bonding	across	multilogics.	
The	claim	to	total	subjugation	is	an	extension	of	the	idea	of	the	necessity	of	single	
principles	for	bonding,	because	it	claims	that	outside	the	principle	there	is	no	
life.	Both	the	claim	to	total	subjugation	as	well	as	the	demand	for	a	single	
principle	I	contest	with	my	proposal	for	nonnormative	ethics.	
	
DIY	code	(Code	It	Yourself)	
	
Before	I	set	out	to	articulate	the	unfolding	of	possible	forms	of	life	across	
multilogical	engagements,	I	want	to	highlight	an	important	pattern.	In	arguments	
about	the	entanglements	of	the	discursive	with	matter,	the	emphasis	necessarily	
falls	on	the	linguistic	approach.76	A	symptomatic	approach	is	Gayle	Salamon’s	
work	who	aims	to	“resist	the	temptation	to	define	that	specificity	[of	the	body]	in	
material	terms”	(Salamon	2010,	1).	Resisting	this	temptation	places	Salamon’s	
project	in	a	Cartesian	modus	with	its	accompanying	post-Renaissance	Christian	
dogmas	emphasising	disembodied	thought	(Wynter	2003,	274,	287).	Salamon	
aims	at	a	wider	use	of	psychoanalysis	to	explain	trans,	rather	than	less,	knowing	
																																																								
76	Considering	such	theory	is	mostly	written	by	academics	whose	outlooks	are	determined	by	
the	word,	this	should	not	be	surprising.	
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full	well	how	this	has	been	used	against	trans	people	(Salamon	2010,	4).		In	one	
turn	of	phrase	articulating	matter	as	an	impenetrable	whole,	and	language	the	
only	possibility	of	nuance,	Salamon	strikes	out	at	the	idea	of	morphology	of	the	
body	not	scripting	identification	or	desire,	warning	the	reader	to	take	“seriously	
some	of	the	ways	gender	is	currently	being	lived”	(Salamon	2010,	93).	While	
Salamon	is	aiming	away	from	transphobia,	the	insistence	that	the	theoretical	
formulation	is	what	makes	trans	lived	experience	understandable	contra	the	
critique	of	“disembodied	theorizing”	(Salamon	2010,	71)	risks	curiously	
flattening	theory.	This	stems	from	Salamon’s	refusal	to	take	articulations	from	
the	margins	seriously	and	Salamon	consequently	bunkers	down	in	scriptural	
explanations	why	lay	and	lived	expressions	are	invalid,	instead	of	seeing	how	
they	function	and	how	theories	might	benefit	from	taking	these	articulations	
seriously.	Salamon,	in	rejecting	these	expressions	creates	space	for	trans	to	
remain	unheard.	Similar	stress	is	articulated	earlier	when	Salamon	attacks	
Prosser	for	creating	a	theory	emphasising	the	body	that	is	unproductive	for	
theorizing	(Salamon	2010,	41).	Regardless	of	the	relative	merits	and	faults	of	
Prosser’s	theory,	it	is	the	question	whether	productive	theorising	is	what	is	at	
stake.	Salamon	aims	to	formulate	theory	and	schemas	underlying	any	conception	
of	the	body,	but	misses	out	on	the	play,	change,	nuance,	dance,	and	sexual	
possibilities	that	do	not	find	their	way	into	words.	Salamon	in	short	aims	to	
articulate	a	coherent	frame	of	singular	epistemology,	which	places	trans	
alongside	normative	bodies,	instead	of	foregoing	coherence	and	creating	space	
for	emerging	codes.	It	is	therefore	worrying	that	Salamon	forecloses	trans	agents	
changing	their	own	gender	as	navigation	away	from	existing	codes,	and	limits	
trans	people	to	stick	to	articulations	firmly	controlled	upfront	by	theories	out	of	
experiment’s	reach.	While	schemas,	or	codings,	might	occupy	an	important	
position,	Salamon’s	theorisation	indicates	clearly	how	over-emphasis	of	
conceptual	schemes	limits	the	possibility	of	understanding	the	nuances	of	
change	and	emergent	meanings.	Especially	by	making	matter	impregnable,	
instead	of	a	dynamic	and	open	ensouled	formation	with	the	possibility	of	
engagement	across	many	different	modes,	the	body	collapses	under	the	
conceptual	scheme	imposed	on	it,	making	it	impossible	to	discern	possible	
escapes.	I	will	return	to	this	issue	in	the	section	‘layers	of	code’,	where	I’ll	unpack	
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the	distinction	between	emergent	codes	with	local	meanings,	and	coherent	
theoretical	forms.		
	
To	reiterate,	overemphasising	conceptual	schemes	hinders	the	formulation	of	
indeterminate	accounts	of	emergence,	and	renders	partial	codes	marking	vectors	
of	understanding	and	evaluation	either	impossible,	or	illogical.	The	problem	with	
these	being	impossible	is	that	experimentation	cannot	be	relevantly	conceived	to	
have	an	impact	on	theory	formation	in	this	structure,	and	the	issue	with	seeing	
such	experiments	and	emergences	as	illogical	approaches	is	that	these	either	
need	to	be	dismissed	upfront	or	can	only	be	conceived	as	pathology	–	an	
unsurprising	effect	considering	the	aims	of	psychoanalysis	underlying	Salamon’s	
conceptualisations.	Salamon’s	concerns	stem	necessarily	from	the	structure	of	
chaos/order	that	Wynter	so	eloquently	unpacks	(Wynter	1984,	28).	The	polis	can	
only	be	ruled	through	a	set	of	axioms	and	principles	to	which	the	judgements	are	
already	agreed	upon,	as	I	argued	in	chapter	three,	creating	a	hardened	diamond	
shape	of	two	points	with	possible	modulations	in	between,	indicating	a	hard	cut	
between	allowed	divergence	and	othered	nonnormativity,	with	its	‘illogical	
epistemic	failings’.		
	
In	order	to	contrast	a	limiting	of	possibilities	to	aims,	actions,	and	formulations	
already	present,	I	will	turn	to	Wittgenstein,	who	offers	the	insight	that	actions	
can	precede	words,	and	that	words	are	consequently	follow	ups	in	a	teleological	
development:	as	in	the	creation	of	a	code	(Wittgenstein	1984).	This	insight	
suggests	two	main	implications.	Firstly,	code	has	a	teleological	emergence,	which	
is	an	emergence	within	limited	parameters.	Instead	of	using	teleological	as	
forward	looking	formation,	I	use	teleological	here	to	indicate	traceability,	as	it	is	
based	upon	feedback	(Rosenblueth,	Wiener,	and	Bigelow	1943,	19).	Traceability	
as	backward	looking	formation,	works	even	if	the	feedback	is	not	placed	upon	
the	positive	node	of	the	action:	the	affirmation	of	action	purposefully	towards	an	
end,	but	on	the	negative	node:	the	consistent	negating	of	adaption	to	a	set	of	
codes.	The	feedback	makes	it	possible	to	trace	the	negation	of	existing	codes,	in	
order	to	understand	formation,	without	needing	an	affirmed	coding.	This	reading	
complements	the	indeterminate	affirmation	of	chapter	two,	with	its	concomitant	
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double	negation	and	vectors	of	development.	However,	it	can	be	understood	
here,	that	this	development	is	not	a	forward	looking	formation,	because	it	can	
and	will	shift,	but	a	backward	looking	forward	formation	based	on	clarity	of	
negation.	This	is	one	of	the	key	points	Salamon	misses,	namely	that	negation	of	
codes	is	equally	informative	for	formation	as	adaption	and	operation	within	a	
schema:	negation	is	on	the	same	level	as	aspiration.	Furthermore,	code	can	be	
partial,	and	does	not	need	to	be	complete.	One	of	the	intermediate	conclusions	of	
chapter	two	should	be	recalled,	that	in	ethics	code	does	not	need	to	be	true	in	
order	to	function.	Ethical	codes	can	also	function	in	contradiction.	Subsequently,	
limitation	of	the	code	as	partial	creates	the	option	to	read	a	further	teleology	into	
it.	This	teleology	suggests	a	post	hoc	reading	–	emergence	looks	purposeful	
looking	back	at	it.	However,	the	moment	of	consideration	is	the	‘end	point’	but	
there’s	no	need	to	accept	it’s	the	end	point,	or	the	necessary	end	point.	The	latter	
is	how	colonialist	narratives	function	(Miranda	and	Keating	2002,	204).	
However,	an	end	can	be	merely	an	interval	from	which	the	route	of	emergence	of	
the	concept	can	be	traced	back.77	‘Teleology’	is	thus	not	a	problem	as	such,	but	
either	the	impact	of	the	codings	is,	or	the	use	of	teleological	imposition	as	
overextension	and	basis	for	a	naturalization	of	dominant	orderings	(Césaire	
2000,	33).	These	overextensions	come	with	the	presuppositions	that	teleology	is	
an	ingrained,	essential	and	inescapable	process,	which	it	in	this	reading	is	not.	I	
connect	teleology	and	code	to	indicate	code	is	subject	to	change,	that	its	meanings	
can	shift	and	be	traced	back,	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	suppose	that	meanings	
are	univocal	at	any	point	along	its	emergence,	and	lastly,	that	its	tracing	is	post	
hoc	and	not	predictive.		
	
Secondly,	I	propose	to	understand	code	as	an	effect	of	formations	that	are	
compilations	of	different	modes	of	action,	and	thus	need	not	to	fit	into	one	model	
of	coherence.	Wittgenstein	offers	“[l]anguage	–	I	want	to	say	–	is	a	refinement,	‘in	
the	beginning	was	the	deed’”(Wittgenstein	1984,	31e).	As	I	have	argued	
throughout	chapters	two	and	three	new	forms	emerge	from	agential	actions,	
																																																								
77	Subsequent	re-tracings	might	indicate	different	meanings	and	actions	of	code	that	have	gained	
acknowledgement	due	to	later	events.	While	there	might	be	a	traceable	lineage,	there’s	no	need	
to	postulate	that	as	lucid	at	all	times	past	from	the	present	standpoint.		
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consisting	of	a	double	negation	and	a	possible	indeterminate	affirmation.	This	
suggests	vectors	of	formation	and	can	involve	changing	codes.	These	unfoldings	
are	thus	not	utopian	actions	with	determinate	outcomes,	but	limited	fields	of	
activity,	allowing	the	emergence	of	new	forms	and	changes	in	practical	truth.	
Wittgenstein	usefully	underlines	not	only	the	possibility	of	emergence,	but	
furthermore	highlights	that	action	and	the	formation	of	new	codes	–	also	through	
language	–	is	a	process	of	refinement.	This	allows	me	to	conclude	that	forms	not	
only	start	as	ensouled	bodily	process,	but	also	that	codings	shift	over	time	–	as	
unfolding	of	possible	understandings,	or	formulations	of	these	processes	of	
agential	action,	allowing	for	shifting	technes	of	relation.		
	
However,	this	is	not	all	that	can	be	learned	from	this	insight.	If	in	the	beginning	
was	the	deed	and	linguistic	coding	follows	action,	this	constitutes	a	departure	
from	a	disciplinary	approach	as	the	imposition	of	precisely	described	formations	
by	processes	of	inscription	(Weheliye	2014,	24).	Nonnormative	actions	can	be	
structured	around	illogical	and	irrational	application	of	elements	available	in	
agent’s	environments.	Wittgenstein	suggest	this	is	a	relatively	unproblematic	
process:	
	
<I>	just	took	some	apples	out	of	a	paper	bag	where	they	had	been	lying	for	a	
long	time.	I	had	to	cut	half	off	many	of	them	and	throw	it	away.	Afterwards	when	
I	was	copying	a	sentence	I	had	written,	the	second	half	of	which	was	bad,	I	at	
once	saw	it	as	a	rotten	apple.	And	that’s	how	it	always	is	with	me.	Everything	
that	comes	my	way	becomes	a	picture	of	what	I	am	thinking	about	at	the	time.	
(Is	there	something	feminine	about	this	way	of	thinking?)	(Wittgenstein	1984,	
31e).			
	
The	elements	of	this	paragraph	show	how	actions	and	imagery	can	find	temporal	
combination.	Importantly,	this	emphasizes	how	codings	are	not	only	monolithic	
formations	weighing	down	on	agents,	but	are	equally	nimble	and	limited	
waypoints	offering	footholds	and	handgrips	for	quotidian	reflection	on	actions.	
Furthermore,	it	shows	how	different	modes,	like	knife	wielding	and	sentence	
copying,	can	be	combined	unproblematically,	with	the	linguistic	not	dominating	
the	action	(cutting	apples	as	editing	sentences).	Rather	the	reverse	is	shown	that	
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bodily	activity	is	easily	taking	over	the	complexity	of	linguistic	endeavours.	This	
approach	is	neither	a	form	of	domination	or	imposition,	but	works	“at	the	time”,	
suggesting	a	pragmatic	combination	of	available	elements	creating	ways	of	
navigating	the	present.	Such	light-hearted	codings	can	thus	offer	footholds	as	
ways	out	of	dominant	signifiers,	but	do	not	demand	agential	loyalty.	These	codes	
can	be	easily	discarded,	forgotten,	or	replaced.	Furthermore,	these	codes	do	not	
emphasise	the	need	for	elaborate	systems	of	thought:	problems	can	be	solved	
without	commitment	to	available	logical	means.78	This	leads	to	conclude	that	it	is	
possible	to	solve	logical	problems	(or	problems	of	logic)	by	illogical	means.	I	will	
come	back	to	this	below.		
	
The	last	sentence	of	the	quoted	paragraph	is	interesting	not	for	its	gendering	
function	–	which	can	either	be	taken	as	essentialist	or	social,	neither	of	which	is	
deep	or	enticing	–	but	indicates	an	intuition	in	this	being	a	nonnormative	
approach.	This	comment	is	suggestive	of	Wittgenstein’s	awareness	of	the	
problem	of	normative	monologics,	and	the	possibility	of	escape	out	of	these	
singular	structures	by	‘irrational’	or	‘inappropriate’	use	of	imagery	as	part	of	a	
practical	approach	to	structures	of	thought.	This	is	suggestive	of	non-linear	
teleological	processes.	The	combination	of	different	elements	allows	multi-
modular	generation	that	need	not	follow	logical	unfoldings	within	one	level	of	
existence.	This	draws	attention	to	the	workings	of	imagery	as	relevant	to	
processes	of	linguistic	generation;	it	indicates	the	unproblematic	application	and	
mixing	of	different	frames	in	order	to	escape	dominant	logical	and	discursive	
encapsulations.	In	sum,	these	considerations	can	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	it	is	
indeed	agency	before	ethics	before	epistemology	as	a	basis	for	the	emergence	of	
nonnormative	forms	of	life.	It	is	not	necessary	for	an	agent	to	know	what	they	
are	doing,	before	they	have	done	it,	while	the	construction	of	understanding	
follows	the	rejection	of	the	current	state	of	affairs.	Extending	from	the	level	of	
the	singular	agent,	this	implies	conditions	of	emergence	based	on	collective	
practices	and	allows	room	for	emergent	abstract	codings.	The	inability	to	escape	
dominant	codings	can	be	understood	as	the	over-focus	on	the	epistemic	modality	
																																																								
78	A	point	elaborated	by	Deneb	Kozikoski	Valereto	in	Berlin,	4	July	2015	at		‘Emancipation	as	
Navigation’	event.	
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of	coding,	as	well	as	isolating	agents	vis-à-vis	overarching	structures,	
disappearing	agents	under	the	weight	of	codes.	
	
	
Coordinates	of	Code	
	
The	space	of	the	polis	claims	to	lift	up	its	citizens,	while	at	the	same	time	it	
subjugates	those	on	the	demonic	and	other	grounds.	Wynter	terms	this	a	
“simultaneously	subjugating	and	emancipatory	homogenizing	regime”	(Wynter	
and	McKittrick	2015,	63).	What	is	consequently	needed	for	a	nonnormative	
ethical	project	is	the	possibility	of	breaking	this	code	as	an	extension	of	remaking	
codes.	Willingness	to	accept	loss	figures	here	as	bulwark	against	reformation	of	
the	master	code,	furthermore	generosity,	which	I	will	theorise	through	the	gift	
below,	pushes	inclusion	to	such	an	extreme,	that	the	unity	of	a	polis	cannot	hold.	
As	I	have	argued	in	chapter	two	there	is	no	change	that	consists	only	in	negation	
or	destruction,	because	the	ensouled	body	will	form	itself	through	its	active	
dunamis.	The	resultant	technes	and	connective	codes	break	down	the	polis	if	they	
are	not	encapsulated	in	unifying	principles,	demanding	exclusion	and	logically	
homogeneous	ordering.		
	
Focusing	on	emergent	codings	I	have	argued	that	codes	function	as	shorthand	for	
structures	of	relation	and	action,	and	these	abstractions	can	function	both	as	
disembodied	mythology	as	well	as	ethical	form.	Quine	underlines	Wittgenstein’s	
assertion	that	forms	of	life	can	encapsulate	agents	in	a	whole	of	axioms,	
principles,	and	agreement	on	decisions.	Furthermore,	Quine	argues	that	myths	
manage	the	flux	of	experience	(Quine	1951,	41).	These	overarching	myths	are	
theorised	as	encompassing	both	the	norm	as	well	as	providing	stability	in	the	
face	of	experiential	divergence.	This	leads	to	a	claim	that	myth	overrules	agential	
logos	by	keeping	the	agent	tied	to	a	relationality	that	is	aligned	to	the	dominant	
coding,	even	if	agents	meet	local	exceptions.	In	short,	this	argumentation	also	
functions	to	legitimise	untrue	codings,	by	reverting	to	stable	codes.	For	Quine	
codes	embed	themselves	in	agents	and	function	as	essences.	Codings	are	
absorbed	by	the	agent	and	inextricable.	However,	in	contrast	I	conceptualise	
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codes	as	providing	navigation	and	relation	between	agents.	Agents	either	aim	for	
the	norm,	and	claim	code	as	interior,	or	aim	away	from	the	norm	displacing	code	
as	exterior.	The	direction	of	fit	I	have	argued	for	is	the	inverse	of	Quine.	
However,	even	within	my	proposal	Quine’s	theorization	remains	useful.	Recall	at	
this	stage	clichés	of	xenophobia,	which	claim	particular	exceptions	to	general	
rules	when	the	exception	is	located	in	constant	proximity.79		The	flow	of	
experience	categorized	under	standardized	codifications	emphasizes	normative	
markers	with	some	room	for	modification.	Quine’s	theory	thus	describes	how	the	
polis	remains	functional	as	monological	whole,	by	providing	insight	how	
experience	contrary	to	its	projections	can	be	ignored,	and	thus	offers	a	second	
tier	of	dismissal	by	the	agents	of	the	polis.	The	first	tier	was	the	argument	in	
chapter	three	that	monological	agents	have	zones	of	invisibility,	and	miss	out	on	
multilogical	connections,	and	the	second	tier	of	Quine’s	argument	now	offers	that	
even	if	connection	to	the	contrary	happens,	it	will	not	necessarily	dismiss	the	
existing	mythological	codification.	This	is	further	underlined	by	the	argument	
that	changing	the	mythos	is	not	dependent	on	individual	experiences,	but	only	as	
“corporate	body”	(Quine	1951,	38).		
	
This	connects	to	the	theorisation	of	Wynter,	who	makes	the	argument	that	all	
codes	are	praxes,	namely	agential	constitution	by	actions	(Wynter	and	McKittrick	
2015,	34).	This	alleviates	the	pressure	to	find	interiority	(or	not)	because	the	
emphasis	shifted	outward.	This	is	further	explained	and	nuanced	by	the	earlier	
discussed	arguments	of	Bernard	Williams	(1985),	and	María	Lugones	(2003)	in	
chapter	two,	who	outline	that	dispositions	come	inherently	with	a	practical	
focus.	Concurring	that	self-constitution	is	praxis	and	being	human	thus	not	a	
noun,	focusing	on	the	technes	by	which	we	constitute	ourselves	as	form	of	life	
necessitates	paying	attention	to	the	navigation	of	abstract	codifications.	My	
argument	provides	nuance	of	Wynter’s	claim	by	focusing	on	the	possibility	of	
transformation.	Hereby	the	immersed	structure	of	logos,	techne,	mythos,	forms	of	
life	with	attendant	logics,	and	code	serves	to	conceptualise	how	change	operates	
on	different	instances	of	ethical	navigation.	
	
																																																								
79	I	refer	here	to	the	“not	this	gay/trans/black/immigrant”	etc.	narrative	
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My	argument	reconstructs	trans	as	the	somatechnical	formation	of	a	changing	
ensouled	body	in	line	with	these	terms	from	chapter	two.	As	can	be	
acknowledged	from	existing	trans	lives,	through	e.g.	Riley	Snorton	and	Jin	
Haritaworn’s	argument	about	the	existence	of	transnormative	subjects	(2013),	
trans	as	such	is	not	radical,	even	though	it	remains	nonnormative.	Trans	can	
articulate	itself	through	normative	patterns,	either	for	survival,	camouflage,	or	
desire,	and	as	such	doesn’t	guarantee	disruption	of	existing	patterns	in	the	
world,	even	if	it	might	add	to	a	turbulent	functioning.	The	lack	of	impact	can	
further	be	the	case	because	the	impact	of	agential	actions	is	too	low,	by	having	
too	small	a	field	of	operation,	or	because	nonnormative	patterns	are	relatively	
open	to	exploitation	by	the	existing	logics	as	temporal	and	passing	codes,	as	
Parisi	and	Terranova	argue	(2000,	10).	These	processes	are	conceptualised	by	
Quine	as	the	stabilisation	of	mythology	(1951,	42).	This	entails	that	experiences	
can	be	taken	as	singular,	while	governing	codes	and	logics	can	stay	intact.	The	
abstract	analytic	of	trans	pathology	can	remain	in	operation	in	the	polis,	even	if	
every	trans	person	denies	pathology.	Quine	explains	such	processes	as	
abstractions	needing	to	refer	only	to	themselves,	which	are	mapped	on	
experiences.	This	shifting	of	abstractions,	which	are	separated	from	experiences,	
creates	the	space	for	emergent	codes.	The	argument	continues	with	the	
explanation	that	models	can	change	at	the	fringes,	while	the	normative	core	
stays	intact,	because	of	such	processes:		
	
total	science	is	like	a	field	of	force	whose	boundary	conditions	are	experience	
[…]	But	the	total	field	is	so	underdetermined	by	its	boundary	conditions,	
experience,	that	there	is	much	latitude	of	choice	as	to	what	statements	to	re-
evaluate	[…]	No	particular	experiences	are	linked	with	particular	statements	in	
the	interior	of	the	field,	except	indirectly	through	considerations	of	equilibrium	
affecting	the	field	as	a	whole	(Quine	1951,	39).	
	
The	stability	of	the	monological	order	is	thus	explained	not	only	through	
severance	of	experience	and	codings,	but	also	through	mechanisms	of	internal	
bookkeeping	creating	stability	of	fields	as	a	whole.	It	is	noteworthy	to	flag	here	
Wynter’s	remark	concerning	the	role	of	the	intellectual	in	the	ongoing	
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reproduction	“of	the	genre	of	being	human,	its	mode	of	consciousness	of	mind,	
and	therefore	the	latter	truth-for.	We	are,	as	intellectuals,	the	agents	of	its	formal	
elaboration”(Wynter	2003,	307).		While	according	to	my	Wittgensteinian	reading	
intellectuals	cannot	be	said	to	have	constituted	the	form,	they	can	be	said	to	
function	as	“grammarians	of	their	orders”	(Wynter	2001,	58),	which	functions	as	
explanation	of	Quine’s	bookkeeping	for	normative	stability.		
	
For	a	nonnormative	ethics	this	leads	to	conclude	that	it	is	not	a	new	singular	
logic	which	is	needed,	one	that	replaces	the	normative	modus	operandi,	nor	a	
new	code	that	can	function	as	recoding80,	but	the	continued	formative	efforts	of	
re-coding	across	differently	situated	nonnormative	efforts.	As	Quine’s	model	
explicitly	explains	–	the	standard	can	change	at	the	fringe,	but	the	core	stays	
stable.	Disruption	of	the	fringes	at	a	variety	of	levels,	through	a	network	of	
changing,	situated,	and	communicated	codes	is	thus	necessary	to	ensure	that	
nonnormative	forms	of	life	can	find	their	own	balance	between	change	and	
equilibrium	instead	of	constantly	being	re-checked	against	the	monological	
order.		
	
A	parallel	explanation	of	agential	activity	against	the	norm,	has	been	termed	
micropolitical	by	Deleuze	and	Guattari	and	are	similarly	connected	to	the	
macropolitical	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987,	213).	In	the	conclusion	of	chapter	
three	I	argued	that	within	normativity	the	walls	of	the	polis	are	fractals	(A.	M.	
Brown	2017,	51)	and	end	in	dispositions.	Contextual	actions	are	resonating	with	
overarching	structures,	yet	not	bound	by	it,	as	logos	can	shift.	Shifts	in	logos	as	
well	as	shifts	in	logics	can	directly	contradict	the	normative	core.	My	argument	
here	is	not	to	create	the	space	for	differentiation	and	fluidity	at	a	micro	level,	but	
to	argue	that	such	action	can	lead	to	the	destabilisation	of	the	macro	levels	of	
organisation.	It	could	be	argued	that	re-codings	are	micropolitical	with	an	eye	to	
the	macropolitical	destabilization	of	monological	imposition.	Deleuze	and	
Guattari’s	vision	of	mass	is	that	is	“always	animated	by	all	kinds	of	movements	of	
decoding”	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987,	220).	To	underline,	I’m	not	suggesting	an	
																																																								
80	The	work	of	Ramon	Amaro	explains	how	different	codings	remain	operative	within	a	
monological	order.	
	 216	
escape	of	the	mass,	I	am	claiming	nonnormative	ethics	taking	place	against	the	
walls:	the	spaces	of	exclusion	and	othering	that	are	material	and	structural,	as	
well	as	dispositional.	To	be	excluded	results,	in	contrast	to	a	debate	in	the	polis	
about	‘inclusion’,	only	in	escape.		
	
Nonnormative	re-codings	are	contextual,	but	traverse	across	contexts	by	
abstraction.	Traversing	creates	networks,	which	lift	codes	above	the	contextual	
in	an	on-going	resonating	between	macro	and	micro	levels.	Braidotti	reminds	to	
avoid	generalisation,	which	can	be	envisioned	as	an	overstretching	of	the	
duration	and	impact	of	emerging	ethical	codes	(Braidotti	2011,	269).	Codes	here,	
do	not	produce	rigid	grids	of	categorisation	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987,	223),	
but,	I	would	suggest,	waypoints	to	direct	vectors	of	ethical	relationality	along	(cf.	
Kelley	2003).	A	rigid	field	of	force	imposes	itself	upon	agents,	while	in	contrast	a	
nonnormative	field	of	forces	forms	relational	codes	as	the	pragmatics	of	ethics.	
As	Parisi	and	Terranova	warned,	this	enables	control,	but	could	alternatively	
open	up	ethics	(2000).	A	nonnormative	ethics	against	the	walls	of	the	polis	thus	
suggests	that	the	micropolitical	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987,	199)	is	thus	perhaps	
better	articulated	as	micro-ethical,	because	these	are	the	emergence	of	new	
forms	of	life,	and	not	articulations	of	a	new	polis.		
		
	
Opacity	and	Surface	Tension	
	
As	I	have	argued	in	chapter	three,	agents	with	different	logos	find	connection	
through	different	logics	and	demonic	engagement.	This	micro-ethical	pragmatic	
of	relations	can	be	understood	as	multilogical	connections.	In	addition,	if	
relationality	cannot	be	crafted	within	the	available	connections	of	shared	forms	
of	life,	codes	could	be	suggestive	of	a	further	possibility	of	bridging.	However,	if	
codes	and	logos	are	claimed	to	overlap,	then	it	can	be	justifiably	feared	that	the	
problems	of	pathology,	transphobia,	and	racism	re-emerge.	A	theory	of	
nonnormative	ethics	thus	needs	to	disinvest	from	interiority,	in	order	to	avoid	
this	problem.	This	situates	an	approach	to	affect	and	to	codification.	
Notwithstanding	the	earlier	argument	that	affects	cannot	face	the	unknown,	in	
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emerging	ethics	affect	could	be	seen	to	carry	some	weight	of	connection.	
However,	theories	centring	affect	seem	disinvested	from	the	tools	for	theorizing	
emergence	post	negation.	Puar	explicitely	claims	that	a	trans	becoming	is:		
a	divestment	of	codes,	of	signification,	of	identity	and	a	process	of	taking	on	the	
register	of	the	impersonal.	Becoming	is	not	about	trying	to	make	the	body	more	
capacitated	but	about	allowing	and	reading	more	multiplicity,	multiplicities	of	
the	impersonal	and	of	the	imperceptible”	(Puar	2015,	63).		
To	divest	as	a	tool	of	letting	go	of	categorisations	and	clarity	creates	an	
indeterminate	becoming.	An	emphasises	on	the	indeterminate	in	theorizations	of	
becoming	and	change,	seems	to	come	with	a	tendency	to	halt	conceptualisations	
before	new	forms	of	life	develop	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987,	232ff;	Ahmed	
2010,	120;	Buchanan	2011,	8).81	My	proposal	is	to	scrutinise	these	emerging	
forms,	not	in	order	to	be	deeply	invested	in	new	codified	forms,	but	to	
acknowledge	their	existence	as	part	of	structures	in	processes	of	emergence,	
partial	or	total	if	necessary,	as	waypoint	or	foothold.	In	contrast,	a	disciplinary	
approach	can	focus	on	the	existence	and	impact	of	codes,	but	does	not	come	with	
the	tools	to	formulate	a	process	of	indeterminate	emergence,	nor	has	the	
capacity	to	suggest	codes	beyond	confinements	(Berlant	2011).	Disciplinary	
approaches	formulate	codes	as	already	constraining	with	an	emphasis	on	
codified	self-knowledge.	In	an	intriguing	combination	of	the	affective	and	
disciplinary	approaches	Alexander	Weheliye	has	discussed	disciplinary	violence	
shaping	nonnormative	positions	of	black	life	through	Spiller’s	concept	of	flesh	
(Weheliye	2014,	33;	Spillers	1987).	Weheliye	aligns	this	enfleshed	brutalised	
being	as	the	possible	starting	ground	for	new	forms	of	life,	also	beyond	the	walls	
of	the	polis	(Weheliye	2014,	138).	In,	hopefully,	an	extension	of	the	discussion,	
because	I	do	not	disagree	with	Weheliye’s	argument,	I	have	offered	arguments	
for	the	ethical	emergence	of	agents	outside	of	the	polis.	I	believe	this	is	justified	
by	having	shown	how	new	forms	of	life	find	their	starting	point	in	the	body.	This	
seems	an	extension	of	Weheliye’s	arguments	who	claims	the	flesh	might	lead	to	a	
“different	modality	of	existence”	(Weheliye	2014,	112).	Focusing	on	the	
																																																								
81	An	interesting	work	that	does	the	opposite	is	RDG	Kelley’s	Freedom	Dreams,	which	links	the	political	imaginary	with	
lived	struggles	and	experiments(Kelley	2003).		
	 218	
impossibility	of	life	within	existing	epistemologies	cannot	formulate	a	possibility	
beyond	the	starting	point.	This	is	exemplified	in	the	impossibility	of	inclusion	of	
ungendered	flesh	(Weheliye	2014,	81,	96,	97).	I	am	in	agreement,	which	is	why	I	
have	focused	on	creativity	in	the	emergence	of	codes	as	suggested	by	Wynter	
(Wynter	2003,	304),	as	a	way	of	clearing	new	ground	to	think	emerging	forms	of	
life	beyond	current	constraints	on.	This	will	direct	the	discussion	to	a	trans	
becoming	based	on	forms	beyond	dominant	norms,	that	need	neither	be	
captured	in	the	polis,	nor	be	violently	pushed	outside	its	walls	as	Agamben	
argues	(1998),	or	be	marooned	on	a	“demonic	island”	(Weheliye	2014,	136).	
Instead,	I	will	continue	my	argumentation	from	the	demonic	grounds	outside	of	
the	polis,	perhaps	laying	siege,	or	involved	in	a	Weheliyan	“guerrilla	warfare”	
(Weheliye	2014,	137)	by	somatechnical	emergence	of	nonnormative	coding	and	
techne,	that	aim	to	bring	the	polis’	walls	down.	Tying	flesh	in	with	the	discussion	
of	chapter	three;	these	techne	should	be	structured	by	loss,	as	gift	of	generosity	
in	relation.	Note	in	the	quote	of	Puar	that	divesting	in	order	to	come	to	
multipliticities	of	relation	a	notion	of	loss	can	be	easily	embraced.		
	
	
Intention,	Opacity,	and	Surface	
	
I	have	argued	above	that	intentions	are	irrelevant	in	moments	of	multilogical	
engagement,	because	of	differences	in	logic.	This	allows	the	emergence	of	codes	
through	any	means	available,	which	need	not	come	with	shared	explanations.	
Instead	of	proposing	an	intentional	and	axiomatic	emergence,	I	aim	to	look	at	the	
structure	of	relation.	Justifications	about	inequality	in	situations	of	monological	
imposition	are	part	of	the	imposition	(Césaire	2000	passim).	Resorting	to	
principles	functions	as	teleological-epistemological	justification	for	‘unintended	
outcomes’	on	the	basis	of	‘fair	principles’.	As	Wittgenstein’s	conceptualisation	
has	shown,	the	outcomes	and	decisions	are	already	embedded	with	the	
agreement	on	the	principles	and	are	expressive	of	a	form	of	life.	Approaches	
based	on	intentions	and	principles	primarily	legitimise	the	monological	order.	
Furthermore,	supposed	clarity	of	intentions	are	used	to	pathologies	those	
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outside	of	the	polis	as	argued	in	chapter	one.	Scrutiny	of	intentions	thus	serves	to	
legitimise	the	post	hoc	principles,	that	reinscribe	the	current	division	of	power	
(Wekker	2016).	This	necessitates	the	understanding	that	codes	are	temporal,	
and	partial	in	their	functioning	between	agents	and	forms	of	life.		
	
For	nonnormative	ethics	there	is	an	important	difference	between	opacity	
(Glissant	1997)	and	thingification	(Césaire	2000).	Thingification	is	the	extreme	
figuring	of	the	black	body	as	matter	only.	If	the	necessity	of	unearthing	
intentionality	is	put	into	question,	anxiety	that	this	might	lead	to	an	acceleration	
of	thingification	is	justified.	The	walls	of	the	polis	function	by	projection	and	
extraction,	and	minimizing	intentionality	does	not	legitimise	the	practice,	but	
also	seems	not	to	curb	it.	Thingification	is	the	extreme	operation	of	a	
monological	ordering	on	the	world,	reducing	black	bodies	to	commodities	
(Césaire	2000,	42).	An	extension	of	this	functioning	of	the	imposition	of	codes	
lies	in	pathologising,	as	a	form	of	dehumanization,	of	trans	bodies	in	processes	of	
forced	sterilization	and	disposability.	While	racialised	bodies	are	enclosed	in	kin	
structures	based	on	eugenical	operations	of	the	norm	(Wynter	2003),	trans	
bodies	are	categorized	in	the	forced	kinships	of	singular	ordering	–	as	
pathologically	invented	beings.	Trans	processes	of	dysselection	do	not	follow	
racialised	understandings	such	as	Wynter	analyses	of	dysselection	(Wynter	and	
McKittrick	2015,	60),	but	functions	within	an	understanding	of	procreation.	
Dysselection	in	this	form	functions	through	physical	modification	as	forced	
sterilization,	which	codifies	agents	as	being	culled	out	of	the	eugenical	or	
dysgenical	line.	These	impositions	of	trans	modification	are	thus	differentiated	
according	to	racialization	(cf.	Wadiwel	2009)	and	come	down	to	differing	
processes	of	thingification	and	demonization.	At	the	extreme	end	of	the	singular	
ordering	is	the	black	trans	femme/woman	that	signifies	an	impossibility	of	
existence	in	normative	eyes	(Spade	2011;	Weheliye	2014;	McDonald,	Stanley,	
and	Smith	2015).	These	positions	get	further	reinscribed	by	already	ordering	the	
trans	feminine	body	as	predator,	removing	them	not	only	from	the	
heteronormative	space	of	procreation,	but	ushering	trans	femmes	in	a	space	of	
unlovability.	In	the	monological	ordering	there	is	the	double	effect	of	
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thingification	as	commodification,	as	well	as	intention	ascription	in	the	form	of	
pathology	and	criminalization	(McDonald,	Stanley,	and	Smith	2015).		
	
In	order	for	a	nonnormative	ethics	to	function	outside	of	this	extreme	violence	
inflicted	upon	bodies,	it	is	inevitable	postulate	the	existence	of	logos	to	evade	
thingification,	but	disinvest	from	ascriptions	of	interiority.	Logos	as	undefined	
formation,	as	opposed	to	systems	of	signs,	which	already	carry	interlocking	
connections	–	such	as	psychoanalysis	(Césaire	2000,	59),	or	physiological	
explanations	leading	to	the	specifics	of	bodily	being,	is	in	my	argument	a	non-
prescriptive	suggestion	of	particular	agential	formation:	it	claims	indeterminate	
affirmative	formation.	However,	the	claim	to	an	indeterminate	logos	and	
underdefined	relationality	can	only	function	when	it	operates	under	“a	
pragmatics	of	mutual	inclusion”	(Massumi	2014,	49)	creating	space	for	mutuality,	
before	a	logic	of	exclusion	and	separability	applies	(Da	Silva	2016,	60).	In	chapter	
three	I	situated	my	argument	around	loss	of	logos	in	order	to	counter	exclusion	
and	create	space	for	emergent	relationality.	It	needs	to	be	noted	here,	that	not	all	
agents	can	face	equal	loss	–	some	agents	have	so	little	to	lose	that	the	leeway	in	
which	their	shifts	of	logos	can	happen	has	been	filled	with	exploitation	(cf.	
Weheliye	2014;	Spillers	1987).	I	do	not	want	to	suggest	that	agents	come	with	a	
standard	of	possible	loss.	Shifts	remain	contextual	and	are	dependent	on	the	
needed	displacements	of	logos	as	well	as	the	material	space	there	is	available	to	
navigate.	Weheliye’s	argument	leads	to	the	conclusion	that		“[t]o	have	been	
touched	by	the	flesh,	then,	is	the	path	to	the	abolition	of	Man”	(Weheliye	2014,	
138).	Weheliye	centralizes	loss,	but	it	is	the	loss	of	exclusion	and	
dehumanization	that	leads	to	the	possibility	of	generation.	It	is	the	total	loss,	
which	enables	abolition	of	the	polis	–	of	Man.	My	more	modest	proposal	is	to	
have	this	structure	of	loss	functioning	in	making	relations	between	those	
attempting	escape,	those	excluded,	and	those	resisting	the	polis.		
	
Outside	of	the	monological	order,	in	the	demonic	spaces	the	claim	to	opacity	
guarantees	both	an	engagement	leaving	one’s	reflective	and	dispositional	
processes	unpathologised,	while	at	the	same	time	making	space	to	operations	of	
generosity	and	loss.	I	have	argued	for	this	point	in	chapter	two	through	Lugones’	
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concept	of	world-travelling,	which	give	up	ease	and	could	be	seen	to	be	
suggestive	of	loss	and	embracing	opacity	(Lugones	2003,	86).	Opacity	thus	
underlines	the	existence	of	another’s	agency,	by	accepting	it	unconditionally	as	
the	surface	tension	within	the	engagement.	By	leaving	space	for	differentially	
operating	logos,	the	question	to	intentionality	need	not	be	asked,	as	it	is	already	
postulated.	While	in	chapter	three	I	argued	for	the	space	of	the	meeting	as	the	
acknowledgment	daimons,	here	the	question	arises	in	renewed	form	asking	how	
codes	operate	without	immediate	presence	or	demonic	entanglement	in	forms	of	
life.	The	question	that	surfaces	is	how	to	meet	across	different	fields	of	force	and	
what	ground	can	be	found	in	between.	At	the	most	extreme	the	opacity	leads	to	
the	incompossibility	of	meeting	as	is	exemplified	by	Wittgenstein’s	talking	lion	
example	(Bowell	2009,	7;	Wittgenstein	2010	PPF	327),	where	Wittgenstein	
claims	that	even	if	a	lion	could	speak	we	could	not	understand	what	was	said,	
because	our	forms	of	life	are	so	different.	Wittgenstein	problematizes	the	idea	
that	the	form	of	language	is	sufficient	to	enable	understanding,	because	the	form	
of	life	that	resonates	through	the	available	terms	is	out	of	reach	of	understanding	
(Wittgenstein	2010,	235e	327).	It	bears	reminding,	that	this	does	not	mean	that	
there	can	be	no	connection,	as	the	ensouled	body	comes	with	dunamis	that	enable	
connection	across	more	than	language.		
	
Furthermore,	as	discussed	above	light	hearted	and	contextually	available	
imageries	can	create	temporal	codifications	which	can	structure	exchanges	
leading	to	forms	of	language.	The	need	for	these	quick	codes	of	little	weight	does	
not	need	to	arise	out	of	the	logical	space	but	can,	as	I	have	argued	above,	arise	
out	of	available	pictures,	situations,	and	present	environmental	cues	on	the	
condition	that	the	meeting	is	not	structured	by	the	demand	for	monological	
imposition.	Available	tools	are	thus	merely	pragmatic	techniques	for	establishing	
a	space	of	non-aggression	in	order	for	processes	of	emergence	to	take	place.	
Intention	ascription	on	the	other	hand,	can	thus	be	seen	to	provide	a	technology	
to	the	monological	denizens	of	the	polis	to	protect	their	own	logic,	claim	
axiomatic	innocence,	while	subjugating	others,	in	the	name	of	political-ethical	
rationality.			
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Opacity	and	Abstraction	
	
Opacity	on	the	ethical	level	thus	needs	to	come	with	inter-agential	approaches	
that	do	not	centre	either	accessible	interiority	or	principled	development.	
Emergent	codes	to	bridge	agential	logos	can	be	found	in	environmentally	present	
practices,	occurrences,	or	haphazardly	applied	imagery.	While	the	codes	can	
have	contextual	bearing,	they	are	also	immediately	abstract	as	they	do	not	lay	
claim	to	internalised	connections,	even	if	these	codes	can	become	part	of	the	
navigated	environment	and	thereby	influence	the	formation	of	logos.	Agential	
loss	as	the	willingness	to	open	up	one’s	logos	to	change	can	therefore	only	be	
self-accepted	in	this	abstract	reading	of	multi-logical	connection.	Considering	
that	the	interaction	can	also	be	partial,	pragmatic,	or	circumstantial,	these	
bridges	can	emerge	and	burn	fast.	However,	opacity	creates	the	possibility	to	
open	connection	between	agents	without	necessitating	accounts	of	
understanding	that	need	to	be	negotiated	between	experience	of	the	agent	and	
the	non-experience	of	the	hearer	(van	der	Drift	2016;	Abbas	2010;	Weheliye	
2014).	Demands	for	understanding	create	an	inequality	in	which	the	founding	
experience	–	that	which	makes	the	difference	–	needs	to	be	articulated,	to	those	
who	do	not	have	the	experience,	in	order	to	be	‘recognised’.	Abbas	articulates:	
“[t]he	sensorium	sponsored	by	liberalism	assigns	undisputed	value	to	a	form	of	
expressed	suffering	as	fitting	with	recognition,	inclusion,	and	empowerment”	
(Abbas	2010).	The	recognition	is	not	an	open	form,	but	a	form	of	devaluation	by	
articulating	itself	as	subjugated	by	the	power	it	addresses	itself	to.	This	not	only	
devaluates	agents	and	experience,	but	its	structure	is	by	necessity	based	in	
incompossibility.	Such	epistemological	recognition	is	thus	immediately	
misrecognition,	with	as	added	problem	a	case	of	‘wounded	attachments’	(W.	
Brown	1995),	holding	on	to	foundational	pain	in	order	not	to	lose	the	
codification	that	forms	one’s	rearticulated	social	self.	Weheliye	critizes	this	take	
by	arguing	that	those	‘attachments’	serve	as	platform	to	demand	rights	
(Weheliye	2014,	76).	Weheliye’s	explanation	opens	possibility	of	opacity	in	such	
interactions,	while	material	injuries	are	sufficient	without	an	interiorised	
understanding	that	needs	to	be	explicated	and	validated.	Weheliye	argues	that	
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the	insistence	on	pain	is	a	counter-effect	for	the	dismissal	of	violence	and	injury,	
not	so	much	an	articulation	of	identity	(Weheliye	2014,	77).	While	Brown	points	
to	‘identity’	as	epistemological	claim,	Weheliye	nods	to	it	as	code	for	enduring	
material	circumstances.	Taking	this	nod	a	step	further,	I	have	defended	the	claim	
for	agential	opacity,	by	removing	interiority	entirely.		
	
Glissant’s	“right	to	opacity	for	everyone”	(Glissant	1997,	194)	deepens	
understanding	of	the	somatechnical	level	of	ethics.	Glissant	uses	the	term	
‘opacity’	in	a	lineage	ranging	from	‘greek	mythologies’	where	opacity	is	always	
‘the	other’	in	conjunction	with	a	transparency	of	the	self	(Glissant	1997,	49).	The	
other	is	never	legitimised,	and	forever	reduced	to	the	transparency	the	self	can	
wrangle	out	of	this	other.	“Either	the	other	is	assimilated,	or	else	it	is	
annihilated”	(ibid.).	The	possibility	of	coming	into	relations	with	opaque	others	is	
precisely	by	not	questioning	the	legitimacy	(Glissant	1997,	55).	This	discarding	
of	legitimacy	is	possible	because	the	agent	does	not	claim	to	be	transparent	to	
oneself,	nor	structured	around	a	specific	legitimacy.	The	polis	does	not	structure	
a	claim	to	relation,	nor	is	interiority	providing	the	fundaments.	The	resultant	
agential	action	focuses	on	environments	and	is	thus	contextual,	and	logos	
emerges	by	navigating	ensouled	bodies	past	dominant	codings	as	well	as	local	
forms.	Eva	Hayward	terms	such	nonnormative	interactions	between	body	and	
environment	‘transpositions’,	which	can	be	“perversions	or	deviations,	
misdirections	that	discompose	order	and	arrangement”	(Hayward	2012,	92).	
These	transpositions	are	sensuous	modalities	of	change.	The	importance	of	
emphasis	on	sensations	does	not	lie	on	a	privileging	of	affect,	but	on	the	
underlining	of	the	absence	of	articulations	when	faced	with	agential	change.	The	
situatedness	of	action	flags	existing	codings,	while	the	emergence	of	logos	
simultaneously	holds	the	door	open	to	transpositions	onto	new	forms.	In	these	
circumstances	narration	of	experience	needs	to	translate	into	abstractions	if	it	is	
to	move	across	contexts.	While	it	can	be	important	to	flag	narration	as	tool,	
shifting	the	focus	to	codings	allows	for	ruptures	of	understanding	and	
association,	rather	than	nudging	formation	or	transposition	back	to	more	
linearly	teleological	formats,	such	as	‘transitions’	may	suggest.	Opacity	functions	
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here	as	possibility	to	change	without	confession	and	demanded	self-codification,	
and	thus	functions	as	openness	to	the	possibility	of	unexpected	emergence	of	
logos.	Furthermore,	it	can	alleviate	the	pressure	of	clarity	on	the	agent,	and	allow	
navigations	to	sensuously	fold	open	new	spaces	between	agents	as	possibility	of	
relation.	This	allows	further	emergence	of	new	forms,	without	demands	for	
explanation.			
	
Contextual	forms	can	become	codes	that	do	not	stay	in	place,	but	migrate	under	
the	radar	of	the	polis,	opening	knowledge	and	attachment	to	agents,	not	as	
subject	formation,	but	sharing	of	access	to	insights.	Where	the	first	makes	a	claim	
to	knowledge	explaining	the	place	of	the	subject	in	terms	localizable	as	social	
positions	(Lugones	2003,	140)	the	second	is	less	descriptive,	as	it	is	a	mere	
indication	of	operations	against	imposition	and	possibilities	for	negation	that	
still	need	to	find	rearticulation	in	localised	logos.	These	codings	can	be	footholds	
or	waypoints,	or	flag	possible	vectors.	The	notion	of	opacity	guarantees	an	agent	
space	for	an	emerging	logos	as	well	as	the	possibility	to	change	emerging	codes	
based	on	further	traversing	along	temporal	vectors:	“[t]he	thought	of	opacity	
distracts	me	from	absolute	truths	whose	guardian	I	believe	myself	to	be”	
(Glissant	1997,	192).	Opacity	thus	works	as	multi-way	process	to	create	space	
between	agents	as	explanation	of	material	circumstances,	as	well	as	for	the	
experience	of	an	agent	itself.	The	practical	truth	of	agents	and	the	logical-
affective	relationality	does	not	need	to	constitute	a	definite	version	of	the	world,	
but	can	remain	in	the	realm	of	the	pragmatic.		
	
My	conceptualisation	of	nonnormative	ethics	resulted	in	the	absence	of	the	need	
to	communicate	experiential-epistemological	codification	across	differences	–	
this	is	a	claim	recognition	theory	makes,	needing	to	translate	relevant	interiority	
into	narrations	of	difference	and	similarity	(Bhanji	2012a;	Bannerji	2000,	48).	
This	returns	the	perspective	on	codifications	to	being	operative	on	surfaces	
instead	of	‘felt	insides’.	Practical	truth	translates	as	the	navigation	of	codes,	
material	spaces,	and	connections	with	agents,	but	does	not	need	to	become	a	
claim	that	is	carried	forward	as	similarity	and	unworked	connection	across	
analogue	codifications.	Here	I	am	returning	to	a	point	elaborated	in	chapter	two	
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–	theory	and	practice	need	not	be	connected	–	that	is:	theoretical	categorization	
and	practical	lives	do	necessarily	not	overlap	(Wiggins	2001b).	This	is	directly	
contesting	disciplinary	formation,	a	theorization	that	does	not	need	to	be	
discarded,	but	can	be	incorporated	as	a	code	that	is	navigated.	This	runs	parallel	
to	Weheliye	(2014),	who	argues	for	an	oscillation	between	discipline	and	the	
fugitivity	this	contains.	Weheliye’s	insights	can	provide	contrast	with	the	
conceptualisation	of	Parisi	and	Terranova,	by	elaborating	that	discipline	is	
ingrained	in	turbulence,	as	yet	another	mechanism	creating	differentiation	for	
exploitation.	However,	Weheliye	also	creates	space	to	unfurl	under	the	radar	of	
the	constraining	codes.	This	means	we	are	not	necessarily	who	we	say	we	are,	or	
we	are	not	who	you	say	we	are.	Abstract	codes	need	not	reach	the	soul,	but	leave	
space	for	renegotiation	and	resistance.	This	point	is	further	underlined	by	
Sharpe,	that	life	does	not	only	happen	in	subjection	(Sharpe	2016,	4).	Echoes	of	
such	experiences	are	found	in	Stone	(Stone	1991)	who	makes	it	as	demand	to	tell	
trans’	own	stories.	My	argument	has	led	to	a	nuance	about	bridging	the	space	of	
resisting	totalising	notions	and	exploratory	agential	action	with	the	argument	
that	was	found	in	Preciado,	discussed	in	chapter	one,	about	the	gap	between	
norms	and	person.	The	current	argument	stands	without	having	to	withdraw	
into	ontological	escapes	of	untouched	personhood	that	somehow	is	able	to	
retract	from	its	body	and	the	space	around	it,	as	I	have	discussed	in	chapter	one	
(P.	B.	Preciado	2013).	Instead	an	agent’s	logos	is	always	a	navigation	of	codes,	
and	can	thus	reside	in	indeterminate	space.	Codes	can	find	resonance	with	logos,	
or	remain	detached	from	logos	and	be	used	as	imagery,	but	also	find	deep	
connection.	The	code	will	always	function	in	abstraction,	as	code	is	not	logos.	
Code	is	the	relational	linkage	between	different	logos.	However,	not	all	codes	are	
accepted	by	all	agents,	and	codes	are	thus	not	uncontested,	but	resisted,	changed,	
and	a	variety	of	contradictory	codings	can	be	operative	at	the	same	time.		
	
My	proposal	extends	navigation	and	the	existence	of	differential	logos	to	all	
agents,	instead	of	being	the	exceptional	realm	of	a	radical	few.	That	means	that	
navigation	and	formation	of	a	logos	is	perhaps	more	explicit	outside	of	
mainstream,	but	certainly	not	unique	to	nonnormative	agents.	Tying	Berlant	
(Berlant	2007)	in	at	this	stage,	normative	aspiration	can	thus	be	postulated	as	
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universal	for	every	body	that	is	closed	out	of	the	norm,	while	it	is	irrelevant	for	
those	closed	in	by	the	norm,	as	they	are	carried	forward	by	it.	Since	forms	of	life	
can	be	construed	in	such	a	way	that	certain	agents	are	necessarily	disadvantaged	
and	unable	to	live	according	to	these	norms,	codes	can	operate	cruelly,	by	having	
agents	aspire	to,	and	thus	support,	forms	of	life	that	are	obstacles	to	their	
flourishing	(Berlant	2011,	1).	Different	positions	have	different	codes	to	
navigate,	while	it	is	not	necessary	that	agents	are	determined	by	those	codes.	
Norms	are	thus	not	‘embodied’	as	such,	but	agents	direct	their	formation	
towards	certain	ends	and	negotiate	their	dispositional	development	under	
varying	circumstances.	These	normative	environments	either	enable	relatively	
unproblematic	threshold	conditions	for	some,	for	instance	for	truth-
qualifications	in	normatively	positioned	speakers,	or	alternatively	bar	agents	
from	stably	residing	in	the	normative	conditions,	up	onto	the	aggressive	
codification	of	dehumanisation.	These	conditions	are	consequently	operative	as	
fields	of	force	determining	the	environment	of	codification	and	navigation	as	
argued	in	chapter	three.		
	
The	pressure	of	imposed	codification	is	pushing	against	present	knowledge	of	
different	forms	of	life,	local	codes,	and	underground	formation.	The	demands	of	
access	to	politics	in	the	polis	claim	agents	in	regimes	that	move	them	away	from	
their	nonnormative	logos	accepting	code	as	if	it	is	logos.	Articulations	within	this	
frame	that	are	not	explicitly	camouflage,	become	aspirations	or	respectability	
(Raha	2015;	Irving	2008).	This	is	injurious	as	it	switches	logos	with	code;	it	
pretends	abstraction	is	formation.	Not	only	constitutes	this	a	removal	from	the	
contextual	environment,	it	places	aspiration	before	experience,	claiming	
abstraction	is	necessary	to	understand	one’s	logos.	This	sweeps	different	forms	
of	life	under	a	single	heading,	which	is	the	normative	representational	demand	of	
the	polis.	Such	a	replacement	of	logos	with	code	lays	claim,	for	instance,	to	an	
interiority	of	a	single	form	of	rationality	as	universal	and	expanding	over	the	
walls	of	the	polis	from	a	selected	few	onto	demonic	others.	It	denies	
nonnormative	logics	while	aiming	to	replace	it	with	normative	code.82	This	
																																																								
82	These	practices	are	every	day	in	pathological	processes	such	as	trans,	but	also	in	prisons	
(Haney	2010).	
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constitutes	a	rule	over	interiority	through	exteriority.	It	is	the	pressure	inward	
as	claim	to	shared	grounds	that	are	encapsulations	by	the	normative	order	of	the	
polis.		
	
Christina	Sharpe	counters	such	extreme	conditions:	“even	as	we	experienced,	
recognized	and	lived	subjection,	we	did	not	simply	or	only	live	in	subjection	and	
as	the	subjected”	(Sharpe	2016,	4).	The	pressure	of	the	dominant	code	does	not	
discipline	simpliciter.	Sharpe	continues	“[d]espite	knowing	otherwise,	we	are	
often	disciplined	into	thinking	through	and	along	lines	that	reinscribe	our	own	
annihilation,	reinforcing	and	reproducing	what	Sylvia	Wynter	(1994,	70)	has	
called	our	“narratively	condemned	status”.	We	must	become	undisciplined”	
(Sharpe	2016,	13	italics	mine).	This	undisciplining	recalls	Hayward’s	earlier	
articulations	of	disordering	as	form	of	transposition,	and	unmasks	the	operation	
of	cruel	optimism	by	turning	away	from	it.		
	
Sharpe	argues	that	to	know	that	force	of	subjugation	is	to	know	each	other	
(Sharpe	2016,	34).	Recipients	and	perpetrators	of	aggressive	codifications	know	
each	other	as	violence	–	one	receives	it	and	another	projects	it.	Camouflage	
against	that	force	is	a	first	possibility	to	re-opening	space.	A	further	line	of	
defence	suggested	by	opacity	clears	this	fog	of	war	of	imagined	lucidity	and	
claims	the	meeting	on	the	surface	as	sufficient	acknowledgement	of	ethical	and	
epistemological	tension.	Nonnormative	codings	are	a	pragmatic	re-description	of	
surface	tensions,	which	allows	new	forms	of	life	to	emerge,	because	they	are	
shared	and	not	imposed.	Surface	tension	serves	as	replacement	of	imposed	
codification.	This	tension	is	felt	before	there	is	codification	of	relation,	and	
perhaps	even	after	(Lugones	2003,	90;	Rodríguez	2014,	141).	Opacity	
furthermore	allows	the	ethics	of	turbulence	to	emerge	as	simpler	tensions	
finding	footholds	in	flux.		
	
I	will	recapitulate	the	working	of	codifications	in	order	to	introduce	further	
nuance;	I	have	introduced	the	distinction	between	force	of	imposition	and	
tension,	whereby	force	is	one-directional	and	tension	multi-directional.	Force	
translates	outward	aggression	as	pressure	directed	inwards.	The	double	
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negation	of	the	normative	agent	is	thus	primarily	a	negation	of	its	direct	
environment	in	order	to	assume	normative	power.	The	codification	of	the	norm	
shapes	a	one-sided	interaction	based	on	negation	of	mutual	realities.	Abstraction	
demands	in	the	normative	modality	clarity	interaction	as	determined	relation,	
foreclosing	mutuality.	This	connection	is	felt	as	force,	when	mutual	relationality	
is	absent,	as	figures	in	the	work	of	Ahmed	(2010).		
	
In	contrast,	the	double	negation	of	the	agent	within	nonnormative	somatechnical	
formation	is	the	negation	of	existing	normative	codifications	and	opening	the	
possibility	of	relationality,	as	I	have	articulated	in	chapters	two	and	three.	
Abstract	codes	in	their	nonnormative	modality	can	function	as	indicators	of	
possibility,	by	which	connections	can	be	envisioned.	However,	when	relationality	
is	structured	around	opacity,	the	possibility	of	seamless	logical	connection	must	
be	given	up.	An	acknowledgement	of	opacity	and	agency	only	offers	surface	
tension	as	site	for	connection.	Tension	is	a	mutual	pressure,	which	is	a	necessary	
presence	in	the	emergence	of	new	forms	–	imposition	is	only	a	singular	pressure:	
monological	and	monodirectional.	Tension	forms	abstract	codes	on	the	surface	
of	meetings	enabling	mutual	connection	through	a	shared	sign.	Tension	is	the	
invisible	possibility	of	connection,	which	could	be	a	ghostly	feeling	expressive	of	
affective	structures	(Muñoz	2009,	41)	or	the	felt	presence	of	different	demons.	
Muñoz	explains	how	keywords	such	as	ghosts	open	up	the	possibility	to	see	how	
“structures	of	feeling	link	queers	across	different	identity	markers”	(Muñoz	
2009,	47).	Codings,	such	as	these,	enable	“traversing	across	categorical	
distinctions”	(Muñoz	2009,	46).	What	I	have	added	to	this	understanding	is	that	
these	traversals	of	codes	through	new	tensions	come	with	the	emergence	of	new	
collective	codes.	This	relies	partly	on	the	hopeful	present	of	intangible	tensions.	
These	tensions	lever	codes	into	existence	as	the	solidification	of	felt	logics	of	
connection.	However,	with	differing	agential	logos	these	codes	need	not	be	read	
similarly,	even	though	they	will	function	as	possible	bridging	of	difference.	
	
Conceptualising	an	encompassing	transsomatechnics	within	a	structure	of	re-
coding	takes	the	view	on	emergence	away	from	personal	formation	and	
articulates	this	as	collective	process.	As	I	articulated	in	chapter	three,	demonic	
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grounds,	as	opposed	to	the	silence	at	the	heart	of	the	polis,	have	enabled	ethical	
conceptualisation	away	from	inclusion	into	the	established	platforms	of	
decision-making,	emphasizing	the	possibility	of	connecting	differing	logos	as	
collaborative	multilogical	emergence.	New	codes	need	not	assimilate	many	into	
one	overarching	theme	–	there	is	no	singular	topos	necessary,	as	local	codes	will	
do.		
	
To	sum	up,	abstractions	give	insight	in	moving	away	from	pre-coded	and	pre-
narrated	forms	of	life.	In	chapter	two,	I	argued	that	new	forms	of	life	emerge	out	
of	ensouled	bodily	vectors	with	undetermined	ends.	In	chapter	three	I	offered	
arguments	for	thinking	about	collectivities	out	of	the	polis	–	not	only	as	not	
included,	but	also	out	of	the	confinements	of	political	thought.	This	can	be	
envisioned	as	a	meeting	of	logically	incompatible	connections	between	
differently	ensouled	bodies,	leading	to	multilogical	ethics.	The	discussion	in	this	
chapter	has	focused	on	emergent	forms	and	re-codings	as	meetings	on	the	
surface,	where	the	newness	arising	out	of	the	tension	of	differing	logos	and	
mythologies	can	entangle.		
	
	
Order	of	Codes	
	
Code	in	the	polis	is	based	on	order,	necessitated	by	two	main	consequences	of	
organisation.	The	first	is	that	subjugated	agents	have	no	particular	reason	to	stay	
subjugated,	whereby	a	regime	of	control	follows	immediately	from	the	
introduction	of	the	ranking	as	such.	The	second	is	subsequent	to	the	first,	
because,	as	was	discussed	in	chapter	three,	the	citizens	in	the	polis	cannot	lay	
claim	to	connection,	other	than	through	subjugation	and	have	to	deny	(subsets)	
of	their	experiences,	or	actively	evade	having	experiences	of	the	humanity	of	
their	‘subordinates’.		The	lack	of	connection	further	necessitates	order	and	
control,	as	there	is	no	further	recourse	to	connectivity.	This	then,	leads	to	the	
question	of	legitimacy,	which	is	ultimately	summed	up	in	the	master	code.		
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Outside	of	the	polis,	where	relationality	can	be	attempted,	as	this	does	not	come	
with	imposition,	codes	are	partial,	based	on	opacity	and	in	their	possible	
contradictions	based	on	navigating	surroundings	that	do	not	come	with	
automatic	procedures	of	social	placement.	As	Stephano	Harney	states:	“there’s	
no	such	thing	as	a	white	community.	A	white	community	is	a	contradiction	in	
terms,	an	oxymoron.	You	can’t	organize	an	oxymoron”	(Harney,	Schapira,	and	
Montgomery	2017).	The	attempted	relationality	outside	the	polis	does	not	
guarantee	absence	of	imposition,	but	inside	the	polis	imposition	is	fundamental.	
The	demonic	disorder	beyond	the	walls	is	partly	possible	because	of	the	
extension	of	agents	beyond	the	knowable,	the	lucid	and	the	articulable.	Demonic	
logos	is	not	based	on	a	single	grid	of	reasons,	but	on	particular	and	mostly	
practical	truth,	found	technes	of	connection,	that	are	admitted	to	lay	outside	a	
claim	to	truth.	Codes	in	the	polis	do	claim	the	monological	ordering	as	based	on	
truth,	which	is	therefore	necessarily	singular,	dominating,	and	constraining	
alternatives.	The	codifications	of	the	polis	are	just	as	mythical	as	the	demonic	
codifications,	but	the	stakes	in	the	polis	are	higher:	a	system	of	exploitation	
enabling	eudaimonia	for	a	few	over	the	lives	of	many.	The	difference	in	structure	
might	be	understood	to	be	that	in	the	polis	agents	are	referred	to	by	their	role	
and	outside	the	polis	are	addressed	by	means	of	the	daimon.	A	role	is	lucid	and	
circumscribed	with	a	positionality,	while	the	daimon	is	unclear,	shifting,	
changing	and	has	different	forms	in	different	moments,	and	through	different	
perceivers.		
	
Cedric	Robinson	suggests	in	The	Terms	of	Order	(2016)	that	the	idea	of	
leadership	and	political	authority	works	to	circumvent	acknowledging	the	
rootedness	in	myth	and	irrationality	of	social	gatherings.	Robinson	discusses	
rationalising	layouts	highlighting	political	authority,	founding	Western	political	
thought,	including	its	alternatives	Marxism	and	Anarchism.	In	the	chapter	on	
myth,	Robinson	explains	myth	as	a	form	of	“operational	code”	(Robinson	2016,	
128).	Myths	serve	to	summarise	and	make	experiences	intelligible.	Codes,	as	
myths,	thus	function	as	summaries	of	experiences.	This	enables	both	dialogue	
and	memory	(Robinson	2016,	133).	What	is	important	and	extends	the	
reasoning	earlier	in	this	chapter	is	that	code	does	not	need	to	be	logically	
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coherent,	rational,	or	of	purely	analytical	nature	in	order	to	function.	The	
operative	function	of	code	does	not	need	to	fit	in	a	‘mathematical	understanding’	
of	action	(Robinson	2016,	144)	in	which	all	actions	and	epistemologies	of	social	
understanding	fit	a	grid	that	is	equally	accessible	to	all.	On	the	contrary,	using	
Eric	Dodds	(Dodds	1951	in;	Robinson	2016,	142ff),	Robinson	unearths	how	the	
polis	is	based	on	irrationalities	that	function	exactly	because	they	offer	a	form	of	
thought	in	which	agents	find	expression	of	experiences	that	cannot	fit	the	
pervasive	understandings.	Robinson	sums	up:		
	
[P]hysical	disorder	presented	paradigmatic	closure	with	social	disintegration;	
the	transformation	of	the	set	of	symmetrical	laws	and	equilibrium	into	twisted,	
tangled,	and	perhaps	fatal	disequilibrium.	Like	the	universe,	the	polis,	the	mind	
and	the	body	contained	the	capacity	for	chaos,	the	possibility	for	the	
disintegration	of	order	(Robinson	2016,	144).	
	
This	undoing	of	rationalised	forms	by	the	body	has	been	central	in	my	argument	
and	the	disintegration	of	order	leads	to	the	possibility	of	connection	beyond	
roles	of	normative	techne.	Robinson	highlights	in	the	discussion	how	this	idea	
demanded	a	concession	to	ordering	and	the	irrational	became	integrated	into	
order	(Robinson	2016,	146).		
	
In	the	current	discussion	the	nonnormative	undoing	of	the	ensouled	body	brings	
this	form	of	mythology	as	structure	for	irrationality	back	into	focus.	As	argued	
previously	through	the	work	of	Wittgenstein,	functional	codes	do	not	need	to	fit	
into	existing	schemes	and	can	easily	traverse	different	realms	of	experience.	
Codifications	emerging	from	this	ordering	can	therefore	be	thought	to	equally	
wrap	themselves	around	a	combination	of	rational,	affective,	and	sensible	
summaries	of	experiences	and	insights	in	order	to	bridge	various	layers	of	
contact,	memory,	and	operational	logics	(whether	they	are	physical,	social,	or	
intellectual).	This	suggests	bridging	that	has	the	ability	to	move	beyond	either	a	
singular	grid,	remain	solidly	individual,	or	needs	to	subsume	in	operational	
hierarchies.	Indeed,	Robinson	ends	with	two	claims	that	are	exceptionally	
interesting	for	the	development	of	this	argument.	After	discussing	the	social	
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relations	of	the	Tonga,	that	have	not	formed	in	response	to	Western	hierarchies,	
one	of	the	main	strands	is	that	the	claim	to	“belonging	is	open”	(Robinson	2016,	
196).	This	has	resulted	from	an	anti-hierarchical	network	of	intermingling	and	
connection,	where	different	people	can	function	according	to	their	claimed	
belonging.	The	second	claim	extends	from	the	first	claim,	and	that	is	that	in	
Tonga	kinship	structure	“all	are	equally	incomplete”	(ibid.).	Both	claims	resonate	
with	the	argument	in	this	thesis,	as	the	multilogical	relations	are	based	on	the	
creation	of	belonging,	and	furthermore	the	incompleteness	acknowledged	by	the	
Tonga,	can	be	seen	to	resonate	with	loss,	impurity	of	groups,	and	the	necessity	to	
bridge	existing	logics,	which	need	not,	and	indeed	cannot	be	done	by	the	
application	of	an	universal,	but	on	the	contrary	functions	by	laying	claim	to	the	
irrational	and	mythological	of	the	daimon	in	order	to	hold	contrasting	logics	of	
forms	in	mutual	relation.		
	
Wynter	discusses	the	connection	between	mythos	and	bios	83	as	the	sociogenic	
principle,	(Wynter	and	McKittrick	2015;	Wynter	2003,	2001).This	term,	
introduced	by	Fanon	(Fanon	1967),	is	“the	information-encoding	organizational	
principle”	(Wynter	2001,	54)	that	determines	what	feels	good	and	bad,	and	thus	
what	it	means	to	be	a	certain	‘organism’	or	living	under	a	certain	codification	
(Wynter	2001,	50).	These	codifications	function	through	“processes	of	
socialisation	effected	by	the	invented	tekhne”	(Wynter	2001,	53).	Wynter	
proposes	human	as	hybrid	between	nature	and	culture	(McKittrick	2015b,	26ff;	
Wynter	2001;	Fanon	1967,	11).	In	the	discussion	on	coding	Wynter	introduces	a	
genetic	set	of	instructions,	as	well	as	a	cultured	layer	of	codings	that	together	
inform	the	form	of	life	and	content	of	experience	of	the	agent.	At	the	same	time	
Wynter	searches	for	the	‘space	for	invention’	in	the	creation	of	forms	of	life	
(Wynter	2003,	331).	Wynter	draws	forms	of	life	(bios)	and	codes	(mythos)	in	
close	proximity	through	techne	and	ties	in	logos	closely,	in	order	to	explain	
different	experience.	In	chapter	two	my	reading	of	Aristotle’s	anima	offered	an	
entanglement	of	the	ensouled	body	of	the	agent	with	its	environment	through	a	
set	of	dunamis	–	powers	of	interaction	–	that	inform	through	actions	a	
formational	logos.	This	reading	allowed	me	to	stake	a	claim	to	changing	bodies,	
																																																								
83	Bios	here	can	be	understood	as	form	of	life	as	I’ve	been	using	it	throughout	the	thesis		
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away	from	a	reading	of	‘bodily	stability’,	as	Wynter	does,	that	is	further	informed	
by	cultural	codings.	A	changing	ensouled	body	enables	me	to	argue	for	a	change	
of	body	as	constitutive	of	a	changing	worldview.	This	argument	allows	
envisioning	the	body	as	interacting	with	the	world,	changing,	yet	not	bound	by	
schematic	descriptions.	By	offering	a	mythological	reading	of	bodily	connections	
and	the	power	within	constitution	different	modes	of	engagement	and	thus	the	
space	for	invention	opened	up.	The	openness	of	the	concept	of	dunamis	leaves	
spaces	for	differently	abled	and	differently	emphasised	interactions,	and	
underdetermined	modes	of	connection.	The	body	need	not	function	as	an	
unquestioned	whole,	but	can	be	thought	as	forming	through	its	modes	of	
interaction	and	environmental	influences.	These	interactions	thought	as	dunamis	
can	for	instance	be	thought	as	traversing,	transversing,	and	transsubstantion	(Da	
Silva	2014,	94);	moving	non-linearly	through	time,	experiencing	emotions	across	
different	bodies,	and	changing	form.	Da	Silva’s	arguments	make	clear	why	a	
monological	order	is	impoverishing,	as	it	limits	modes	of	engagement	to	the	
constraints	of	a	single	order.	Desensitising	in	the	polis	is	a	poor	connection	to	the	
world,	as	agents	end	up	in	one	form,	where	social	interactions	can	be	envisioned	
as	negotiations	of	that	imposed	coherence.	The	absence	of	an	interior	order	
opens	new	modes	of	connection.			
	
Codings	enter	into	this	picture	as	“de-essentialised	essence”	(Quine	1951)	of	the	
monological	ordering	of	the	world,	in	what	Wynter	terms	“the	master	code”	
(Wynter	2003,	263,	300).	In	order	to	re-envision	lives	away	from	the	
monological	ordering,	I	will	defend	an	argument	about	emerging	nonnormative	
codings,	as	constitutive	of	relations	between	agents,	and	connections	to	logos.	
This	involves	the	acceptance	of	a	change	of	structure,	which	subsequently	
necessitates	a	re-ordering	of	logic.	Furthermore,	the	evaluative	keys	–	that	which	
Wynter	articulates	what	feels	good	and	bad,	and	thus	what	it	means	to	be	(black)	
(Wynter	2001,	50)	–	will	be	up	in	the	air	and	replaced	by	temporary	codings,	
alternative	and	possibly	confusing	waypoints,	and	rely	on	‘surface	tensions’:	both	
pleasurable	and	negative	frictions,	to	enable	new	codes	to	emerge.	Codes	
encompass	the	different	logos,	technes,	and	logics	and	retain	connections	
without	demand	of	forming	a	single	form	of	life.	Codes	function	as	connection	
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detached	from	lived	difference.	This	underlines	the	earlier	conclusion	of	chapter	
three	that	codes	are	the	new	mythoi.			
	
Wynter	(2003)	articulates	a	lineage	of	the	monological	order	as	the	imposition	of	
the	master	code	distributing	role	allocations	according	to	imaginations	
legitimizing	economic	orderings.	Through	claims	of	interiority	–	whether	they	be	
theological	in	nature,	at	later	stages	genetic,	culminating	in	material	conditions	–	
the	master	codes	enables	exaltation	and	canonization	of	those	in	the	polis	and	
articulates	dysselection	and	marginalization	of	those	deemed	to	be	naturally	
outside	(Wynter	2001,	43ff,	2003).	These	codings	lay	a	claim	to	interiority	in	
order	to	stay	rooted	in	agents	and	thus	remain	part	of	the	reproductive	
processes.	It	is	the	mythology	of	superiority	and	inferiority	that	is	coded	on	
phenotypes	–	as	Du	Bois’	description	of	the	‘Colour	Line’	(Du	Bois	1903)	–	that	is	
structuring	agential	formation.	Wynter	elaborates	this	claim	to	range	from	
codings	of	genetic	selection	or	dysselection	to	new	codings	centring	material	
circumstances	as	“blacks,	Latinos,	Indians	as	well	as	the	transracial	group	of	the	
poor,	the	jobless,	the	homeless,	the	incarcerated,	the	disabled,	the	
transgendered”	(Weheliye	2014,	28)	can	be	argued	to	be	ushered	onto	the	
demonic	grounds,	with	material	circumstances	still	emerging	around	the	codings	
of	the	Colour	Line	(McKittrick	2015b).	
	
Codings	are	thus	different	from	reading	identity	or	subjectivity,	as	they	imply	a	
structure	of	relations,	and	structures	in	relations,	which	does	not	need	to	
coincide	with	self-conception.	While	identity	lays	claim	to	a	series	of	internalized	
understandings	of	one’s	being,	subjectivity	makes	the	further	claim	that	these	
forms	of	understanding	are	necessarily	related	to	one’s	understanding	of	the	
environment	one	operates	in	(Lugones	2003,	225;	Ortega	2016,	116).	Codings	
open	the	space	between	multilogical	engagements	to	share	forms	of	life,	without	
needing	to	subsume	understandings	of	one’s	being	or	one’s	surrounding.	A	code	
can	indicate	difference,	as	has	been	argued	and	unpacked	extensively	by	Wynter	
(Wynter	2007,	2003,	1984),	but	can	also	indicate	connections	and	collective	
actions	without	needing	to	revert	to	shared	interior	processes.	Nonnormative	
codes	thus	leave	space	for	difference,	without	essentialising	difference	as	
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belonging	to	larger	overarching	group	identities,	which	fragment	upon	closer	
scrutiny.	Codings	arising	out	of	collective	praxis	are	different	from	codings	as	
monological	imposition.	While	imposed	codings	defend	themselves	as	
‘inevitable’	and	‘natural’	(Wynter	2003),	codings	emerging	out	of	collective	
experimentation	with	forms	of	life	are	temporal,	situational,	and	thus	
changeable.	However,	as	indicated	above	they	can	also	traverse	contexts	and	
function	as	described	in	Wittgenstein’s	example	–	imageries	enabling	emergence	
in	different	contexts.	Whether	these	codes	stick	and	align	with	different	
situational	practices	is	then	a	relational,	contextual	and	agential	issue.		
	
	
Ontology	of	Code	
	
Turbulent	Geographies	
	
The	two	modes	of	turbulence,	discussed	in	chapter	three,	found	normative	
agents	inside	the	polis,	as	well	as	nonnormative	agents	on	the	demonic	grounds,	
outside	the	projections	of	the	walls	of	the	polis.	Nonnormative	turbulence	comes	
with	an	aesthetic	of	making	connection	on	the	surface,	without	access	to	the	logic	
of	the	other	in	the	meeting.	Glissant	terms	this	an	ethics	that	is	not	determined	in	
advance,	and	is	possible	by	generosity	(Glissant	1997,	154).	An	ethics	of	
generosity	comes	with	an	aesthetics	of	turbulence	(Glissant	1997,	155).	This	
aesthetics	is	conceived	as	the	work	of	joining	the	dynamics	of	emergence.	This	
generosity	resonates	with	the	argument	in	chapter	three	about	loving	perception	
(Lugones	2003,	95),	and	its	attendant	non-agonistic	attitude	which	enables	
openness	to	new	forms	and	actions.	This	re-connects	to	loss,	as	a	structure	in	the	
encounter,	which	is	the	willingness	to	surpass	one’s	own	logic,	and	lose	sense,	
meaning,	and	even	risk	dignity	by	looking	like	a	fool	(Lugones	2003,	96).	
Turbulent	encounters	are	thus	a	play	of	generosity,	loss,	and	dunamic	modes	of	
engagement,	which	risks	foolery.	The	ethical	work	on	the	demonic	grounds	is	
partly	a	continual	retraction	of	imposition	within	relations.	This	retraction	of	
imposition	structures	relations	as	making	space,	and	becomes	part	of	the	coded	
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reactions	of	encounters.	It	is	the	mark	to	recreate	possible	re-encounters	that	
has	been	pre-emptively	coded	under	normative	regimes,	with	their	attendant	
claim	of	agential	enclosure	(Glissant	1997,	174).	It	is	the	work	on	the	crossroads	
of	logics	without	turning	it	into	colonialism	as	extractions	of	those	useful	
moments	(Césaire,	2000).	Agential	encounters	are	making	relational	commons.		
	
In	these	nonnormative	encounters	commonplaces	(Glissant,	1997,	176)	function	
as	the	(new)	‘formalised’	channels	guiding	the	flow	of	interaction.	These	
commonplaces	are	a	not	a	problem	if	they	don’t	become	normalising	channels	
and	should	thus	neither	be	naturalized	(as	‘inevitable’),	nor	reified	(as	‘the	best’)	
outcome,	but	seen	as	changeable	occurrences.	Commonplaces	dim	the	intensity	
of	(de)tracing	coding,	and	agential	usage	of	the	double	negation	in	
transsomatechnics.	They	function	as	quick	normative	aspirations,	or	multiple	
shared	waypoints	of	formation.	Commonplaces	need	to	be	public	and	accessible,	
graspable,	and	leave	room	for	individual	navigation	–	these	new	codings	do	not	
need	to	come	with	multilayered	perspectives	–	this	is	what	commonality	at	the	
brink	of	transsomatechnics	and	commonplacing	will	do.		
	
Turbulence	will	lead	to	placements	and	new	tracings	of	code	–	the	making	of	new	
shelters	and	anchors	of	flow	–	shielding	intensity,	but	equally	collectivizing	the	
emergence	of	new	forms.	Commonplaces	function	thus	as	flexible	codes,	
similarly	to	Wittgenstein’s	example	of	apples	and	editing.	Paolo	Virno	discusses	
Commonplaces	through	Aristotle,	as	widely	available	means	of	expression	that	
people	cannot	do	without	(Virno	2004,	36).	This	can	be	understood	in	the	
current	discussions	as	the	shifting	terms	of	the	debates	around	nonnormative	
gender,	such	as	genderqueer	or	non-binary.	The	transsomatechnical	movement	
will	not	need	to	become	overinvested	in	them	as	permanent	dwellings,	or	final	
aims.	Historical	approaches	have	shown	a	continued	shifting	in	terms,	as	these	
terms	are	covering	new	conceptualisations	(Stryker	2008b;	Raha	2015).	
Commonplaces	can	become	ethical	vectors,	normalised	and	in	need	of	less	
flexibility,	or	these	vectors	function	as	passing	point,	forming	new	lives	as	part	of	
destabilisations	of	the	polis	and	recoding	of	nonnormative	spaces.		
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While	commonplaces	function	as	moments	of	evaluation,	providing	a	stable	
point,	they	also	indicating	loss	of	flexibility.	A	current	example	would	be	the	use	
of	the	term	‘genderqueer’	(Nestle,	Howell,	and	Wilchins	2002)	which	rose	up,	
and	is	again	moving	out	of	use.	It	could	be	said	that	the	discussions	surrounding	
‘non-binary’	(Barker	2016)	have	become	centralised,	rather	than	envisioning	this	
as	replacement.	Such	shifts	can	be	seen	as	markers	of	the	ensouled	effort	of	
ethical	engagement.	These	are	moments	of	collective	agency	flaring	up	in	a	
temporal	code	that	will	be	incorporated	and	then	recoded,	as	forms	of	life	are	in	
continued	change.	Feinberg	has	termed	these	the	passing	codes	that	change	as	
we	speak	–	the	inevitable	changing	names	of	trans	(Feinberg	1992b).	These	will	
not	need	to	culminate	in	an	around	the	world	in	80	genders	approach	(Bhanji	
2012a),	but	will	also	and	perpetually	need	to	be	changed,	opened	and	
destabilised,	keeping	formations	open	and	reworking	possible	impositions.		
	
	
Destabilising	Codes	
	
Returning	to	Bernard	Williams,	it	is	now	possible	to	retrace	the	statement	that	
dispositions	are	central	to	ethics	(Williams	1985,	160)	with	added	meaning.	It	is	
not	only	the	change	in	logos,	but	also	the	interactive	change	in	logos	and	codings	
that	is	needed	for	changing	dominant	patterns.	If	only	codes	change,	the	logics	
operative	on	those	codes	remain	intact,	ensuring	internal	stability,	as	Parisi	and	
Terranova	(2000)	have	argued.	If	only	logos	changes,	but	normative	codings	
remain	dominant	there	is	the	possibility	that	agents	are	forced	to	fall	back	into	
dominant	logics	as	they	remain	navigating	dominantly	coded	environments.84	
While	these	nonnormative	agents	might	fall	out	of	the	norm,	the	environment	
forces	engagement	with	dominant	codings.	The	earlier	remark	that	the	walls	of	
the	polis	are	fractals	ending	in	dispositions	situates	Williams	remark	about	the	
preservation	of	forms	of	life	in	dispositions:	
	
																																																								
84	Some	agents	might	want	to	navigate	dominantly	coded	environments,	as	they	want	to	be	part	
of	these.	This	would	be	inclusion	in	the	polis,	which	is	not	what	this	thesis	is	concerned	with.	
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Dispositions	are	basic	because	the	replication	of	ethical	life	lies	in	dispositions.	
[…]	If	ethical	life	is	to	be	preserved,	then	these	dispositions	have	to	be	preserved.	
But	equally	if	the	ethical	life	that	we	have	is	to	be	effectively	critized	and	
changed,	then	it	can	be	so	only	[by]	modifying	the	dispositions	that	we	have	
(Williams	2006,	75).		
	
This	quote	does	indeed	underline	the	importance	of	agential	change,	however,	as	
the	arguments	above	show,	this	needs	furthermore	a	change	in	logic	and	a	
change	in	codes.	While	attitudes	to	certain	codings	may	change,	an	unchanged	
logic	means	that	a	change	of	codes	is	predominantly	an	aesthetic	affair,	for	
instance	by	keeping	a	structure	of	relations	that	enables	exploitation.	As	opposed	
to	a	wholesale	change	of	code	and	logic	–	which	would	be	a	utopian	ideal	
perhaps,	or	often	a	change	of	code,	but	retaining	a	mimetic	logic	–	a	multilogical	
network	changes	the	stability	of	the	monological	order,	not	only	through	
emergent	codes,	but	also	through	the	possibility	of	perpetuating	disrupting	
logics.		
	
The	problem	of	changing	codes,	while	a	dominant	logic	gets	reinforced,	is	clear	
notions	of	backlash,	further	impositions,	and	re-emerging	lines	against	fugitive	
logics	(Harney	and	Moten	2013).	In	relation	to	this	issue	of	collapsing	back	into	
stabilising	norms,	Wynter	speaks	about	a	‘Ceremony	that	must	be	found’	to	
break	this	logic	(Wynter	1984).	As	I	have	argued	throughout	this	thesis,	one	key	
for	such	a	ceremony	is	an	Aristotelian	strategy	of	changing	bodily	logos	in	order	
to	come	to	a	changed	understanding	of	the	world.	This	requires	both	ensouled	
bodily	change,	in	combination	with	an	Anzaldúan	making	of	a	new	mythos:	a	
change	of	code	and	form	of	life.	Only	then	can	a	change	of	logic	emerge.	This	
strategy	is	thus	a	matter	of	action	as	well	as	space-making	for	emerging	codes.	
These	codes	shift	from	unstable,	to	destabilizing,	or	a	re-orientation	of	evaluative	
vectors.		
	
This	means	in	practice	for	an	emergent	ethics	–	as	form	of	life	–	that	it	is	
irrelevant	to	judge	such	an	ethic	on	the	potential	for	coherence	–	as	singular	
substantive	project,	albeit	with	different	zones	of	activity:	work,	home	and	
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family,	friends	and	community,	art,	(secular)	faith,	and	politics.	This	is	the	
standard	model	of	heteronormative	happiness,	and	filling	in	the	open	spots	leads	
to	Ahmed’s	objects	of	happiness	that	will	function	as	new	zones	of	agential	
exclusion	(Ahmed	2010).	Outside	of	the	zones	of	generative	life,	these	zones	
function	as	Berlant’s	normative	aspirations	(Berlant	2007).	Such	aspirations	can	
shift	into	codings	that	become	symbolic	norms	for	unreachable	lives.	Juana	María	
Rodriguez	writes	in	this	sense	about	Latinx	networks	of	relation	that	are	not	
comprised	of	these	clearly	demarcated	structures,	but	are	made	up	of	different	
formations	(Rodríguez	2014).	The	encapsulations	of	these	lives,	in	legislation,	in	
adoptive	possibility,	legal	aid,	housing	remain	however	tied	to	the	monological	
ordering	of	dominant	norms.	This	means	not	only	that	the	agents	live	outside	of	
the	norm,	but	moreover	that	lives	are	structured	through	impossible	demands,	
and	unsupported	practicalities	(Spade	2011).	The	monological	evaluations	
remain	stable	by	judging	nonnormative	lives	as	failures	with	the	impossibility	to	
envision	what	is	at	stake	in	nonnormative	lives	–	as	I	have	argued	in	chapter	
three,	a	tendency	with	both	positive	and	negative	effects.	Multilogical	forms	can	
operate	as	mutual	supports	through	the	possibility	of	retaining	connection	and	
support	in	absence	of	the	aim	of	exploitation.	Here,	it	is	not	the	case	that	
dispositions	necessarily	need	further	destruction,	but	the	material	forces	
operative	on	present	logics	need	immediate	adjustment	(Spade	2011;	McDonald,	
Stanley,	and	Smith	2015).		
	
	
Layers	of	Code	
	
At	this	stage	it	is	relevant	to	discuss	layering	of	codes,	as	abstraction	is	a	way	to	
connect	across	distance	for	trans	agents.	Isolation	and	lack	of	communal	ties	
(Raha	2017;	EU-FRA	2014)	return	the	agents	to	the	necessity	of	translation	and	
abstraction	in	order	to	make	meaning	of	lived	experiences	and	find	alternatives	
to	the	dominant	codings	(Alcoff	1991).	
	
Contextual	codes	need	experience	and	affect	in	proximity:	similarity	and	
difference	are	key	terms	in	these	approaches,	which	can	favour	larger	
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encapsulations	of	agents,	while	–	sometimes	uncomfortably	–	retaining	agential	
difference.	Abstract	code	flows	long	distance,	connecting	different	situations,	and	
are	techne	for	reading	environments	through	–	while	agential	effort	is	needed	
not	to	collapse	these	codes	into	the	environment	(Wynter	2001).	Linda	Alcoff	
furthers	a	similar	argument	as	a	critique	of	positionality	(Alcoff	1991).	
Positionality,	which	can	be	understood	as	the	contextualisation	of	points	of	view,	
needs	translation,	which	is	in	practice	done	by	the	listener.	Alcoff	elaborates	that	
this	translation	is	the	necessary,	but	lonely,	effort	of	isolated	agents,	making	do	
with	whatever	imagery	can	fit	their	experiences	–	however	distorted	at	times.	
This	illuminates	the	earlier	discussion	about	Wittgenstein’s	pragmatics	–	
‘whatever	works’	as	imagery	is	not	only	creative,	but	also	a	mode	of	survival	in	
isolating	circumstances.	This	fitting	in	of	imageries	to	experiences	can	turn	into	
new	codings	of	mimesis	and	differences,	but	can	also	remain	an	on-going	
fragmentation	and	recoding.	Only	when	coded	community	has	formed	can	
abstraction	return	to	directly	narrated	experience	and	comparative	difference.85		
	
Wittgenstein’s	insight	about	the	absence	of	private	language,	which	emphasises	
that	language	is	always	shared	(Wittgenstein	2010	243),	maps	onto	codings.	
Codes	share	with	Wittgenstein’s	analysis	that	they	need	to	be	shared	in	order	to	
be	retained,	and	function	as	summary	for	a	series	of	practices.	There	is	a	sense	in	
which	‘knowing	how	a	code	works’	makes	one	part	of	a	form	of	life,	but	also	that	
at	times	it	is	possible	one	only	has	a	subjective	understanding	(Wittgenstein	
2010,	269).	A	private	language,	like	the	apple	peeling	as	code	(Wittgenstein	
1984,	31e),	works	because	it	functions	for	the	person	and	“I	‘appear	to	
understand’“	(Wittgenstein	2010,	269	italics	in	the	original).	However,	also	for	
shared	codes	there	remains	agential	difference.	Singular	agents	come	with	
diverging	logos.	Logos	comes	with	differentiated	perspectives	and	action-
initiations,	however	these	singularities	are	not	unique	per	se.	There	are	overlaps,	
including	affirmed	codes	and	shared	vectors	of	evaluation,	as	has	been	my	
primary	argument	of	chapter	three.	Normative	aspiration	translates	as	the	
																																																								
85	This	refers	to	notions	of	affective	feminist	theory,	which	does	not	always	work	for	trans	
agents,	as	the	available	affects	are	undercoded	and	do	not	fit	trans	understanding,	or	their	needs.	
This	hampers	the	direct	theoretical	model	of	translation	of	affects	into	community.		
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affirmation	of	existing	codes	as	credible,	desirable,	or	inevitable,	and	using	the	
space	between	the	code	and	the	agent	as	vector	for	agential	coursing.	This	is	
evidenced	in	Aristotle’s	theory	of	agential	actions:	how	to	become	a	normative	
agent	and	reach	the	shared	marker	of	eudaimonia	(Aristotle	2002;	Nussbaum	
2001b).	I	have	argued	that	this	process	does	not	operate	through	inscription,	but	
through	affirmation.	Affirmation	of	codes	as	central	retains	agential	dunamic	
engagement,	and	thus	the	possibility	for	navigating	away.	It	could	be	argued	that	
envisioning	these	formations	as	passive,	by	inscription,	reinforces	the	status	quo,	
as	argued	before,	because	it	summarises	the	polis	as	total	system.	This	is	
different	from	forced	processes	of	dehumanisation	which	are	disciplinary	
reductions	of	the	body	to	flesh,	possibly	through	a	contraction	of	the	soul	
(Weheliye	2014;	Wadiwel	2009;	Spillers	1987).	These	disciplinary	measures	are	
the	projections	of	the	walls	of	the	polis	upon	nonnormative	agents	and	are	techne	
of	agential	reductive	hierarchisation	in	relation	to	the	normative	agent.	However,	
as	Weheliye	argues	this	reduction	can	be	reconceived	as	the	starting	point	for	
new	forms	of	life	(Weheliye	2014,	138).	From	within	my	argumentation	this	is	
not	due	to	the	inscription,	but	to	the	enforced	negation	of	the	polis,	leaving	
indeterminate	affirmative	courses	of	action	as	only	option.		
	
Here	a	further	connection	with	Lugones’	conception	of	loss	can	be	welded.	
Weheliye	re-conceptualises	the	flesh	as	starting	point,	because	there	is	no	
positive	coding	available,	while	the	determination	to	develop	life,	find	dreams,	
and	create	connection	does	not	get	extinguished	(Weheliye	2014,	128).	Flesh	is	
the	total	point	of	loss.	Lugones,	in	making	a	plea	for	agential	loss	of	meaning	and	
comfortability	–	should	we	add	confidence?	–	offers	loss	as	founding	moment	for	
interconnection,	as	I	have	discussed	in	chapter	three.	While	Lugones’	loss	is	
based	on	existing	interactivity,	the	suggestion	is	to	create	space	by	leaving	the	
need	for	a	modernist	agency	of	power	to	inflict	intended	change	behind.	
Lugones’	concept	of	loss	operates	on	the	level	of	truth	formation	and	logics	of	
interaction,	in	contrast	to	antagonistic	notions	of	loss	that	use	the	term	to	
indicate	dimishment	of	goods	and	(modernist)	agency.	Lugones	loss	is	based	on	
more	demarcated	positions	and	not	on	a	totality	like	Weheliye	discusses.	
Lugones	thus	offers	loss	within	relationality,	where	Weheliye	discusses	loss	as	
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totality.	Within	relationality	Lugones	finds	playfulness,	as	a	form	of	
indeterminate	affirmation,	which	opens	a	space	for	foolishness	–	for	doing	it	
wrong:	loss	of	dignity	in	interaction	that	is	not	based	on	domination.	Play	
functions	for	Lugones	as	tool	to	open	up	to	losing	one’s	practical	truth.	The	
attendant	‘wrongness’	is	conceptualised	in	connection	with	others,	while	not	
suggestive	of	a	codified	and	lucid	relation.	Lugones’	agent	might	not	have	much	
to	offer,	but	is	prepared	to	accept	their	loss.	Weheliye	in	theorising	flesh	has	
taken	the	most	deprived	position,	where	only	(mal)nutrition	is	available,	and	in	
that	moment	of	extreme	loss,	found	the	pressure	towards	new	life	(Weheliye	
2014,	128).	A	strange	sweetness	indeed	(ibid).		
	
Agential	logos	is	thus	not	only	based	upon	the	navigation	of	the	existing	
environment	in	relation	to	its	codified	possibilities,	but	has	also	a	matter	of	
agential	instigation	towards	to	undetermined	new	forms.	The	distance	needed	
for	agential	resistance	to	the	norm	(Sharpe	2016;	Lugones	2003)	is	thus	not	a	
distance	from	“oneself”	but	a	distancing	and	reflecting	upon	the	availability,	
desirability,	morality	even,	of	the	surrounding	codes.	Read	in	this	manner	the	
discussed	problematic	“gap”	between	body,	self	(P.	B.	Preciado	2013,	236),	and	
norms,	in	Preciado	disappears	as	one	is	entangled	in	one’s	surroundings,	but	not	
merged	with	its	norms	or	signs.		
	
In	sum,	there	are	various	levels	at	play	in	nonnormative	ethics.	There’s	the	
micro-ethics	of	navigating	the	formation	of	one’s	logos.	Then	there’s	the	
navigation	of	encounters	through	multilogics,	and	furthermore	there	is	the	
abstract	work	of	changing	various	layers	of	code.	These	are	connected	as	one’s	
logos	can	be	overdetermined	by	the	code	one	has	to	live	with/under/through.	
These	encapsulations	of	agents	in	code	can	be	negated	in	their	normative	
reading,	and	recoded	in	nonnormative	meanings.	The	coordinates	of	code	change	
depending	on	the	agential	interactions,	spacings,	and	the	opening	of	possible	
negations	and	navigations.	It	is	not	the	case	that	recoding	is	the	final	answer	to	
the	problem	of	nonnormative	agency,	even	though	recoding	will	indicate	
possibilities	of	vectors.	A	large	part	of	the	problem	is	the	persistence	and	
inevitable	normative	invasions	of	the	monological	order.	Changing	codes	may	
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change	the	form	of	impositions,	but	not	the	logic	structuring	an	assumed	right	to	
accumulate,	exploit,	and	destroy	(Da	Silva	2015,	97).	
	
In	my	proposal	for	de-essentialised	trans	conceptions	is	the	uncomfortable	
possibility	that	certain	logics	have	the	option	of	traversing	out	of	the	social	
positions	these	might	have	originated	in.	Codings	carry	logics	as	normative	
aspirations,	but	also	as	structure	of	relations	and	modus	operandi.	This	structure	
of	relation	can	be	copied	as	shorthand	codings	in	dealing	with	division	of	labour	
that	is	not	centred	around	generosity	and	loss,	but	around	gain	(Piepzna-
Samarasinha	2017).	That	means	it	is	possible	to	encounter	large	parts	of	
“straight,	white,	masculine”	logic	encoded	through	minoritized	bodies	(Moraga	
2011;	Bannerji	2000).	That	is	partly	the	effort	of	neoliberalism	–	awarding	of	the	
option	of	aggression	as	the	key	to	inclusion	–	because	inclusion	is	just	that:	
inclusion	in	the	colonial	project	(Spade	2011;	Subcomandante	Marcos	2017).	
This	inclusion	is	more	often	only	partial	exclusion,	rewarded	with	the	power	of	
partial	aggression.	This	inclusion	is	negotiated	through	rights,	which	are	thus	
protections	against	the	violence	of	the	majority.	However	the	coding	of	rights	
suggest	the	operation	is	complete	once	the	right	is	granted	(Raz	1994).	In	this	
sense,	rights	are	treated	as	privileges	of	yore.	Some	bodies	have	less	chance	of	
inclusion,	as	their	(racialised)	coding	is	heavily	weighing	down	the	possibility	of	
upwards	mobility:	inclusion	in	the	hierarchical	reality	of	the	polis.	Weheliye’s	
arguments	point	to	racialised,	trans,	and	indigeneity	as	codings	weighing	bodies	
down	to	flesh,	and	suggests	their	experiences	of	subjugation	might	attest	to	
untruth	of	inclusivity	as	means	to	solve	exclusion.	Inclusion	in	the	project	of	
“Man	[…]	synonymous	with	the	heteromasculine,	white,	propertied,	and	liberal	
subject	that	renders	all	those	who	do	not	conform	to	those	characteristics	as	
exploitable	nonhumans,	literal	legal	no-bodies”	(Weheliye	2014,	135).	Inclusion	
becomes	a	condition	of	domination	in	order	to	exploit	as	means	to	reproduce	the	
project	of	the	polis	(Sampaio	2015;	Da	Silva	2015).	
	
If	normative	codes	have	sufficient	power,	nonnormative	agents	can	be	
encapsulated	by	code,	as	well	as	be	in	material	circumstances	that	are	
constraining.	To	disrupt	normative	codings	two	strands	of	resistance	
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immediately	come	to	mind.	Either	resistance	is	friction	(Fanon	1969;	Berlant	
2011)	or	a	move	under	the	radar	of	the	dominant	code	–	and	have	a	form	of	life	
lateral	to	such	coding	(Harney	and	Moten	2013).	The	aim	of	friction	is	to	break	
the	dominant	code,	but	the	grip	of	that	code	can	be	broken	before	the	
encapsulation	in	the	dominant	perception	is	over,	in	the	invisible	lives	outside	of	
the	walls	(Lugones	2003,	218).	In	addition	to	the	argument	that	within	a	
monological	order	there	is	the	impossibility	of	perceiving	other	forms	of	life,	I	
have	suggested	the	existence	of	nonnormative	codings	that	are	operational,	even	
if	they	are	not	“liberated”	to	the	extent	that	the	dominant	power	has	no	more	
hold	on	the	bodies	that	live	(also)	nonnormative	ethics.		
	
	
Totality,	Friction,	and	Ending	the	World	
	
Local	and	Global	Codings		
	
Nandita	Sharma	argues	it	was	the	creation	of	a	single	field	of	power	that	
characterized	the	creation	of	the	new	world	in	1492	(Sharma	2015,	164).	This	
single	field	of	power	finds	expression	in	a	hierarchical	and	monological	code,	
which	creates	determinate	places	of	eugenic	and	dysgenic	narratives,	and	
consequently	dysselected	and	exalted	members	of	the	species	(Wynter	2003	
passim).	The	processes	of	universalizing	creates	a	‘referent	we’	(Wynter	and	
McKittrick	2015,	33).	This	referent-we	is	explained	by	Wynter	as	“altruistic	kin	
recognising	[…]	and	its	imagined	community”	(Wynter	and	McKittrick	2015,	27),	
a	coding	of	some	agents	as	inside	and	connected,	and	others	as	outside	and	
disconnected	of	a	kinship	structure.	Furthermore	this	coding	contains	a	
universalizing	positive	force	when	applied	to	the	eugenic	elite,	and	a	universal	
negative	when	applied	to	the	dysgenic	others.	These	processes	of	
universalization	of	code	have	created	patterns	of	possibility,	impossibility,	with	
an	emphasis	on	making	available	a	labour	force	(D.	Scott	and	Wynter	2000;	
Federici	2004;	Sampaio	2015)	as	well	as	opening	up	spaces	for	occupation,	
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extraction,	and	destruction,	under	the	heading	of	terra	nullius	(Wynter	2003,	
293;	Federici	2004).	Taking	over	land	is	a	further	function	of	the	referent-we,	
which	operates	by	suggesting	that	territories	not	claimed	by	the	elite	not	claimed	
at	all.	Dysselected,	or	negatively	coded,	agents	cannot	stake	a	claim	that	is	
recognised	unless	it	is	articulated	as	friction	against	the	code.	The	structure	of	
eugenics	and	master	coding	reduces	abstraction	from	merely	being	part	of	a	
process	to	the	claim	that	the	master	code	is	the	only	possible	abstraction,	
negating	all	other	universalising	tendencies	(Wynter	2003,	292).		
	
Nonnormative	ethics	is	not	only	aiming	at	a	re-coding	of	this	destructive	
conceptualisation,	but	looks	for	a	different	balance	of	connected	and	
disconnected	forms	of	life.	The	normative	domain	creates	interactions	based	on	
ranking,	which	enables	exploitation,	and	disconnected	agents	are	‘others’	–	
strangers	both	feared	and	desired	due	to	their	incalculability.	In	contrast	I	have	
been	articulating	a	nonnormative	ethics	as	finding	ways	of	mutual	connection	
away	from	imposition.	This	entails	both	a	recoding	of	present	relations,	but	also	
a	new	approach	to	disconnected	others	that	does	not	travel	through	the	norm	in	
order	to	find	footholds	of	relation.	I	have	articulated	these	connections	as	
multilogical	in	chapter	three.	Abstractions	of	multilogical	connections	enable	
codings	that	can	traverse	contexts.	While	I	have	conceptualised	logics	as	the	
operational	tendencies	of	a	form	of	life,	codings	are	the	abstractions	of	
interconnections,	as	well	as	the	summaries	of	operational	tendencies	outside	of	
their	contexts.	Codings	are	thus	related	to	logics,	but	can	also	be	used	to	
challenge	and	criticise	logics.	Without	the	abstractions	of	code,	both	memory	of	
activity	cannot	be	retained,	but	also	the	danger	of	logics	collapsing	into	
provincialism	will	emerge.			
	
Codings	within	a	monological	structure	can	be	understood	as	the	logistics	of	the	
monological	order	(cf.	Cowen	2014),	creating	a	form	of	life	that	through	
assimilation	and	aesthetical	differentiation	keeps	the	single	field	of	power	
untouched	(Bannerji	2000,	51).	The	codings	function	as	logistics,	because	they	
aim	at	a	distribution	of	material	goods	and	labour,	minimising	friction	with	
dominant	aims	(Cowen	2014,	11).	Juxtaposed	to	distributive	flows	lies	the	field	
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of	relation,	where	differing	logics	try	to	maintain	connections	through	friction,	
opacity,	healing,	and	overheated	turbulent	meanderings	of	social	space,	abstract	
codings,	and	agential	logics.	It	is	not	so	much	the	previously	discussed	problem	
of	piecing	and	fragmenting	(Puar	2015,	47),	but	multi-sidedness	and	
acknowledgement	of	containing	and	contrasting	different	codes,	as	well	as	
having	multilogical	connections	in	a	single	substance	(Lugones	2003,	141).	
Simultaneously	abstract	codings	can	function	as	a	moral	marketing,	for	instance	
in	the	example	of	rights,	that	are	flagged	as	social	progress,	but	without	
attendant	arrangements	for	access	and	non-domination	are	functioning	as	claim	
to	superiority,	rather	than	enabling	connection	(Puar	2007;	Spade	2011;	van	der	
Drift	2016).	
	
A	singular	subjectivity	claims	a	naturally	determined	difference	of	rational	
substance:	inevitable	practical	difference	in	logos	are	deemed	unproblematic	
under	the	master	codings,	that	aim	at	inclusivity,	as	these	differences	are	
perceived	as	modulations	of	the	norm	such	as	in	the	Athenian	polis	or	bounded	
entities	that	aim	to	fit	with	the	dominant	logic	(Bannerji	2000,	50).	
Simultaneously,	these	differences	become	a	naturalized	hierarchy	in	the	master	
codings	out	of	the	norm	through	racialization	and	pathology	–	as	discussed	
above.	Thus	if	an	agent	is	adapting	to	a	normative	range	of	modulations,	but	
coded	hierarchically	lower,	this	agent	cannot	make	it	into	the	hierarchical	norm	
–	as	there	will	be	inevitable	random	moments	of	aggressive	invasiveness	(Sharpe	
2016;	Harney	and	Moten	2013;	McDonald,	Stanley,	and	Smith	2015).	For	a	
nonnormative	ethics	of	relation	the	stake	is	creating	a	difference	between	
singular	and	coherent	subjectivity	and	articulating	how	codings	and	logics	can	
operate	to	navigate	an	agent	in	its	surroundings	and	different	collectivities	
retaining	the	possibility	for	connection,	without	collapsing	into	demands	of	
similarity,	mimesis,	and	homogeneity	(Ortega	2016,	109ff	and	chapter	3	passim).	
This	will	render	a	theorisation	of	change	that	can	be	indeterminate,	and	does	not	
rely	on	formlessness	as	answer	to	domination	of	codes,	and	yet	does	not	lapse	in	
the	contextual	alone	in	total	absence	of	traversing	codes.			
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Alliance	code	and	the	war	on	the	Soul	
	
As	I	have	been	arguing,	the	codes	of	the	polis	traverse	contexts	and	encapsulate	
populations.	“Populations,	therefore,	are	not	simply	groupings	of	human	beings	
or	individual	juridical	subjects	of	right,	but	rather	are	statistically	organized	and	
manipulated	as	groupings	of	characteristics”	(Clough	and	Willse	2011,	52).	
Clough	and	Wilse	propose	this	manipulation	of	the	coding	of	racism	as	
manipulation	of	capacities,	but	also	“to	produce	sensation,	affects,	and	somatic	
effects	[…]	that	are	felt	at	the	population	level”	(ibid.).	What	I	have	argued	above,	
and	I	suggest	this	as	an	addition,	rather	than	a	criticism,	is	that	agents	and	
collectivities	are	encapsulated	in	these	imposed	codings,	but	not	captured	by	
them.	The	manipulation	is	thus	one	of	steering	the	navigation	of	agents,	up	to	the	
point	that	they	are	readable	–	and	that	could	be	‘sufficiently	readable’	to	be	
deemed	controllable.	This	ties	in	with	the	turbulent	forms	of	control	as	discussed	
in	chapter	three	through	the	work	of	Parisi	and	Terranova	(Parisi	and	Terranova	
2000).	Codings,	such	as	racism	or	transphobia,	work	to	dehumanize	the	
nonnormative	agent	in	the	perception	by	the	norm.	That	does	of	course	not	mean	
necessarily	that	nonnormative	agents	hold	those	views	of	themselves,	even	
though	they	could	well	be	living	with	the	adverse	effects	of	such	aggressive	
codings.	On	a	resistant	level	Subcomandante	Marcos,	the	ski-mask	wearing	
spokesperson	for	the	Zapatista	insurrection,	was	offered	as	a	hologram	in	order	
to	gain	readability	by	the	norm,	as	the	indigenous	population	was	invisible	
(Subcomandante	Marcos	2017,	230).	Turbulent	control	can	thus	mean	that	
dehumanizing	codifications	pass	over	people’s	heads	on	the	epistemic	level	–	
while	mainly	material	effects	are	felt	(Weheliye	2014,	77).	Control	happens	
through	matter	and	the	norm	functions	as	codification	of	communication.	Clough	
and	Wilse	make	the	argument	that	engagement	through	population	management	
structure	publics	“that	are	full	of	passions	and	prejudices	that	allow	affective	
states	to	take	on	a	facticity	without	employing	a	logic	of	evidence”	(Clough	and	
Willse	2011,	53).	This	is	primarily	possible	through	a	variety	of	connected	levels:	
firstly,	if	the	publics	are	navigating	their	attitudes	to	an	alienated	and	dominated	
other.	Secondly,	evidence	about	material	circumstances	witnessed	by	either	the	
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publics	or	those	deemed	other	is	already	discredited	by	means	of	these	enforced	
affective	states.	And	thirdly,	if	these	publics	do	not	believe	their	attitude	will	
have	harmful	effects	on	themselves,	this	is	yet	another	effect	of	trying	to	draw	a	
large	distinction	between	the	normative	and	targeted	people.	The	point	I	am	
drawing	out	is	that	the	operations	coming	from	the	polis	and	the	effect	on	
peoples	are	not	one	of	total	capture,	but	of	affective	encapsulation	where	people	
align	themselves	willingly	to	oppressive	codes.	This	is	part	of	the	accountability	
Alcoff	indicated	(Alcoff	1991,	20):	one	does	not	only	speak	for	oneself,	because	
one	navigates	structural	codes,	and	one’s	affirmations	or	negations	are	part	of	
accountability.	In	tandem	with	the	structure	of	thought	discussed	through	Quine,	
making	it	possible	to	dismiss	deviations	of	described	standard	patterns,	the	
affective	structure	and	the	structure	of	judgements	work	together	to	solidify	this	
web	of	the	polis	encapsulating	agents.	Codings	can	function	as	psychological	
warfare	–	a	war	of	the	polis	on	the	soul.	
	
Nonnormative	ethics	is	thus	not	the	dream	of	making	an	utopia	true	in	the	
present,	but	it	is	partly	the	creation	of	a	living	archive	of	the	work	done	to	
decolonize	the	imagination	(Rage	and	Shenje	2017).	Raha	(2015)	clearly	
formulates	that	the	work	of	trans	liberation	easily	disappears	under	normative	
pressure,	making	a	point	parallel	to	Rage	and	Shenje.	Part	of	the	project	of	
nonnormative	ethics	is	keeping	the	space	between	nonnormative	agents	open	by	
dismantling	oppressive	codes.	This	in	turn	generates	space	to	form	lives	against	
the	targeting	and	pressured	codings	of	the	norm,	beyond	the	directly	tangible,	
but	also	traversing	contexts.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	material	deprivation	
and	exploitation	is	solved,	for	as	long	as	the	polis	can	supply	(a	part	of)	its	
population	with	targets	to	enable	exploitation,	it	has	barely	reason	to	stop	doing	
so,	even	though	it	is	preferred	to	keep	the	exploited	out	of	sight	–	either	through	
ghettoization,	or	by	levying	the	exploitation	to	other	parts	of	the	world	(Cowen	
2014;	Kelley	1997;	Bannerji	2000).		As	long	as	materials	need	to	appear	cheaply	
in	the	polis,	downgrading	those	who	supply	it	will	not	stop.	This	counts	as	much	
for	resources,	material	as	well	as	for	emotional	labour	(Federici	2004;	Raha	
2017).	The	nonnormative	ethical	project	is	thus	not	a	project	of	securing	living	
conditions	equal	to	those	in	the	guarded	zones	of	the	polis,	but	to	form	
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evaluations	of	lives	that	re-humanise86	agents,	as	well	as	keep	material	and	social	
success	a	limited	factor	in	evaluations	of	what	kinds	of	life	could	be	seen	as	good.	
The	above	discussion	on	material	deprivation	and	exploitation	indicates	that	the	
material	is	relevant	as	it	determines	nurture	and	the	possibility	of	different	
engagements.	However,	control	over	circumstances	is	not	the	key	to	eudaimonia.		
	
Nonnormative	ethics	brings	into	perspective	why	the	transsomatechnical	
approach	as	ensouled	bodily	change	functions	as	starting	point.	The	conditions	
for	material	survival,	as	well	as	the	affective	navigation	of	prevalent	and	emerged	
codings,	not	only	create	space	for	the	nonnormativity,	but	also	serve	as	reminder	
how	deeply	agents	can	be	operating	within	normative	codings.	It	is	through	the	
body	as	active	archive	that	forms	of	life	get	preserved,	whether	these	are	
normative	or	nonnormative.	Normative	somatechnics	instrumentalises	the	
ensouled	body,	while	agents	become	the	bodily	technology	of	a	singular	purpose,	
aimed	–	when	trained	in	that	scheme	–	on	a	single	course;	the	monological	vector	
of	the	polis.	The	agent	cannot	fold,	unfold	or	refold,	as	it	misses	the	
multidimensional	spaces	of	the	demonic	grounds.	The	monological	order	can	
thus	only	run	aground,	or	explode	–surrounded	by	demons	that	are	projections	
of	monological	orders	on	those	multilogically	human;	as	argued	in	chapter	three	
the	citizens	of	the	polis	can	only	see	the	reflections	of	their	projections.87	Fanon	
remarks	such	patterns:	“[w]hen	whites	feel	that	they	have	become	too	
mechanized,	they	turn	to	the	men	of	color	and	ask	them	for	a	little	human	
sustenance”	(Fanon	1967,	129).	Somatechnics	as	transsomatechnics	needs	this	
multilogical	unfolding	as	form	towards	the	possibility	of	a	nonnormative	ethics,	
which	is	not	based	on	accumulation,	destruction,	or	imposition.	Without	
domination,	there	can	only	be	relation,	and	relation	needs	to	be	multilogical	in	
order	to	remain	mutual.	
	
Questioning	patterns	of	logos	returns	multilogical	ethics	as	the	question	of	
alliance	against	dominant	codings.	Deleuze	and	Guattari	offer	a	thinking	of	
																																																								
86		This	term	is	merely	intended	as	the	opposite	of	dehumanize.	
87	From	this	point	it	can	be	understood	that	fear	functions	to	preserve	unity,	even	in	the	face	of	a	
failing	polis.		
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alliance	as	translation	of	stasis	into	flux	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1984,	219).	While	
alliance	is	important	for	change,	resonance	or	alliance	happens	through	codes	
(and	sometimes	technes)	–	not	the	transformation	of	code	into	flux	alone.	As	I	
have	argued,	there	are	vectors	and	directions	that	function	as	a	perpetual	
recoding	of	the	agent	and	attendant	pragmatic	abstractions.	Flux	happens	
through	vectors,	and	pure	indeterminacy	will	not	happen.	There	will	emerge	
fuzzy	points	on	an	imagined	horizon,	or	temporal	and	local	understandings	of	
relational	actions.		
	
Abstractions	are	not	different	from	the	concrete	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1984,	
221)	–	a	moment	of	difference	is	introduced	when	abstractions	are	disconnected	
from	logos	and	the	impact	of	codings	upon	the	materiality	that	it	impacts.	Coding	
is	not	a	game,	but	it	can	be	play	(Lugones	2003,	93;	Massumi	2014,	69).	
Generative	play	needs	involvement	of	the	body.	Codes	can	produce	each	other	in	
playful	abstractions,	but	for	a	project	of	world-making	attendant	logos	needs	to	
change,	otherwise	new	codes	will	reform	only	the	forms	of	normative	logics,	and	
keep	the	monological	order	in	place.	This	is	what	Parisi	and	Terranova	termed	
the	turbulent	extraction.	In	a	moment	of	world	making	abstraction	and	
concreteness	are	connected	due	to	this	changes	codes	and	logos.	This	connection	
in	experimentation	does	not	mean	they	are	casually	linked,	because	
indeterminate	change	does	not	need	to	involve	linear	production.	Indeterminate	
and	unintended	consequences	come	out	of	the	bodily	engagement	between	
agents.	As	addressed	previously,	especially	in	chapter	three,	monological	codes	
can	serve	to	sever	agents	from	acknowledging	the	realities	of	impact	of	the	codes	
they	live	by	–	experiences	become	invisible.	Other	times	new	monological	code	is	
a	form	of	bait	–	waiting	for	other	logics	to	produce	content	that	can	be	absorbed,	
and	revalidate	or	obfuscate	current	logical	operations.		
	
Some	codes	are	removed	from	the	body,	but	desirable	–	these	are	what	Berlant	
has	termed	normative	aspirations	(Berlant	2007,	278).	That	these	are	desirable	
does	not	mean	they	are	good	for	the	agents,	in	which	case	they	become	a	form	of	
cruel	optimism	(Berlant	2011).	To	recall	chapter	one,	cruel	optimism	occurs	
when	agents	are	aiming	at	codes	that	make	them	worse	off.	Trans	codings	are	
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different	in	that	respect,	in	that	they	do	not	make	agents	better	off	necessarily,	
but	neither	are	they	cruel.	Firstly,	they	are	not	normative	aspirations,	and	
secondly,	because	nonnormative	trans	codings	are	not	aiming	at	things	“getting	
better”,	but	at	changing	normative	evaluations.	This	might	entail	falling	apart	or	
fragmenting	under	normative	pressure	(Raha	2017),	or	alternatively	enable	
traversing,	transversal,	and	transsubstantation	(Da	Silva	2014).		
	
Furthermore,	there	are	codes	that	serve	as	navigations	and	waypoints,	but	they	
are	not	exactly	endpoints	or	aspirations	–	these	terms	can	be	abstractly	“sexist”	
or	can	be	speculative,	like	“xenogenesis”	(O.	Butler	1987,	1988,	1989).	These	
codes	are	not	unequivocal:	
	
	 In	the	90s	every	white	body	wants	a	theory	of	becoming,	other.	
	 Don’t	let	D&G	fool	you,	nobody	wants	to	become	other	(Salah,	2002,	47).	
	
Salah	puts	a	finger	on	a	sore	spot,	while	to	be	other	stays	in	the	normative	
reasoning,	as	the	other	is	always	descriptive,	and	the	target	of	affective	tension,	
as	argued	above.	Codes	that	keep	description	or	prescription	in	their	core	hold	a	
fascination	from	within,	but	hardly	from	without	the	polis.	Outside	the	polis	one	
is	already	in	the	two-dimensional	deflated	zone	of	discarded	logos	and	being	
overcoded	by	the	word	that	bears	too	little	resemblance	to	the	processes	around	
which	one	has	to	navigate.	The	imposed	code	is	a	marker	for	recognition	from	
the	polis,	but	merely	another	entity	to	negate	for	the	agent.	These	are	the	
imposed	epistemologies	which	well-willing	normative	agents	curiously	then	try	
to	respect	as	originary.88	The	otherness	in	and	of	the	polis	is	the	disengaged	
flattening	of	the	agent	encapsulated	in	code.	This	is	in	contrast	with	the	
multilogical	engagement	based	on	opacity,	where	the	lack	of	ascribed	internality	
is	not	a	flattening,	but	an	unassuming	approach	opening	the	space	for	partial	loss	
of	logic	and	emergence	of	new	codes.	The	processes	I	described	earlier	as	surface	
tension	can	be	found	back	in	those	normative	renderings	as	two-dimensionality.	
To	flatten	and	feel	resistance	is	a	responding	to	the	absence	of	mutual	inclusion	
																																																								
88	To	be	entirely	fair	–	not	only	normative	agents	try	to	respect	such	codes,	also	nonnormative	
agents	try	to	adapt	to	imposed	codings	as	truth	bearers.		
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(Massumi,	2014).	Surface	tension	can	be	generative	in	combination	with	opacity	
as	ground	for	meeting.	This	surface	tension	translates	then	as	space	for	
entanglement,	which	is	not	encapsulation;	the	wrapping	of	the	agent	in	
normative	code.	Entanglement	signals	mutuality	in	meeting	and	finding	
connective	codes	and	techne.		
	
The	neoliberal	allowance	of	visibility	of	coding	is	certainly	not	only	liberation	
(Haritaworn,	Kuntsman,	and	Posocco	2014,	4;	R.	Gossett,	Stanley,	and	Burton	
2017).	While	it	can	be	envisioned	as	helpful	not	to	have	to	disappear	as	minority,	
this	politics	is	not	without	its	problems.		The	politics	of	diversity	has	received	
criticism	from	across	a	range	of	disciplines	(Bannerji	2000;	Duggan	2004b;	
Spade	2011;	A.	Y.	Davis	and	Kelley	2012;	Haritaworn	2015),	summarising	it	as	a	
shallow	display	aimed	at	the	majority	rather	than	the	needs	of	minorities.	The	
outcome	of	visibility	is	focused	on	control.	Rey	Chow	writes	“seeing	is	
destroying”	(Chow	2010,	4).	Turbulent	extraction	of	difference	needs	exploitable	
visibility.	The	operations	of	biopolitics	as	well	as	necropolitics	thus	needs	to	be	
able	to	keep	its	targets	clear	and	visible,	while	simultaneously	keeping	other	
processes	and	categories	out	of	sight.	The	code	of	‘trans’	as	visible	code,	exists	
easily	“as	image	and	slogan	than	as	substance”	(Chow	2010,	6)	extending	Chow’s	
argument	around	the	visibility	of	E=mc2,	in	relation	to	the	destructive	force	of	
the	atom	bomb.	In	its	simplicity	the	slogan	E=mc2	superimposed	upon	a	
mushroom	cloud	functions	as	political	act,	because	it	generates	the	simple	
message	that	one	bomb	creates	sufficient	terror	that	one	nation’s	willingness	to	
resist	is	broken.	In	a	neoliberal	politics	of	inclusion	trans	imagery	flags	
analogously	the	possibility	of	inclusion	of	those	fallen	from	grace;	the	agents	that	
‘lost’	inclusion	in	the	norm	(van	der	Drift	2016)	while	being	able	to	violently,	
administratively,	and	carcerally	exclude	others	(McDonald,	Stanley,	and	Smith	
2015;	A.	Davis	2003).	For	a	nonnormative	ethics	this	means	that	the	proximity	of	
coding	to	logos	is	inevitable	for	survival	as	the	promise	of	inclusion	by	neoliberal	
standards	is	encapsulation	and	violation	as	argued	above.	Inclusive	‘codes’	are	
codes	that	function	according	to	the	logic	of	the	norm,	this	is	necessarily	
removed	from	the	logos	of	agents,	especially	when	these	are	simultaneously	
codified	as	‘lesser’	or	‘	pathologised’.	Forcing	visibility	upon	trans	bodies	can	be	
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partly	understood	as	the	securisation	against	“the	trap	of	trans”	–	the	
stereotypical	coding	of	trans	deception	and	capture	of	innocent	straight	desire.		
	
As	I	have	been	arguing	earlier,	a	desideratum	of	oppression	theory	is	that	it	is	
total	(Lugones	2003,	55).	The	encapsulation	within	disinterested	visibility	
suggests	that	this	functions	through	lack	of	knowledge	and	simple	codifications.	I	
have	contrasted	the	totality	of	encapsulation	throughout	the	thesis	with	
attendant	claims	that	the	body	is	generative,	and	will	escape	codes	even	if	it	
cannot	(always,	or	immediately)	escape	the	social	reality	in	which	it	is	captured	
(Sharpe	2016).	Consequently,	It	is	inevitable	to	suggest	that	the	structural	
cruelty	of	imposed	coding	and	its	enforcement	by	a	series	of	techne	is	that	it	
doesn’t	work	on	the	epistemological	level,	while	its	functionality	lies	on	the	level	
of	material	exploitation	and	destruction.	Imposed	codings	function	as	an	ironic	
opposite	of	Berlant’s	cruel	optimism,	there	coding	is	conceptualised	as	
aspirational	trap,	however	codings	of	visiblity	in	its	lack	of	totality	functions	
even	though	one	does	know	better.		
	
Thinking	through	codings	as	creating	space	for	material	exploitation	(da	Silva	
2015)	the	‘body	politic’	emerges	as	code	for	the	valorization	of	bodies	and	
politics	of	exploitation.	The	body	politic	is	the	mapping	of	the	political	space	of	
the	polis	through	the	anatomy	of	bodies,	but	it	hardly	needs	saying	that	the	
bodies	that	are	functioning	as	the	map,	as	the	territory	for	the	division	of	labour,	
are	not	the	bodies	that	offering	a	reading	beyond	the	established	patterns	of	
power.	The	body	politic	is	thus	code	for	the	recreation	of	the	existing	political	
body	as	the	anatomical	model	(Thacker	2011,	147).	Thacker	forwards	an	
argument	that	the	unificatory	model	of	the	body	politic	falls	apart	under	the	
pressure	of	the	many.	“[M]ultiplicity	is	the	disease	of	the	body	politic.	Or,	
alternatively,	it	is	multiplicity	that	plagues	the	body	politic”	(Thacker	2011,	154).	
My	argument	extending	from	chapter	three	indicates	the	opposite,	that	the	
encapsulation	in	a	singular	structure	constrains	the	agents	captured	within	and	
without.	Therefore	the	reasoning	should	indicate	that	it	is	the	body	politic	that	
plagues	the	multiple	forms	of	life	outside	its	walls.	Thacker,	in	a	standard	
reversal	of	the	problem,	shifts	the	weight	back	onto	the	multiple	forms	of	life	
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when	friction	is	experienced	leading	to	the	death	of	the	body	politic.	It	switches	
the	necropolitics	for	its	necrology,	as	if	it’s	the	monological	order	that	now	needs	
to	be	mourned.		
	
	
Nonnormative	Ethics	and	the	Gift	Code	
	
Beware	of	Greeks	bearing	gifts	–	Virgil,	Aeneid		
	
Nonnormative	Evaluations		
	
The	notion	of	ethics,	as	transsomatechnical	becoming,	returns	at	this	point	as	a	
question	of	pragmatism	in	evaluations.	How	does	nonnormative	ethics	
pragmatically	function?	As	Robin	Kelley	(Kelley	1997)	discusses	nonnormative	
activity	navigates	between	survival	and	recoding,	using	dominant	forms	as	
means	to	get	by.	In	the	chapter	“Looking	to	get	paid”	Kelley	makes	the	case	that	
the	navigation	between	work	and	play	as	a	means	to	make	it	through,	defies	the	
normative	logic	of	play	versus	work	(Kelley	1997,	43ff).	The	codings	shift	due	to	
the	impossible	demands	and	exclusions	operative	at	the	same	time.	Likewise	
Raha	(2017)	emphasizes	the	way	agents	necessarily	fall	apart	in	the	face	of	
forces	that	aim	at	the	rupture	of	nonnormative	agents,	but	that	this	falling	apart	
is	not	the	end,	resonating	with	Weheliye’s	conclusion.	This	contrasts	with	Puar’s	
conceptualisation	of	the	norm	in	a	society	of	control	that	“all	bodies	are	being	
evaluated	in	relation	to	their	success	or	failure	in	terms	of	health,	wealth,	
progressive	productivity,	upward	mobility,	enhanced	capacity”	(Puar	2012,	155).	
However,	it	is	not	only	evaluation	of	different	functioning	that	is	at	stake,	but	
also	the	production	of	exploitable	bodies.	Wynter	and	da	Silva	stress	that	
domination	is	the	step	before	exploitation	(Da	Silva	2007,	11;	Wynter	2007,	9).	
Raha’s	theorisation	describes	the	structures	where	trans	femme	agents	explicitly	
become	solely	providers	of	emotional	and	reproductive	labour,	and	through	
these	processes	fragment	to	face	disrupted	possibilities	of	life	building.	Raha’s	
work	can	be	conceived	as	describing	single-sided	techne	where	relationality	is	
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offered,	but	not	returned.	Irving	warns	in	this	light	against	the	presentation	of	
the	trans	agents	as	explicitly	high	functioning	in	the	workplace	in	order	to	escape	
the	predicament	of	marginalisation,	as	it	only	ties	in	to	further	economic	
exploitation	(Irving	2008).	This	argument	is	supported	by	Puar	warning	against	
“piecing”:	the	flexibility	of	the	nonnormative	agent	under	conditions	of	
capitalism	(Puar	2015,	54).	The	nonnormative	agent	finds	in	the	norm	demands	
and	appropriation	and	no	mutuality	can	be	established.		
	
What	does	this	mean	for	the	functioning	of	code	as	nonnormative	waypoints,	
footholds,	and	imagery?	Firstly,	we	can	find	that	nonnormative	codes	do	typically	
not	come	with	the	“impact	factor”	that	can	dislodge	normative	codings,	and	thus	
cannot	hope	to	directly	change	normative	logics.	Secondly,	as	we	saw	through	
discussion	of	Lugones	these	nonnormative	codings	can	turn	into	new	closed	
communities,	furthering	dominant	and	dominating	logics	(Lugones	2003,	143).	
What	is	needed	then	is	a	double	working	of	differing	codes,	as	well	as	changing	
logics.	Logics	function	through	webs	of	affects	and	reasons.	Normativity	
demands	fungibility	of	feelings,	as	well	as	agreement	on	decisions:	it	
encapsulates	both	domains	of	goodness	and	truth.	To	this	extent	codings	are	
subservient	to	logics	and	function	as	grammarians	of	the	norm,	and	possibly	as	
forms	of	moral	marketing,	or	markers	that	make	demands	upon	agential	
navigation.	Both	logics	and	codes	need	to	be	altered	in	nonnormative	forms	of	
ethics	in	order	to	escape	both	exploitation	and	complicity	in	domination.	
	
Nonnormative	ethics	thus	comes	with	differing	logos:	the	agential	navigation	
away	from	the	normative	domains	by	use	of	double	negation	and	indeterminate	
affirmation.	This	enables	the	constitution	of	a	new	mythos	and	techne	of	relation.	
Attention	to	emerging	codifications,	which	are	not	claiming	to	be	solid	
foundations	for	new	reasoning,	but	which	need	to	function	as	waypoints	
allowing	understanding	emerging	vectors	of	evaluation.	Harney	and	Moten	
formulate	the	project	of	nonnormative	break	out:		
	
But	we	won’t	stand	corrected.	Moreover,	incorrect	as	we	are	there’s	nothing	
wrong	with	us.	We	don’t	want	to	be	correct	and	we	won’t	be	corrected.	Politics	
	 256	
proposes	to	make	us	better,	but	we	were	good	already	in	the	mutual	debt	that	
can	never	be	made	good.	We	owe	it	to	each	other	to	falsify	the	institution,	to	
make	politics	incorrect,	to	give	the	lie	to	our	own	determination.	We	owe	each	
other	the	indeterminate.	We	owe	each	other	everything	(Harney	and	Moten	
2013,	20).	
Nonnormative	agents	are	encapsulated	in	codes	determining	their	wrongness,	
and	faced	with	the	demands	for	forced	adjustment	as	perceived	by	the	norm.	The	
formulation	of	Harney	and	Moten	allows	understanding	how	the	space	to	go	with	
multilogical	engagements	functions	as	a	way	to	remain	indeterminate	and	allow	
opacity,	without	claiming	a	total	space	of	openness,	as	I	have	problematized	in	
chapter	one.	What	they	suggest	is	that	this	openness	as	mutual	debt	lies	not	in	
the	claim	to	institutions	representing	the	collective,	but	on	the	contrary	a	debt	
not	to	encapsulate	each	other	–	to	owe	each	other	the	possibility	of	emergence,	
to	create	the	space	for	generosity.	Debt	resonates	with	loss,	but	is	a	
predetermined	condition,	not	a	structure	within	relation.	Debt,	so	to	say,	
provides	foundation	to	the	possibility	of	emergence.	The	account	of	loss	suggests	
how	to	make	openness	in	meetings.	Debt	is	a	condition,	rather	than	the	outcome	
of	an	act.	New	codes	of	collectivity	are,	when	seen	in	this	vein,	unsuccessful	
regulations	(Harney	and	Moten	2013,	97).	These	codes	are	unsuccessful	because	
they	are	ready	to	disappear	when	they	don’t	function	as	waypoint	anymore.	
These	are	unclear	and	have	plenty	of	space	to	malfunction:	allowing	cracks	to	
appear.	This	is	the	direct	counter	of	the	normative	codings	as	domination	
shaping	the	space	for	exploitation,	accumulation,	and	destruction.	In	Harney	and	
Moten’s	reading	the	space	of	loss	is	found	as	the	indebtedness	as	waypoint;	it	can	
be	read	as	a	structure	that	suggests	loss	before	the	encounter.	“We	owe	each	
other	everything”	(ibid.)	allows	re-understanding	the	claim	of	Weheliye,	as	the	
availability	of	one’s	becoming	flesh	in	order	to	have	a	new	world	emerging.	
However,	as	opposed	to	be	made	flesh,	it	is	crucial	to	reference	the	mutuality	as	
well	as	the	porosity	of	the	‘we’	(Wynter	and	McKittrick	2015,	25),	this	is	not	false	
inclusion,	but	a	mutual	willingness	to	share	loss	in	order	to	change.			
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New	forms,	new	codes	
	
In	chapter	two	I	proposed	logos	to	be	a	dynamic	formation	giving	shape	to	
affects,	perceptions	and	practical	truth.	Logos	is	thus	not	comparable	to	“the	
demands	for	a	single	currency	of	reasons,	[which]	are	certainly	expressions	of	
modern	bureaucratic	rationality”	(Williams	1985	ch1	n.13).	The	conception	of	
logos	that	I	offer	already	acknowledges	the	situated	structure	of	its	reasoning,	
perceptions	and	affects.	What	is	at	stake	when	thinking	through	codes,	is	thus	
not	that	logos	and	codes	are	demands	for	a	categorizing	approach	to	the	world,	
but	that	logos	is	an	inevitable	formation	in	an	environment,	even	when	the	agent	
is	not	subsumed	in	that	environment:	the	double	negation	leaves	the	space	to	
navigate	and	exit	the	current	norms.	The	emergent	codings	between	
nonnormative	agents	do	not	only	bridge	multilogical	engagements	as	discussed	
in	chapter	three,	but	have	the	opportunity	to	travel	across	contexts,	because	of	
their	looser	attachment	to	the	context.	Agents	with	different	logos	can	also	
simply	remain	in	affective	resonance	without	emergent	codes.	The	
indeterminacy	that	Harney	and	Moten	claim	is	being	owed	to	other	agents,	is	
thus	not	a	‘freedom	from	everything’	indeterminacy,	but	an	ethic	against	
overcoding.	The	indeterminacy	makes	it	possible	to	use	an	image	as	
Wittgensteinian	foothold,	lightweight	and	in	passing,	in	order	to	keep	the	space	
for	emergent	codings	or	affective	resonances.	One	antidote	to	impositions	of	
monological	orderings,	with	its	overdetermining	codes	is	to	make	space	for	each	
other.		
Returning	to	the	pragmatic	conceptualization	of	ethics,	this	implies	certain	forms	
of	life	come	into	existence	because	agents	make	space	for	each	other.	This	
making	space	is	not	a	disentangling,	but	holding	the	space	for	affirming	codes	
that	can	well	up,	as	Lugones	describes	(Lugones	2003,	217).	Against	the	
“monosense	of	domination”	(ibid.)	stands	the	complex	interweaving	of	multiple	
meanings.	Codes	are	thus	multiple	in	their	meaning,	with	different	facets	to	
attach	to	from	the	diverse	sets	of	logos	of	agents,	yet	enabling	connection.	This	
lack	of	univocal	meaning	of	code,	underlines	again	the	need	to	think	outside	of	
what	Williams	had	called	the	“bureaucratic	boundaries”	of	rationality,	and	what	
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Moten	and	Harney	frame	as	“policy	is	the	new	form	of	command”	(Harney	and	
Moten	2013,	74).	The	bureaucratic	encapsulation	of	lines	of	action	–	the	vectors	
of	possibility	–	are	curved	back	onto	the	core	from	the	fraying	ends	of	Quine’s	
network,	with	its	stable	core	and	fraying	edges	(Quine	1951,	40).	Not	only	can	
the	edges	‘fray’	and	is	the	core	stable,	but	as	Duggan	and	Berlant	have	argued,	the	
core	sucks	the	edges	back	in	(Berlant	2011;	Duggan	2004b),	making	turbulence	
operative	within	exploitation	(Parisi	and	Terranova	2000).		While	codes	get	
taken	up	and	taken	in,	the	monological	order	does	not	change	–	it	reforms	its	
appearance	to	fit	its	primary	aim:	accumulation,	exploitation,	and	destruction	as	
asymmetrical	order,	functioning	through	a	monodirectional	singular	grid.		
These	understandings	figure	as	warning	against	claiming	codes	as	universal,	and	
to	remain	open	to	the	difficult	work	of	translating	abstractions	of	code	to	allow	
multiple	resonances	with	different	logos.	Removed	from	the	monological	form	of	
operation	is	what	Harney	and	Moten	call	planning:	“the	ceaseless	
experimentation	with	the	futurial	presence	of	forms	of	life	that	make	such	
activities	possible”	(Harney	and	Moten	2013,	74).	This	planning	could	be	
imagined	to	fluctuate	between	the	determination	of	Anzaldúa’s	Aristotelian	
double	negation,	Lugones’	anticipation	of	collective	emerging	intention,	and	
Massumi’s	and	Lugones	approach	to	playfulness	not	as	antagonism,	but	as	the	
sympathetic	foolishness	(Massumi	2014,	36;	Lugones	2003,	96)	that	offers	the	
possibility	of	emergence	in	the	in-between.	The	socially	exhaustive	reproduction	
of	trans	emergence	is	thus	already	the	production	of	new	forms	of	life	(Raha	
2017;	van	der	Drift	2018),	simply	because	there	is	nowhere	to	go,	which	
underlines	Weheliye’s	conclusions	(Weheliye	2014).	However,	transliberalism,	
in	claiming	a	form	of	a	transnormative	subject	(Snorton	and	Haritaworn	2013),	
offers	an	affirmative	space	coded	as	part	of	the	monological	order,	which	is	
already	structured	as	exclusion	through	the	lines	of	the	dysgenic	humans	
(Weheliye	2014,	28).	Transliberalism	might	try	to	move	trans	out	of	pathology,	
but	it	does	so	as	part	of	the	larger	excluding	structure	of	the	polis.		
Away	from	pathology	claiming	the	interiority	of	the	agent,	codes	can	equally	
work	their	force	immediately	on	the	surface.	Hortense	Spillers	articulates	how	
the	weight	of	codes	can	collapse	the	soul	to	leave	just	flesh:	“flesh,	that	zero	
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degree	of	social	conceptualization”	(Spillers	1987,	67).	Flesh,	as	Spillers	
materializes,	is	ungendered,	in	contradistinction	to	an	indeterminacy	of	gender,	
as	it	figures	in	trans	theory	(Stryker	and	Whittle	2006;	Stryker	and	Aizura	2013).	
My	conceptualization	of	the	body	as	ensouled	forms	its	relations	(that	can	be	
understood	as	gender)	under	the	normative	codings,	possibly	claiming	the	
weight	of	codings	as	lighter	than	Spillers.	In	thinking	through	the	possibility	of	
being	other	than	the	code,	it	is	at	times	necessary	to	do	so	despite	its	weight,	
despite	the	nonnormative	lack	of	impact,	and	despite	the	disappearance	of	its	
kinaesthetic	efforts,	which	might	be	why	we	forget	the	elders	(Raha	2016).	Eric	
Stanley	summarises	“[g]ender	seems	to	always	escape	the	confines	of	the	
language	that	we	use	to	capture	it”	(McDonald,	Stanley,	and	Smith	2015,	4).	
Between	the	ultimate	reduction	of	the	black	body	to	flesh	under	slavery,	with	its	
loss	of	gender,	and	the	enclosure	of	the	body	in	prison,	some	space	for	trans	is	
created.	Somewhere	in	the	space	between	the	soulless	existence	and	the	soul	
crushing	somatechnics	of	the	prison	complexes	is	a	gap	where	the	body	finds	a	
way	to	escape	the	code.	The	double	negation	of	imposed	codes	needs	merely	a	
little	wiggle	room	for	it	not	to	be	extinguished.	Spillers	statement	“words	will	
most	certainly	kill	us”	(Spillers	1987,	68)	claims	the	lethal	power	of	code,	while	
there	are	still	ways	in	which	nonnormative	bodies	have	existed	under	the	weight	
of	the	dominant	codings,	in	underground	assemblages,	in	the	double	meanings	of	
words.	This	is	not	optimism,	but	acknowledging	the	efforts	that	have	to	be	put	in,	
in	order	to	contract	souls	to	the	bare	level	of	existence	(Wadiwel	2009,	54).	
Disciplining	that	needs	to	be	rejected	will	not	function	as	“acculturation	of	the	
soul”	(ibid.)	as	ethics	(perhaps)	also	does,	but	merely	limits	the	vector	of	escape	
and	contracts	the	space	for	unfolding.	Disciplining,	then,	is	perhaps	not	so	much	
the	acculturation	of	the	soul,	as	it	is	the	work	of	domination	in	order	to	create	
room	for	accumulation	by	extraction	at	the	collective	level	(Da	Silva	2015,	99),	
negating	the	necessity	of	ensouled	formation	by	replacing	it	with	forced	adoption	
of	material	powers.	The	nonnormative	agent	thus	need	not	know	itself,	as	long	as	
it	stays	in	the	place	the	dominant	descriptive	statement	assigns	to	it	to	further	
accumulation	and	exploitation	(Da	Silva	2015,	95).		While	I	have	been	arguing	for	
ensouled	bodily	formation	from	the	first	person’s	perspective	of	the	agent,	it	is	
merely	a	step	to	come	to	the	emergence	of	new	forms	of	life.	Multilogical	
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connections	and	emergent	codes	are	collective	processes	shying	away	from	
imposed	determination,	but	outgrow	the	individual	agent.	The	technes	involved	
in	this	recoding	are	partly	the	ensouled	space	for	connection	across	multilogics:	
it	is	non-singular	code,	and	an	engagement	with	the	multiple	possibilities	coming	
from	dunamic	engagement.		
Moreover,	as	discussed	in	chapter	three,	these	connections	are	active	and	are	
thus	acts.	Codes	may	seem	static,	but	its	interpretation	to	connect	to	differing	
logos	is	the	affirmative	activity	of	collective	formation.	It	is,	as	Linda	Alcoff	
theorises,	the	translation	of	one	position	to	another	position	(1991).	If	one	
claims	one’s	position,	context,	and	location	as	means	to	avoid	“critical	
interrogation	of	the	bearing	of	such	an	autobiography	[…]	It	leaves	for	the	
listeners	all	the	real	work	that	needs	to	be	done”	(Alcoff	1991,	25).	Not	only	
makes	Alcoff	a	claim	for	the	indexing	of	certain	speech	acts,	but	more	importantly	
lays	out	the	argument	that	such	translating	might	entail	a	“partial	loss	of	control	
[over	meaning,	which]	does	not	entail	a	complete	loss	of	accountability”	(Alcoff	
1991,	17).	This	accountability	resonates	with	Moten	and	Harney’s	account	of	
debt	that	we	owe	to	each	other.	Loss	of	meaning	does	not	mean	that	
accountability	for	one’s	logos	is	out	of	the	picture.	To	not	know	and	claim	that	
discomfort	as	a	way	to	forward	change	can	be	a	method	through	which	new	
forms	can	arise	(Morris	2016).	This	tension	of	translation	of	indexed	codes,	
coming	with	loss	of	control	over	meaning	underlines	also	the	earlier	arguments	
about	nonnormative	indeterminacy	between	agents.	Indeterminacy	gives	the	
code	free,	while	embracing	the	insight	that	loss	continues	to	be	an	inevitable	
ingredient	in	multilogical	coded	emergence.	Loss	in	this	sense	is	not	to	be	read	as	
‘loss	of	property	and	thus	agency’,	where	agency	is	tied	in	to	the	material	means	
to	effect	actions,	but	loss	is	indicating	here	the	possibility	of	connection	and	
relation	across	logical	frames.	Loss	is	making	space	for	meaning	to	arise.	In	this	it	
is	different	from	monological	ordering	where	loss	of	control	and	communication	
indicates	a	battlefield	failure,	while	intelligence	is	linked	to	command	(D.	
Haraway	1991,	150).		
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Gift	Code	
	
Every	imposed	change	comes	with	a	loss	of	access.	It	is	a	limiting	of	options	and	
constraining	of	material	circumstances	of	sustenance,	the	monological	
imposition	is	directed	to	monodirectional	extraction.	A	meeting	on	the	surface	
between	agents,	who	respect	opacity,	whereby	extraction	will	not	function,	the	
available	option	is	make	space.	This	was	found,	as	I	have	argued,	in	the	surface	
tenstion,	pushing	new	codes	summarising	relationality	into	existence.	However,	
there	is	another	way	to	envision	those	codes,	especially	as	they	can	be	read	from	
different	angles.	Codes	can	function	as	gifts.	I	offer	this	theorization	explicitly	to	
take	code	away	from	contractarian	thinking,	the	liberal	logic	that	erupted	from	
within	the	polis	(Rawls	2009),	where	ethics	is	negotiated	and	documented	in	a	
system	of	rights,	duties,	and	allowances.	Godelier	summarises	that	contractarian	
thinking	about	exchange	makes	“society	[…]	in	its	essence,	[…]	language,	because	
it	originates	in	a	contract”	(Godelier	1999,	23).	This	would	also	make	the	sign,	
the	code,	the	contract,	more	real	than	the	relation	that	is	happening	under	that	
sign,	code,	or	contract.	My	argument	has	been	that	codes	are	one	level	of	
navigation,	situated	alongside	logos,	technes	and	logics.	Logos,	and	thus	technes	
too	as	they	find	their	origin	in	logos,	goes	beyond	language	because	of	its	
indeterminacy	in	action.	Consequently	the	eruption	of	unimagined	relationships	
is	possible.	Lucidity	can	thus	be	understood	as	limiting	the	terms	of	engagement	
to	the	already	present.	The	present	is	undoubtedly	more	beneficial	for	some	than	
for	others.		
	
The	gift,	especially	when	conceptualized	outside	of	existing	relations,	is	the	
material	invocation	of	the	difference	between	imposed	change	and	signalling	the	
readiness	to	accept	loss,	as	givers	are	already	in	debt	(Godelier	1999,	30).	Gift	
giving	is	thereby	structured	in	a	non-commercial	logic	(Godelier	1999,	43).	A	gift	
between	unrelated	agents	should	therefore	not	be	seen	as	an	object	of	property,	
but	as	gesture	towards	that	which	doesn’t	yet	exist:	mutuality	in	existence.	It	
indicates	possibility	of	connection	and	offers	the	willingness	of	loss.	It	quite	
literally	proclaims	the	readiness	to	give	up	something	precious.	This	resonates	
with	the	earlier	theorizations	of	Harney	and	Moten,	and	Lugones.	Loss	and	
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indebtedness	are	at	the	heart	of	making	new	forms	of	life.	Gifting	logos	and	logic	
is	thus	not	accumulation,	but	change.	Recall	here	Lugones’	playfulness	as	
medium	through	which	a	loss	of	logic	can	be	navigated.	The	gift	of	loss	is	a	
formalized	articulation,	perhaps	opening	the	space	for	play.	The	gift	is	the	first	
sign	of	possibility,	of	creating	a	space	of	collectivity,	of	opening	the	floor	to	play	
(Massumi	2014,	41).	This	kind	of	giving	is	only	possible	with	the	acceptance	of	
surface	tension	and	opacity.	Antagonistic	approaches	confuse	this	tension	with	
the	need	to	establish	power,	as	it	doesn’t	want	to	lose,	but	to	accumulate	and	be	
ready	to	destroy	what	it	finds.	A	monological	order	can	never	give;	it	can	only	
attempt	to	pay	off.		
	
Knowing	that	the	body	is	prone	to	grow	new	forms	and	(temporarily)	stabilise,	
as	a	form	can	be	the	articulation	of	a	certain	perspective,	a	certain	action	
instigation,	and	a	way	of	thinking,	I	am,	empathically,	not	making	the	claim	for	a	
state	of	constant	flux	–	even	though	it	is	possible	to	imagine	flux	as	traversing	
along	a	specific	set	of	vectors,	channelled	through	a	stable	function.	I	am	making	
the	claim	to	acknowledge	forms,	but	argue	against	making	a	new	polis.	While	we	
can	trust	bodies	to	grow	forms,	at	the	same	time	it	is	necessary	to	break	down	
the	walls	of	forms	that	might	be	tried	to	erect,	and	keep	forms	porous.	Opening	
the	space	for	multilogical	emergence	is	one	strategy	of	both	being	able	to	spend	
time	on	emerging	structures	and	scrutinizing	the	codes	that	come	up.	Without	
enclosure	logics	can	withdraw	from	the	code,	signalling	a	cease	of	function	and	a	
disruption	of	flux.	The	absence	of	walls	guarantees	the	existence	of	multilogical	
forms	of	life	more,	than	the	presence	of	an	enclosure	will.	These	codes	are	the	
gifts	that	we	give	each	other.		
	
These	gifts	entail	poetics:	lyrical	codes	exploring	new	possibilities.	The	codes	
need	to	sustain	the	contradictions	of	multilogics,	while	simultaneously	steering	
away	from	the	polis	and	its	coherent	monologic.	Such	lyrical	codings	perhaps	end	
the	monological	world	(Da	Silva	2014),	by	holding	the	space	for	bodies	to	emerge	
in	new	forms.	Bodies	undo	as	well	as	generate.	This	situates	generosity	and	loss	
at	the	heart	of	emerging	ethics.	The	code	turns	coda.	
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Conclusion:	souls,	forms,	codes	
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In	this	thesis	I	have	proposed	a	conceptualisation	of	changing	forms	of	life	at	
various	levels:	body,	relations,	and	abstractions.	This	articulation	of	change	that	
is	emergent	from	the	level	of	the	agent	and	extends	beyond	adaption	and	
subversion,	comprises	a	conception	of	ethics	that	encompasses	actions,	relations	
and	abstractions.	The	possibility	of	change	as	generative,	which	is	not	merely	
assimilation	or	mimesis,	requires	bodily	change	to	become	something	else.	It	
requires	an	acceptance	of	opacity	of	oneself	and	others	in	order	for	change	to	be	
new	and	not	preconceived	or	comprehended.	This	leads	to	the	necessity	of	a	
conception	of	multiplicity,	which	subsequently	requires	accepting	loss	of	truth	in	
combination	with	generosity	towards	truths	of	other	forms	of	life.		
	
The	argument	I	propose	in	the	thesis	incorporates	these	requirements	around	
three	key	notions.	The	first	is	that	it	is	bodily	change	that	allows	a	change	in	
understanding	and	forms	of	life.	The	second	is	that	forms	of	life	need	to	be	
structured	around	the	possibility	of	multiple	logics.	And	the	third	is	that	codings	
should	avoid	imposing	upon	agents,	but	instead	open	space	for	emergent	
relations.	These	notions	combined	give	the	argument	for	an	emergent	
nonnormative	ethics.		
	
The	thesis	finds	its	root	in	bodily	change,	because	it	emerges	out	of	a	
conceptualisation	of	trans.	Trans	bodily	change	is	not	“biological”	but	material.	
Biology,	the	science	of	categorisation	of	nature,	is	naturally	a	cultural	artefact.	
The	schemas	of	classification	and	functioning	of	the	body	follow	a	specific	
pattern,	and	the	attendant	codings	are	aligned	to	dominant	normativities	and	
sensitivities.	Revisiting	Aristotle’s	ensouled	body	allows	both	bodily	change,	but	
also	in	its	various	modalities	of	engagement	opens	the	possibility	to	understand	
immersion	in	environments	beyond	schemas,	vision,	or	language.	Dunamis,	the	
operational	modalities	of	the	body,	once	taken	outside	of	a	presumed	“teleology”	
or	“ergon”	argumentation,	allow	for	understanding	and	articulation	of	
engagements,	which	are	more	than	reflections	or	affects.	This	can	be	used	for	a	
wide	range	of	conceptualisations	and	is	not	limited	to	trans.	This	palette	could	be	
used	to	support	developments	in	sound	studies,	relations	between	animals	and	
non-animals,	and	crip	theory	(Clare	2015;	McRuer	2011),	amongst	others.	This	is	
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possible	because	thinking	through	an	ensouled	body	freed	from	the	metaphysical	
luggage	of	categorisations	allows	to	conceptualise	both	change	as	well	as	
immersion,	but	is	not	pre-ordered	according	to	available	schemes.	An	ensouled	
body	allows	thinking	through	the	interstices	of	categorisations	and	codifications	
that	are	available.	The	various	modes	of	the	body	do	not	need	to	be	taken	apart,	
but	can	be	understood	in	its	dynamic	functioning.		
	
Logos,	which	I	articulate	beyond	what	Williams	calls,	a	‘bureaucratic	rationality’	
(1985)	can	be	seen	to	be	a	summary	that	allows	for	individual	difference,	but	
because	of	its	navigational	schemas	lay	connection	between	agents	too.	This	
frees	the	body	from	being	taken	apart	in	categorisations:	for	instance,	trans	
and/or	migrant	and/or	rural,	where	a	body	disappears	in	essentialising	
structures	because	it	is	not	able	to	retain	particularity.	Yet,	it	is	important	to	
have	a	tool	to	understand	particularity	and	collectivity	in	the	agent.	Logos	with	
the	attention	to	modification	of	perception,	reflection,	and	practical	truth	allows	
that	and	moreover	presents	a	clear	argument	why	singular	logics	will	always	
function	as	imposition.	Furthermore,	thinking	through	logos	allows	immediately	
a	criticism	of	‘excel	sheet’	diversity	–	so	popular	in	neoliberal	times	–	while	
‘diversity’	needs	to	be	attendant	to	the	possibility	of	different	logos	and	logics	not	
of	different	codifications	alone.		
	
To	conceptualise	forms	of	life	through	logic	is	contentious.	It	might	suggest	to	
some	people	that	I	would	over	emphasise	rationality.	However,	this	is	far	from	
the	case.	The	logic	of	forms	of	life,	as	my	argument	has	suggested	is	indicative	of	
what	seems	good	as	principle	and	as	decision.	In	contrast	to	disembodied	
articulations	of	decisions,	claiming	they	come	through	an	autonomous	process	of	
the	will	and	reflection,	for	instance,	I	am	making	the	case	that	decisions	always	
follow	the	logic	of	a	specific	form	of	life.	This	is	not	a	problem,	as	long	as	this	
form	of	life	does	not	need	to	operate	as	a	monological	order.	These	arguments	
and	conceptualisations	are	specifically	interesting	when	trying	to	escape	a	zero-
sum	game,	leave	the	competitive	mind-set,	and	for	understanding	concerns	of	
bonding	across	different	practices.	María	Lugones	terms	these	antagonisms.	To	
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understand	these	as	logics	allows	seeing	as	well	how	diversity	work	can	be	made	
to	fail	by	being	a	front	for	the	unhindered	operations	of	an	extractive	ordering.		
	
Logics	of	forms	of	life	are	being	softened	because	their	relationality	operates	
through	the	notion	of	daimons.	Partly	this	functions	to	allow	intuitive	
approaches,	but	also	it	strengthens	the	argument	against	isolated	individuality.	
An	agent	dependent	on	its	environment	cannot	be	transparent	for	itself,	but	
neither	can	other	agents	be	the	authorities	on	their	being.	The	daimon	sits	snugly	
in	this	place	in	between;	it	allows	for	opacity	of	agents,	it	cannot	be	fully	
explained,	which	would	suggest	a	schematic	ordering,	but	also	opens	the	door	for	
metaphysical	allegiances,	such	as	those	Moten	calls	the	‘inalienable	wrong’	
(Moten	2017,	117)	of	slavery	that	plays	out	across	time,	or	Avery	Gordon’s	
‘hauntology’	of	the	past	that	continues	to	overshadow	present	complexities	of	
the	social	(Gordon	1997,	xvi).	The	daimon	is	another	door	that	can	be	opened	in	
order	to	explain	or	conceptualise	relationalities	that	are	not	lucid,	policy	driven,	
or	ordered	through	available	principles.		
	
The	notion	of	loss	comes	in	at	this	stage,	because	it	allows	explaining	why	
generation	does	not	function	to	explain	change.	In	an	upcoming	article	on	the	
malfunctioning	of	rights	and	moral	change,	I	will	make	the	case	that	ever	
widening	and	inclusive	principles	do	not	function,	because	of	a	dual	problem.	
First	principles	don’t	allow	for	change,	because	principles	at	least	should	be	able	
to	be	comprehended	for	the	agents	that	come	in	touch	with	them.	Change,	as	I	
have	argued	here,	does	not	follow	that	logic,	and	is	at	least	for	a	while	
incomprehensible,	also	for	the	agent	that	is	involved	in	the	change.	Secondly,	
widening	principles	are	based	on	a	logic	of	accumulation	(Raz	1994;	Moody-
Adams	1999).	This	means	that	principles	suggest	that	the	world	as	we	currently	
understand	it	is	on	the	right	path.	That	can	be	very	easily	called	into	doubt.	
Moreover,	moral	principles	purport	to	be	true	(Raz	1994).	This	is	called	into	
doubt	by	the	arguments	provided	in	this	thesis.	A	principled	approach	suggest	
agents	come	with	divergent	practical	truth	and	yet	need	to	fit	in	to	principles	
that	encompass	this	truth	more	or	less	unproblematically.	These	problems	lead	
me	to	come	to	the	articulations	of	coding,	where	codings	can	function	within	a	
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particular	grammar	of	interaction,	but	need	to	be	shed	if	the	grammar	of	
relations	changes.	Here,	I	diverge	most	strongly	from	accounts	that	centre	
language	and	understanding	because	shifting	practical	truths	demand	another	
approach	than	a	‘misunderstanding	or	ignorance’	of	principles	thesis,	as	for	
instance	Michelle	Moody-Adams	suggests	in	criticism	of	Raz’s	account	(Moody-
Adams	1999).	Loss	functions	to	open	this	trap	door	of	non-understanding	and	
allows	one	to	stare	into	the	depths.		
	
Loss	here	functions	not	as	legitimation	of	a	right	to	exploit,	but	as	warning	
against	knowing	too	much.	Loss	is	opening	up	the	space	for	non-understanding	
and	hesitation	in	the	emergence	of	mutual	relations.	Furthermore,	the	
conceptualisation	of	loss	generates	the	possibility	to	acknowledge	that	giving	up	
truth	is	the	way	to	allow	emerging	relations.	Loss	simultaneously	opens	the	
space	for	relation	and	thus	creates	the	possibility	for	collectivity,	as	well	as	
counters	a	logic	of	accumulation.	It	is	simply	not	the	case	that	one	go	on	
extending	their	relations,	therefore	loss	implies	the	limitations	of	ethics	and	thus	
the	limitations	of	the	codings	that	can	emerge.		
	
This	tension	between	limitations,	loss,	practices,	and	the	danger	of	localism	finds	
resolution	in	the	chapter	on	codings.	My	attempt	in	that	chapter	is	to	build	the	
argument	for	ethics	as	forms	of	life	by	explicitly	situating	the	discussion	in	
understandings	of	colonialism.	The	necessity	for	making	that	move	stems	from	
Sylvia	Wynter	who	has	argued	that	the	European	colonial	regime	started	by	
harking	back	to	the	Greek	polis	and	articulating	agents	as	necessarily	bound	up	
in	the	interests	of	the	state	(Wynter	2003,	277).	I	have	returned	the	argument	
back	to	Aristotle	in	order	to	break	down	the	polis	an	attempt	to	destabilise	the	
thinking	of	necessary	immersion	in	the	state.	At	this	stage	the	thesis	supplants	
ethics	as	emergence	of	a	form	of	life	with	ethics	as	an	anti-political	programme.	
Encountering	the	work	of	Cedric	Robinson	(2016/1980)	was	a	great	help,	but	
unfortunately	the	work	is	very	isolated.	Robinson	equally	suggests	ethics	instead	
of	politics	as	solution	to	a	way	of	thinking	that	does	not	explicitly	demand	
lucidity	and	constricting	rationality,	but	allows	irrationality	and	disorder	as	
modus	of	relationality.	Robinson’s	work	provokes	the	insight	that	politics	cannot	
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solve	the	problems	generated	by	politics,	and	instead	proposes	transformation	
without	leadership.	That	means	also,	without	privileged	interpreters	of	ordering	
principles.	Robinson	does	not	propose	chaos	to	counter	order,	but	ethics:	a	
radically	transformed	form	of	life.	It	is	in	Robinson’s	work	that	I	found	the	
clearest	articulation	of	moving	beyond	a	critical	project,	which	scrutinises	
boundaries	and	transgressions,	towards	a	radical	project,	where	‘radical’	
indicates	doing	something	new	and	transformed.		
	
This	transformation	needs	a	space	for	not	knowing	what	one	does,	which	can	
become	central	to	a	conception	of	ethics,	not	as	negation,	but	as	indeterminate	
affirmation.	Yet	this	indeterminacy	does	not	need	to	come	at	the	cost	of	
acknowledging	emerging	forms.	These	emerging	forms	can	be	understood	not	to	
provide	a	new	polis	but	to	be	forms	one	is	passing	through.	This	passing	through	
might	not	provide	greater	inclusion	–	the	project	of	legitimacy	–	but	works	to	
avoid	imposition	and	exclusion.	In	addition,	allowing	loss	in	interaction	suggests	
that	homogeneity	is	not	that	much	at	stake	in	nonnormative	ethics.	The	
assemblage	of	logos,	daimons,	techne,	logic,	mythos,	codings	and	loss	suggests	not	
categorical	differences	and	homogenous	collectivities,	but	on	the	contrary	claims	
difference	all	the	way	up	and	all	the	way	down.	That	is	not	to	say	that	navigation	
of	imposed	codings	cannot	provide	relationality	(“solidarity”)	or	bonding.	This	
could	be,	for	instance,	understood	through	logos	that	connects	easily,	matching	
techne,	contrasting	logics	et	cetera.	However,	what	my	argument	problematizes	
is	that	the	coding	as	such	provides	the	bond.	In	short,	there	is	no	overarching	
category	or	principle	that	suffices	to	do	the	work	of	ethics.	Ethics	is	always	the	
work	of	the	body	in	environments	making	relations.		
	
The	claim	I	make	is	that	trans	is	thus	not	limited	to	the	modus	of	‘gender’,	even	if	
that	is	a	code	that	is	specifically	navigated,	but	trans	can	be	understood	as	
shifting	the	ensouled	body	in	order	to	change	relations	in	the	world.	Trans	is	thus	
an	ethic	that	navigates	and	rearranges	codes,	technes	of	relation,	and	one’s	
ensouled	body.	The	notion	of	opacity	is	important	here	to	protect	the	possibility	
of	change	into	something	new,	and	thus	unknown,	because	trans	is	a	
nonnormative	endeavour.	It	needs	remarking	that	the	navigation	of	ensouled	
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bodies	constitutes	agency,	however	not	every	navigation	is	nonnormative,	and	
not	always	directed	at	shifting	the	codes	bodies	live	with.	This	distinction	is	
important	as	it	indicates	both	a	gradual	shift	of	bodies	in	ethics,	as	well	as	the	
rupture	that	comes	with	nonnormative	codification.	This	leaves	room	for	
explanation	of	formation	over	time	(transformation)	and	also	ruptures	of	codes,	
processes	that	can	be	understood	through	migration,	new	imposed	codes,	or	
encapsulations	by	logics.	Trans	as	nonnormative	ethics	can	thus	be	suggestive	of	
various	modalities	of	changing	environments,	whether	it	is	by	the	agent,	imposed	
upon	agents,	body,	context,	or	code.		
	
Aristotle	does	not	offer	a	stable	frame,	internal	to	the	agent,	but	on	the	contrary	
suggest	that	the	agent	is	in	formation.	Aristotle	becomes	rapidly	problematic	for	
a	theory	of	nonnormative	ethics,	exactly	because	of	this	reason.	Since	agents	do	
not	have	an	internal	frame,	but	are	extended	through	a	web	of	relations,	which	
determines	their	good	life,	part	of	their	formative	work	is	that	of	fitting	into	the	
polis.	The	frame	of	reference	is	the	exterior,	as	opposed	to	the	interior.	Bernard	
Williams	discusses	the	implausibility	of	the	harmonious	mapping	between	inside	
and	outside	(1985,	46).	It	could	be	thought	that	this	would	indicate	a	shift	from	
authenticity	–	a	claim	to	what	one	really	is	–	to	sincerity,	which	claims	one’s	acts	
as	originary	(Williams	2010).	This	does	not	need	a	very	dubious	to	attempt	to	
eradicate	conflict	as	being	ethically	desirable,	due	to	the	demands	of	real	selves	
(Williams	1985,	47).	Friction	might	be	pleasurable,	while	its	erasure	also	
demands	a	monological	order.	Denise	Ferreira	da	Silva	suggests	this	as	an	ethics	
without	separability	(Da	Silva	2016,	58).	This	means	partly	to	shift	from	a	
knowable	authenticity,	which	“produces	collectives	as	‘strangers’	with	fixed	and	
irreconcilable	moral	attributes”	(ibid.)	towards	an	appraisal	of	multiplicities	and	
agency	which	allows	the	emergence	of	collectives.	Differences	do	not	mean	being	
apart,	and	friction	might	provide	connection	instead	of	suggesting	fear.			
	
Rather	than	arguing	for	inclusion,	dispensing	with	the	project	of	the	polis	
altogether	opens	a	more	fruitful	way	of	thinking	through	nonnormative	ethics.	
Claiming	inclusion	legitimises	the	polis	as	single	structure,	while	simultaneously	
erasing	the	foundational	grounds	of	exploitative	misogyny	and	slavery.	These	are	
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also	the	two	main	strands	of	critique	offered	by	nonnormative	ethics.	Firstly	the	
dismissal	of	the	idea	that	a	single	structure	will	fit	‘us’	all,	and	secondly	the	idea	
that	various	forms	of	exploitation	are	permissible	in	any	form,	whether	it	is	
capitalist	corporations,	misogyny,	or	slavery.	Inclusion	generates	second-rate	
citizenry,	because	inclusion	is	not	about	making	space,	but	functions	as	
allowance	and	at	most	protection	of	‘different	and	minoritised’	forms	of	life	from	
the	majority.	Laws	of	inclusion	thus	always	designate	the	majority	as	violent	yet	
are	presented	as	progress.	Benign	majorities	do	not	exist.		
	
The	dismantling	of	the	polis	is	achieved	through	two	central	ideas.	The	first	
concept	is	a	multilogics	based	on	differences	of	logos	informing	connection,	
which	circumvents	single-order	engagements,	whether	they	are	contractarian	
(Cudd	and	Eftekhari	2017)	or	interpretative	in	form.	Contractarian	approaches	
claim	differences	at	a	starting	point	and	voluntary	submission	to	a	mutually	
encompassing	ordering.	Such	approaches	not	only	curb	possible	transformation	
to	what	can	be	envisioned	at	a	starting	point,	but	also	circumvent	taking	account	
of	consequences.	This	makes	the	ordering	principle	(the	contract)	stronger	than	
possible	shared	agency.	The	second	concept	emerged	from	the	work	of	María	
Lugones	and	enabled	the	willingness	to	accept	loss	of	logos	and	thus	practical	
truth,	as	well	as	extend	generosity	in	one’s	interpretation	of	others	and	other	
forms,	that	makes	multilogics	possible	(Lugones	2003).	Centralising	loss	and	
generosity	shifts	the	emphasis	from	the	necessity	of	generation	and	abundance,	
to	come	to	a	different	form	of	engagement	based	on	the	emergence	of	
relationality,	but	also	the	possibility	of	refusal.	What	is	to	be	gained	is	nothing	
more	than	potentiality,	but	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	this	potentiality	is	
generative,	or	that	it	should	be.	What	is	important	is	that	relationality	can	
emerge.		
	
Multilogical	ethics	indicates	how	agents	in	forms	of	life	can	relate	without	the	
space	in	between	already	articulated	or	regulated.	Multilogical	ethics	does	not	
demand	adaption	to	a	ruling	order,	or	an	ordered	society,	or	a	principle	of	
engagement.	A	monological	order	at	times	might	need	to	adjust	its	orderings,	or	
tweak	its	principle,	but	it	cannot	solve	the	problem	of	Wittgenstein’s	talking	lion:	
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that	even	if	a	lion	could	speak,	we	wouldn’t	understand	what	it	was	saying,	
because	its	form	of	life	is	so	different	(Wittgenstein	2010).	An	ordering	can	only	
hear	through	its	own	form	(Abbas	2010).	The	polis	at	its	best	(which	it	often	is	
not)	can	only	offer	adaption	but	cannot	change	the	drive	to	manage	and	order,	
because	ordering	is	its	prime	directive	(Rawls	2009,	4,	8).	Robinson	articulates	
lucidly	how	order	and	authority	coincide	in	philosophical	paradigms	in	the	West	
(Robinson	2016),	and	Wynter	has	convincingly	argued	that	it	is	in	the	moment	of	
colonisation	that	the	state	conceptualised	that	the	individual	can	only	find	its	
interests	through	existing	within	its	parameters	(Wynter	2003).	Nonnormative	
ethics	questions	bodily	change	outside	of	existing	orders	of	relation	and	thus	
outside	of	existing	norms.	Principles	of	social	arrangements	can	not	be	expected,	
even	at	their	best	functioning,	to	have	space	for	the	emergence	of	divergent	
forms,	other	than	what	is	seen	as	‘interesting’	or	‘useful’	-	or	at	least	not	too	
demanding	-	variations	of	forms	of	life	(Parisi	and	Terranova	2000).	In	sum,	
because	the	polis	is	necessarily	focused	on	its	continued	existence,	it	will	strongly	
curb	the	possibility	of	new	forms	of	life,	and	attach	them	to	existing	logics	of	
order.	These	logics	of	order	are	in	their	foundation	based	on	the	right	to	exploit	
and	hierarchical	notions	legitimising	impositions.	A	multilogical	ethics,	which	
concerns	itself	with	forming	technes	of	relation	open	up	new	forms	of	life,	new	
forms	of	engagement,	and	offer	the	possibility	to	think	outside	of	structures	of	
exploitation.		
	
New	is	not	necessarily	good.	In	order	not	to	get	stuck	in	the	demand	for	newness	
of	forms	the	focus	lies	on	relationality	and	logics,	in	order	to	remain	open	to	
needed	changes	in	techne	as	undoing	of	the	master	code.	The	proposal	for	
nonnormative	ethics	does	not	suggest	the	founding	of	a	new	polis,	but	
emphasises	that	the	walls,	which	will	inevitably	form	as	dispositions,	keep	being	
broken	down	in	order	to	ensure	the	absence	of	new	excluding	and	imposing	
codes	or,	as	Lugones	theorises,	new	demands	for	purity	(Lugones	2003).	Here,	
again,	embracing	loss	functions	as	the	willingness	to	generate	space	for	other	
agents.	Loss	needs	to	coincide	with	generosity,	because	generosity	alone	runs	
into	a	politics	of	austerity:	change	seems	only	possible	with	sufficient	resources.	
Forms	with	their	attendant	logics	allow	for	thinking	through	stabilisation	of	
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lives,	without	encapsulating	agents	in	proposals	for	orders	that	hide	the	violence	
at	their	borders.	A	willingness	to	question	forms,	but	not	defying	the	emergence	
of	logics,	attends	to	the	various	modalities	of	change,	and	suggests	telos	as	
inevitable,	but	undirected.	Logic	emerges	over	time,	and	cannot	be	discarded	
easily	in	a	whim.	Generosity	is	needed	to	overcome	burdens	of	stasis	of	forms,	
and	loss	functions	as	the	modus	by	which	this	is	possible.		
	
	
Applicability		
	
While	this	thesis	started	out	as	a	way	to	think	through	changes	of	trans	bodies,	
the	argument	broadened	to	allow	thinking	through	more	forms	of	life.	
Nonnormative	ethics	conceptualises	the	dynamics	of	formation	vis-à-vis	a	
dominating	order.	However,	it	does	not	suggest	a	revolutionary	overthrow	in	the	
classical	sense	of	the	word.	Nonnormative	ethics	perhaps	proposes	undermining	
monological	orders	in	the	spirit	of	Moten	and	Harney’s	Undercommons	(Harney	
and	Moten	2013),	and	especially	an	order	that	claims	to	encapsulate	‘all	of	us’.	
This	dynamic	ethics	forms	an	argument	against	the	politicisation	of	change,	as	
part	of	a	system	that	supports	and	legitimises	unequal	distribution.	This	
politicisation	would	then	immediately	suggest	a	capitalisation	of	change.	The	
argument	in	this	thesis	provokes	perhaps	the	idea	that	there	can	be	no	
incremental	change,	other	than	changing	our	bodies.	Systems	of	distribution	of	
labour	and	resources	force	bodies	in	directions	or	demand	accountability	to	
vectors	of	formation	that	can	be	given	up.	The	world	as	it	is	currently	ordered,	
has	been	formed	since	1492	and	it	can	be	changed	again.	In	its	current	form	the	
legalised	aggression	(Spade	2011),	legalised	maldistribution	(Cowen	2014),	and	
legalised	slow	death	(Raha	2017,	2015)	suggest	that	incremental	change	is	only	a	
breather	until	the	backlash	arrives.89	An	order	built	on	exploitation	cannot	
nurture	different	forms.		
	
																																																								
89	Only	by	changing	bodies	to	be	nonnormative	can	incremental	change	function	as	strategy	for	
radical	change.	Otherwise	such	change	will	function	to	accommodate	moderates.	By	drawing	the	
body	out	of	the	polis	the	need	to	pursue	change	is	evident.	
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This	thesis	then	proposes	a	strategy	to	grow	out	of	the	master	code,	to	form	new	
lives	that	do	not	endorse	exploitation	as	immediate	outcome	of	any	
organisational	process.	The	conceptualisation	of	agency	under	duress	as	
navigational	possibilities	suggest	a	way	out	of	totalising	articulations	of	
nonnormative	lives	to	find	emergent	possibilities.	Furthermore,	it	offers	these	
possibilities	and	potentialities	as	a	way	to	make	connection,	rather	than	as	
demand	to	create	new	worlds	that	are	‘autonomous’	in	their	own	right.	
Articulating	this	step	using	insights	of	Lugones,	I	have	argued	that	such	forms	of	
autonomy	are	not	only	unhelpful	and	excluding,	but	follow	majoritarian	logics.	In	
Wynter’s	terms,	this	would	mean	that	the	‘referent-we’,	those	that	we	accept	as	
kin90,	is	too	narrowly	and	inflexibly	circumscribed	(Wynter	2003;	McKittrick	
2015b).	Both	María	Lugones,	as	well	as	Sylvia	Wynter	allow	insight	in	the	
possibility	of	articulating	structures	of	bonding	across	differing	logics	and	out	of	
the	current	codified	structures.	However,	it	is	imperative	that	it	is	acknowledged	
that	this	bonding	away	from	the	current	master	codes	is	only	relevant	and	more	
than	self-indulgence	if	these	forms	are	a	way	to	destabilise	and	ultimately	break	
down	the	master	code.	If	not,	then	these	forms	are	a	variation	that	serve	
exploitation	in	a	differences	enabling	capitalism,	as	argued	by	Himani	Bannerji	
(Bannerji	2000).	
	
Codings,	gifts,	and	loss	allow	to	see	how	the	formation	of	new	forms	of	being	
together	do	not	need	to	be	based	on	purity.	The	gift	of	loss	of	truth,	as	generosity	
between	and	willingness	to	give	up	one’s	truth,	in	its	extreme	form,	strangers,	is	
a	gift	of	the	possibility	of	relation	(cf.	Hooker	2017).	The	gift	itself	then,	is	the	
belief	in	the	possibility	of	this	emergence	(Godelier	1999).	The	codes	of	relation	
that	come	out	do	not	need	to	be	stable,	but	can	evolve	with	the	passing	histories	
and	memories.		What	is	key	to	this	code	is	that	it	is	non-binding.	It	is	not	a	‘social	
contract’.	At	each	moment	any	body	can	walk	away,	break	the	bond.	This	matters	
as	the	code	needs	to	be	honoured	for	it	to	exist,	but	there	is	no	retaliation	for	
betrayal,	other	than	retraction.	To	lose	a	bond	is	to	face	loss	of	shared	truth.	This	
is	not	just	the	bond	that	is	lost,	but	also	the	loss	one	was	willing	to	face	before	the	
bond	emerged;	there	is	no	return	to	a	neutral,	but	only	a	lost	relationality	with	
																																																								
90	Kin	is	used	in	a	wide	sense.	
	 274	
its	shared	logic	structuring	practical	truth.	One	has	lost	part	of	one’s	logos	and	
with	it	the	naïve	belief	that	one’s	logos	could	have	been	whole	–	perhaps,	at	its	
extreme.	Just	like	multilogical	relationality	is	a	many-sided	unfolding,	loss	is	the	
fragmenting	of	logos,	shattering	truths	and	techne.	To	face	loss	when	bonding	is	
to	create	space	for	the	emergence	of	a	new	code,	a	temporal	stable	relation.	To	
face	the	loss	of	this	bond	is	to	have	the	emptiness	in	full.	This	is	not	a	loss	one	
cannot	get	over,	but	this	ethical	loss	is	destabilising.	Part	of	one’s	form	of	life	fell	
apart.	
	
In	nonnormative	ethics	it	is	the	rewording	and	remaking	of	the	‘referent-we’	
(McKittrick	2015b,	24)	that	is	at	stake.	Processes	of	loss	and	bonding	through	
emergent	codings	and	techne	create	some	hesitation	around	an	idea	of	
generation	or	expansion.	The	resultant	‘we’	of	overlapping	logics,	codings,	and	
demonic	bonds	might	always	be	limited	and	partial.	Partly,	this	is	a	given,	
because	the	structure	of	ethics	is	formed	around	the	life	world	of	the	agents.	
However,	codings,	incorporating	abstractions	of	technes,	can	traverse	these	life-
worlds	and	extend	‘we’	beyond	the	lived	realities	of	agents.	How	this	‘referent-
we’	finds	articulation	is	key	–	these	are	patterns	of	recognition,	kinship,	
exclusion,	and	encapsulation	(McKittrick	2015b,	24).	The	master	code	is	one	of	
bodily	phenomenology	creating	a	hierarchy	enabling	exploitation	and	
diminishing	social	agency.	In	contrast	nonnormative	codings,	as	I	have	argued	in	
my	thesis,	are	one	of	bonding	across	logics.	These	are	codings	of	non-imposition,	
making	space	for	different	traversals	of	space	opening	logical	being	to	
transubstantiate	and	change	form.	These	nonnormative	codings	create	the	
possibility	to	transverse	across	forms	of	life,	without	getting	entangled	in	specific	
principles	and	judgements,	as	the	diamond	form	of	the	polis	is	reduced	to.	
Traversal,	transversal,	and	transsubstantiation	are	suggested	by	Denise	Ferreira	
da	Silva	as	outcomes	of	the	project	of	undoing	universal	subjects,	demanding	
desires	to	be	met	(Da	Silva	2014,	92).	The	polis	keeps	its	variations	guarded	by	
hardening	the	principles	of	form,	and	solidifying	the	judgements	coming	out	of	
its	lives,	as	I	have	argued	in	chapter	three.	In	contrast	nonnormative	ethics	aims	
to	find	connection,	suspension	if	necessary,	between	different	principles	and	
judgements	by	opening	of	the	logos	and	logics	of	forms.	This	can	be	envisioned	as	
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an	opening	in	the	middle,	creating	space	for	change	of	form	and	thus	change	of	
principles	and	judgements.	This	rearticulation	of	Quine	(Quine	1951),	allows	
understanding	that	it	are	less	the	fringes	that	needs	attention,	but	a	willingness	
of	nonnormative	agents	to	open	up	their	core,	or	in	my	articulation	to	challenge	
their	logos,	rather	than	their	judgements.			
	
This	structure	of	ethics	leads	to	the	possibility	to	think	change	beyond	
neoliberalisms	key	phrases	‘it	gets	better’	and	‘inclusion’.91	One	application	is	the	
challenge	that	it	is	sufficient	to	change	laws	to	be	more	inclusive,	while	
exploitative	logics	remain	in	place.	This	neoliberal	‘multiculturalism’	is	criticised	
by	Himani	Bannerji,	as	an	inclusion	that	generates	exploitative	difference	
(Bannerji	2000).	One	is	reduced	to	the	image	that	is	‘included’	(Abbas	2010),	but	
not	allowed	to	change	the	form	in	order	to	make	different	lives	possible.	
Nonnormative	ethics	challenges	this	single	logic	of	difference	and	variation	in	the	
polis	by	proposing	tools	to	unearth	logics	beyond	the	‘identity’	differences	that	
have	been	generated	in	the	recognition	discourses	of	capitalist	multiculturalism.		
	
Because	my	argument	offers	no	single	solution	and	no	new	unity,	it	challenges	
the	monological	order.	The	suggestions	for	multilogical	connection	and	
nonnormative	ethics	can	only	be	applied	by	generating	space	for	retraction,	and	
non-imposition	as	a	way	to	create	the	space	for	emergence,	but	no	demand	for	
emergent	codings.	To	be	good	strangers	to	each	other	is	perhaps	the	minimal	
code,	and	suggests	a	respect	for	opacity	and	the	right	not	to	know	(Glissant	
1997).	In	the	polis	the	stranger	generates	mistrust,	either	because	they	are	
suggested	to	come	to	exploit92,	and	are	thus	following	the	colonial	logic	of	
empire,	or	because	they	come	to	manage,	and	are	in	the	monological	attitude	of	
ordering	and	subjecting,	which	can	be	called	gentrifying,	or,	lastly,	they	do	not	
follow	the	unspoken	rules	of	hierarchy	and	are	a	challenge	to	order.	The	first	of	
these	three,	and	it	is	by	no	means	an	exhaustive	list,	are	the	invasive	logics	of	
colonialism	and	empire	in	the	form	of	logos	and	logic,	often	backed	up	by	state	
																																																								
91	It	is	most	unfortunate	that	a	part	of	trans	politics	in	Europe	(including	the	UK)	is	aimed	at	
inclusion	and	necessitates	spelling	out	such	a	perhaps	‘trite’	aim.		
92	See	contemporary	papers,	but	also	Anna	Sampaio	(Sampaio	2015),	Jasbir	Puar	(Puar	2007),	A	
Sivanandan	(Sivanandan	1982)	
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force,	that	will	disrupt	the	‘referent-we’	of	the	web	of	relations	in	place	in	a	
certain	space.	The	last	one	is	the	stranger	challenging	undisputed	judgements	
and	principles	in	the	form	of	life,	and	bringing	them	to	light	in	a	new	way.	This	
can	be	done	from	a	monological	entitlement	or	from	nonnormative	‘foolery’.	The	
joking	appraisal	of	fossilised	forms	that	are	mono-directional	beneficial	for	
certain	agents.	Perhaps	it	allows	some	agents	to	invoke	rebellion	and	not	side	
with	the	going	order,	whether	this	is	done	in	whispers	or	in	shouts.	A	
nonnormative	ethics	allows	one	to	give	space	and	simultaneously	challenge,	a	
monological	ethics	only	sees	the	challenge	to	order	and	perhaps	the	adjustment	
of	order	to	incorporate	differences,	while	the	order	remains	functional.		
	
While	it	might	be	argued	that	agency	as	navigation	without	subjectivity	will	
make	for	easy	manipulation,	I	have	aimed	to	undercut	this	problem	in	the	thesis.	
Navigating	agents	might	find	themselves	in	an	environment	that	is	manipulated,	
and	claimed	in	heated,	or	orchestrated,	political	discussions	to	consist	of	issues,	
debates,	problems,	and	shortcomings.	An	agent	without	subjectivity,	it	can	be	
feared,	will	easily	get	lost	in	the	demands	of	the	environment.	In	the	articulation	
I	have	offered,	the	agent	does	not	know	itself	as	a	mode	of	subjectivity,	but	its	
knowledge	is	displaced	to	knowing	what	it	is	rejecting	in	the	environment	(cf.	
Muñoz	1997,	83).	This	does	not	instantly	lead	to	wantonness,	because	
knowledge	of	rejection	might	be	just	as	thorough	and	grounded	as	claims	to	
subjectivity.	At	the	same	time,	the	indeterminate	affirmation	allows	for	a	logos	of	
being	to	emerge	that	is	already	outside	of	the	bounds	of	the	manipulated	
environment.	Exactly	because	the	agent	is	not	tied	to	a	stable	subjectivity,	and	its	
way	of	being	in	the	world	can	be	know	if	it	would	be	that,	the	agent	is	more	
difficult	to	manipulate,	as	the	concerns	fall	out	of	the	reach	or	understanding	of	
the	controlled	parts	of	the	environment.	While	the	environment	might	be	toxic,	
the	agent	can	shift	its	engagements.				
	
The	nonnormatively	ensouled	body	will	come	with	a	logos	that	is	partly	outside	
of	its	understanding,	because	indeterminate	affirmation	means,	at	times,	that	one	
doesn’t	know	what	one	is	doing.	In	my	thesis	this	is	not	a	problem.	It	contrasts	
for	a	reading	of	trans	with	the	practices	of	gender	clinics	who	demand	to	have	a	
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clear	and	normative	explanation	about	one’s	body	and	being,	and	who	will	not	
leave	room	for	doubt	or	experiment.	This	demand	for	clarity	becomes	an	
extortion,	which	forces	agents	to	pretend	normativity,	and	puts	strain	on	the	
agent	to	present	in	a	way	that	is	deemed	comprehensible	by	disinterested	
observers.	It	demands	erasure	of	the	agent’s	being	and	simultaneously	insists	on	
a	portrayal	of	imagery	that	can	be	judged	according	to	norms	that	are	out	of	
reach	of	the	agent.	This	demanded	attempt	to	pass	is	presented	as	cure	for	an	
imagined	pathology	(Benjamin	1954).	The	pathology	can,	in	fact,	be	summarised	
as	lack	of	normativity.	The	process	of	the	agent	coming	with	its	own	navigation	
and	thus	formation	stays	out	of	sight,	which	is	possibly	the	intention	of	the	
clinicians.93	Clinicians	are	aware	that	trans	agents	cannot	be	who	they	want	to	
be,	because	they	tell	the	trans	agents,	thus	clinicians	will	judge	on	how	well	over	
a	period	of	time	trans	agents	pretend	to	be	what	they	want	them	to	pretend.	A	
logos	out	of	reach	might	thus	be	played	in	a	game	of	power	differences	
structuring	environments	and	demands	for	adaptation.	Logos	thus	comes	not	
only	with	being,	but	also	with	possible	scenarios	of	camouflage.94		
	
	
Coda	
	
A	logos	embedded	in	multilogical	environments,	navigating	around	technes	and	
codes	enables	the	articulation	of	nonnormative	ethics	both	contextually	as	well	
as	structurally.	It	is	contextual	as	the	multilogics	differ,	and	codes	take	on	specific	
formations,	however,	it	is	also	structural	as	the	conceptualisations	that	I	have	
argued	for	are	enabling	another	way	of	looking	at	formation,	meaning,	lack	of	
meaning,	and	possible	modes	of	being	and	their	emergence.	In	a	sense,	I	have	
argued	for	an	ethics	that	allows	looking	over	the	edge	of	the	known,	not	what	to	
what	can	be	found	there,	but	to	how	it	can	be	extended	without	exploitation.	
Possibly,	this	suggests	similitude	to	the	Ancient	Greek	vision	of	time	as	walking	
																																																								
93	This	is	irrespective	of	how	the	agent	identifies,	as	that	will	always	be	a	modulation	through	
logos	and	not	a	mimetic	alignment	with	spectral	diagnostic	criteria.	
94	Outside	the	bounds	of	this	thesis	W.E.B.	DuBois	has	articulated	a	similar	process	as	double	
consciousness	(Du	Bois	1903).	
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backwards	(Maul	2008):	one	can	see	what	has	happened,	but	cannot	see	what	
comes	in	the	future.	Navigation	moves	backwards,	which	is	why	the	means	
produce	the	ends,	as	I	have	argued	in	chapter	two.		
	
I	have	argued	that	making	limits	visible	is	not	sufficient,	as	this	will	only	
highlight	categorical	differences	that	seemingly	structure	those	limits.	The	
categorical	differences	are	mapped	onto	bodies,	which	will	function	as	short	
hand	for	projects	of	epistemic	hierarchies.	This	possibly	reinscribes	codes	along	
existing	lines,	but	articulated	in	different	patterns.	For	a	trans	reading	this	is	not	
sufficient,	because	a	trans	reading	needs	to	make	space	to	change	categories,	or	
change	categorically.	Trans	needs	to	dissolve	categorical	limits,	even	though	
these	might	return	rearticulated	after	‘transition’.	This	displacement	of	limits	
comes	with	a	suggestion	of	the	shift	of	logos	and	logics.	The	claim	that	I	have	
defended	in	this	thesis	is	thus	not	that	it	is	categorical	being,	but	categorising	
logics	that	are	the	issues	that	need	facing.	Spread	sheet	diversity,	as	already	
conceived	by	Himani	Bannerji	in	2000,	will	not	change	the	logic	at	work	in	
harnessing	difference	to	benefit	the	monological	order	of	exploitation.	While	it	is	
helpful	to	understand	limits	as	structuring	codes	and	enabling	powers	of	
exploitation,	it	is	also	helpful	to	see	that	logics	can	traverse	limits	and	
codifications	and	structure	operations	that	at	first	sight	seem	nonnormative.	It	is	
in	this	sensitising	to	operational	logics	that	ethics	can	emerge.	The	de-sensitised	
operation	of	the	monological	order,	and	it	can	only	exploit	because	it	is	
desensitised,	demands	with	its	violence	a	shutting	down	within	the	
environments	it	touches.	Nonnormative	ethics	is	structured	by	sensitivity	and	
using	dunamis	to	explore	engagement,	an	activity	that	is	structured	by	the	
willingness	to	accept	loss	and	extend	generosity.	And	it	is	in	this	shift	that	
exploitation	shifts	to	something	resembling	the	possibility	of	another	form	of	life.	
This	can	dissolve	the	master	code	and	turn	it	to	a	coda.	The	structure	of	the	
world	as	we	know	it	can	end,	and	something	non-exploitative	can	emerge	in	its	
place.		
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